
ARTEX is an open-source, LLM-driven penetration testing framework, published on GitHub on July 26, 2026, that attackers now use to automate intrusions from reconnaissance through data exfiltration. The FBI described ARTEX in FLASH-20261113-001 on November 13, 2026, and reported that some intrusions moved from initial targeting to privileged access in under three hours.
This reference, current as of November 2026, covers what ARTEX (also written ARTEX AI or Artex) is, who uses the framework, the backdoored tomicdd/artex Docker image, the indicators to hunt for, and a first-hour runbook. One section answers the question of the week: which recent incidents are linked to ARTEX, and which are not. Security teams running ARTEX for authorized testing get their own section: the tool became a supply chain target the day its author took the repository down.
ARTEX at a glance
ARTEX is an attack tool, not a vulnerability, so no CVE exists and no patch applies.
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Name | ARTEX (ARTEX AI, Artex; commercial edition ARTEX PRO) |
| Type | Open-source, multi-agent AI penetration testing framework |
| Author and license | Autumn-27 on GitHub, AGPL-3.0 |
| First published | July 26, 2026 |
| Taken closed-source | October 8, 2026, 10:50 UTC, after reported abuse |
| Stack | Go server, Next.js console, PostgreSQL, usually run in Docker |
| Default console port | 8787 |
| CVE | None. ARTEX is a dual-use tool |
| Exposed consoles | More than 1,600 as of early November 2026, per the FBI |
| FBI alert | FLASH-20261113-001, November 13, 2026 |
| Backdoored images | tomicdd/artex, congdonglinux/artex (removed from Docker Hub November 5, 2026) |
ARTEX hands a penetration test to a team of AI agents
ARTEX takes a goal in natural language and has LLM agents plan, execute, and record the test with real tools. A person sets the objective and steers. The agents do the work.
The last open-source release, version 0.3.15, works like this:
- One program, one console. A Go server, a Next.js web console, and a PostgreSQL database run together, usually in Docker. The supplied Compose file publishes port
8787on every interface, so on a rented server the console faces the internet at startup. - Planner and workers. One agent turns the operator's goal into objectives and scope. A planner breaks objectives into steps. Worker agents, three per task by default, run tools such as
nmap, a shell, and an HTTP client, then write back results. A retest agent checks findings a second time. - Bring your own model. ARTEX ships no model. Operators connect Anthropic, OpenAI, or any compatible API. CrowdStrike and the FBI report attacker deployments running mostly on DeepSeek models.
- Soft limits only. The original blocks
.govand.edutargets and holds risky actions for approval. CERT-EU found no hard technical enforcement of scope, and at least one fork advertises removal of the blocklist.
Most ARTEX techniques are old: scanning, password spraying, exploits for known web flaws such as SQL injection, SSRF, and anonymous file upload. The agents add speed and persistence. Microsoft watched one agent send a malformed request to Azure, read the error, and send a corrected request about 28 seconds later.
ARTEX use spread from one criminal ring to state-aligned groups in three months
No single group owns ARTEX. The FBI says a variety of actors have used the framework since at least August 2026, and published reporting names at least six. Barracuda added a confirmed victim report on November 16.
| Actor | Reported by | What happened |
|---|---|---|
| Storm-0940 (China state-aligned) | Microsoft, Wiz | Used ARTEX against hundreds of organizations. Stole the credentials of the ConnectWise Cloud Backup application, then attempted sign-ins to more than 2,250 customer tenants. Some intrusions reached privileged cloud access in under three hours. |
| VAPOR PANDA (China-linked) | CrowdStrike | More than 200 organizations in 14 countries in 11 days, mostly government and defense. |
| Chinese-speaking actor, South Korean finance | CrowdStrike, Censys | Compromised at least nine organizations, including major banks, in late September and early October. Agents deployed web shells and stole credentials. The operator left ARTEX settings and AI session logs in an open directory. |
| Storm-3358 (Cambodia-based, criminal) | Microsoft | Financial firms in Southeast Asia since October. Agents exploited anonymous file upload and SSRF flaws, then installed remote access tools. |
| Crafty Falcon (criminal) | CERT-In advisory CIAD-2026-0058 | Indian lenders, fintechs, and crypto exchanges. Enters through test and staging systems, then reuses credentials shared with production. |
| South Korean criminal ring | Seoul Metropolitan Police | More than 90 organizations and 8.2 million records. Leader arrested October 15. |
What the agents have exploited
ARTEX ships no exploits of its own. The agents use whatever weakness an internet-facing system exposes, and the reporting so far names classes more often than CVEs.
- Web flaw classes. SentinelOne lists IDOR, command injection, and server-side template injection, next to hardcoded administrator passwords and unauthenticated APIs. Check Point documented command injection and template injection used for remote code execution against iOS signing services, without naming products or CVEs.
- CVE-2022-2588 and CVE-2025-5054. Operator infrastructure held exploit builds with these Linux kernel CVEs in the file names, per SentinelOne. That shows the builds were present. No report confirms the agents ran them.
- CVE-2026-75650. AhnLab found a working copy of the public StyleSmuggler exploit for this Magento flaw inside REAPER, a customized ARTEX distribution.
The fastest path in is a credential, not an exploit
ARTEX intrusions lean on exposed credentials more than on software flaws. Microsoft observed an agent move from a GitHub search for a target's secrets to data theft from Azure Key Vault in five minutes. Unit 42 saw campaigns reach cloud access through password reset pages and exposed APIs without exploiting a single vulnerability. GitGuardian found no secret-hunting feature in the ARTEX code: the model decided to search code and git history for credentials unprompted, and found eight of nine planted secrets in lab runs.
No public evidence links ARTEX to the Optimizely attack or the US outages
As of November 17, 2026, no public reporting ties ARTEX to the Optimizely attack or to the outages at JPMorgan Chase, United Airlines, and the NSA. The FBI alert is dated November 13 and landed in the same news cycle, which is why the stories keep getting joined.
| Incident | What is reported | ARTEX link |
|---|---|---|
| Barracuda cloud breach (November 1 to 2) | An attacker used a cloud access key issued to a third-party vendor and never retired, and reached about 10 cloud accounts over 44 hours. | Confirmed by Barracuda's investigation |
| Optimizely, also called OPTIMJACK (November 16) | An attacker exploited a flaw in Optimizely Web Experimentation and injected JavaScript served to visitors of at least 178 organizations, per Unit 42. | None reported |
| JPMorgan Chase outage (November 16) | The bank attributed the outage to a software problem in its own systems, per CoinDesk. | None reported |
| United Airlines outage (November 16) | United said it found no indication of a cybersecurity incident. | None reported |
| NSA network disruption (November 17) | The NSA described temporary degradation during scheduled routine maintenance. | None reported |
Officials have not linked any of the outages to ARTEX, to one another, or to a cyberattack. ARTEX has been used against banks, in South Korea, Southeast Asia, and India. Those cases are separate from the US outage.
The Barracuda case is the pattern to learn from: a vendor key outlived the project, and an agent found the gap.
The tomicdd/artex Docker image gave anyone a root shell before login
A backdoored ARTEX image on Docker Hub, tomicdd/artex, runs any command sent in the login form as root, before the password is checked. BadByte published the analysis on November 4, 2026, and Docker removed the image and an identical copy, congdonglinux/artex, on November 5.
The sequence took under ten hours on October 8, 2026 (all times UTC):
- 10:50. The author announces ARTEX is going closed-source and removes the repository.
- 18:50. A new Docker Hub account,
tomicdd, is created. The account pushestomicdd/artex:latestat 19:41. - 20:33. A GitHub copy,
trhhubsd/ARTEX, changes one line ofdocker-compose.ymlin commita4f4d38:image: autumn27/artexbecomesimage: tomicdd/artex. The README presents the copy as the maintained successor. - October 12 to 13. The repository gains 1,098 stars in 48 hours. About 1,100 stars later disappear.
The root cause is a trust gap between source and artifact. The repository source matched upstream, so a code review found nothing. The backdoor lived only in the prebuilt binary at /app/artex: a 160-byte function, server.verifyCaptcha, that passes a captcha field from POST /api/auth/login to sh -c and returns the output. The implant never calls out. From the network, the trigger looks like a failed login.
| Measure | Value | Source |
|---|---|---|
| Pulls before disclosure (by November 3) | 7,946 (tomicdd/artex 7,913, congdonglinux/artex 33) | BadByte |
Final pulls of tomicdd/artex | 9,131 | BadByte |
| Internet-facing consoles serving the backdoored build | 62 (November 2 to 4) | BadByte |
| GitHub repositories still pointing at the image | 637 | BadByte |
| Live ARTEX consoles of any build | 1,645 (November 4) | BadByte |
One shell in the container reaches everything ARTEX stores in plaintext: LLM provider keys in ANTHROPIC_API_KEY and OPENAI_API_KEY, the database password in ARTEX_PG_DSN, the session signing key at /app/jwt.key, credentials harvested from engagement targets, and unpatched findings. Updating does not remove the backdoor. The working update path, update.sh, runs docker compose pull against the same image.
Public reporting does not attribute the image to Crafty Falcon. CERT-In names ARTEX among that group's tooling, and the two stories broke the same day, but no source links the operator.
Indicators of Compromise (IOCs) and behavioral signals
Hunt in three places: traffic against your applications, your identity logs, and any ARTEX install your own team runs. ARTEX infrastructure changes fast, so treat IP lists in the primary reports as a starting point, and note that authorized testers also run ARTEX.
Backdoored image and binary
| Type | Indicator |
|---|---|
| Docker image | tomicdd/artex:latest |
| Docker image | congdonglinux/artex:latest |
| Manifest digest (linux/amd64) | sha256:cb85a7206290dc1813e3203e044741054b26c7a7c557c7d9d6d91af20aeb232b |
SHA-256 of /app/artex | d5070f52262effe216b840711343bff8f2787f39208d887d8dfd9c673f8d1573 |
| UI build ID served on every page | 3aC1db3gGU08O4UHbAt4J |
| Symbol in binary | github.com/Autumn-27/artex/server.verifyCaptcha |
| Module version string | v0.3.16-0.20261008134550-5c0dbd4bec94+dirty |
| Request pattern | POST /api/auth/login with a captcha key in the JSON body |
| Host signal | sh -c spawned by /app/artex |
ARTEX activity against your systems
| Type | Indicator | Source |
|---|---|---|
| HTTP user agents | artex-enrich/1.0, norma/0.4, Mozilla/5.0 (compatible; ArtEx/1.0) | WorkOS, Wiz |
| Request rhythm | Bursts of 1 to 14 requests about a second apart, then a 25 to 31 second pause | Unit 42 |
| Test inputs | evil[.]com, test@example[.]com | Unit 42 |
| Entra ID sign-in errors | AADSTS7000215 (wrong client secret), AADSTS7000222 (expired client secret) | Microsoft |
| Console fingerprint | Port 8787, page title starting ARTEX | Censys, SOCRadar |
| Internal signal | AI model API traffic from servers with no business reason to send any | CERT-In |
A failed application sign-in followed by a success from the same source is the urgent case. Either Entra error means someone holds a credential for your application.
Immediate response: the first-hour runbook
Start with your own ARTEX installs, then credentials, then logs. An install of the backdoored image is a confirmed compromise. Everything else is a hunt.
- Find every ARTEX install. Run
docker compose config | grep -nE 'image: *(tomicdd|congdonglinux)/artex'anddocker image inspect --format '{{json .RepoDigests}}' tomicdd/artex congdonglinux/artexon any host where a security or research team tests tooling. - Verify the binary. Run
docker exec <container> sha256sum /app/artexand compare against the hash in the IOC table. Check your own console for the build ID withcurl -s http://127.0.0.1:8787/ | grep -c 3aC1db3gGU08O4UHbAt4J. - Isolate and rebuild any host that ran either image. Removal from Docker Hub does not clean existing installs or mirror caches. Data in
./data,./skills, and the database volume survives a re-pull, so rebuild from a trusted source. - Rotate everything the console held. LLM provider keys, the database password, the JWT signing key, MCP server tokens, notification webhooks, and every credential harvested from engagement targets. Tell the owners of those targets.
- Search web, proxy, and API gateway logs for the user agents
artex-enrich/1.0andnorma/0.4, and for the burst-then-pause request rhythm. - Review application sign-ins in Entra ID. Look for
AADSTS7000215andAADSTS7000222, and for one IP address signing in as several applications. - Scan repositories for secrets, including full git history, and rotate every hit. Microsoft's guidance is direct: removing the original disclosure does not remediate the exposure.
- Report confirmed ARTEX activity to the FBI or IC3, as the FLASH requests.
A scanner shows what is present. Runtime shows what executed.
Every static check passed in the tomicdd/artex case, and the only evidence of the backdoor was a process spawning a shell from a login handler. The same gap decides how an ARTEX intrusion goes on the defender's side: agents test every exposed path at machine speed, so the question that matters is which weakness is real in production, not how many findings exist.
Kodem's layers map to the specific failures in this story:
- Exposed secrets. Kodem secret scanning finds exposed secrets in code and git history, with policies that can block a merge. Git history is where ARTEX agents found credentials in GitGuardian's lab runs.
- Container images. Kodem scans Docker and OCI images in the registry and at runtime, detects malware in scanned images, and separates third-party vendor images from customer-built ones as part of securing the SDLC. A backdoor made of one small function with no network indicators is a hard target for any image scanner, which is why the next layer matters.
- Runtime truth. Runtime intelligence shows which packages a running process has loaded and which vulnerable functions are invoked. The fix queue starts with code that executes.
- Exploitation in the running application. ARTEX agents exploit web flaws such as SQL injection, SSRF, and file upload. Kodem Application Detection and Response (ADR) detects exploit behavior at the moment of initiation, using behavioral baselines and call-stack context instead of signatures. Call-stack context separates a process spawn the application intends from one reached through an injection path.
Two boundaries, stated plainly. Kodem is not an autonomous pentest tool and does not do what ARTEX does. ARTEX explores broadly to discover. Kodem investigates one specific risk, validates whether that risk is exploitable in your application, and verifies that the response removed the risk, for supported risk classes. Kodem also works at the application layer and does not replace identity controls, WAF, or EDR. Credential abuse against Entra ID belongs with those controls.
Hardening against the next agentic framework
Remove the easy credentials and keep agent tooling off the internet. Blocking one tool's features will not help, since about 45 similar open-source frameworks exist, per GitGuardian.
- Replace long-lived cloud keys in CI with short-lived OIDC tokens. Set an expiry on every personal access token and prefer fine-grained tokens.
- Move Entra ID applications from client secrets to managed identities or certificates where possible.
- Share no credentials, tokens, or API keys between test and production. This is CERT-In's first recommendation on Crafty Falcon.
- Retire vendor keys when the project ends. The Barracuda breach ran on a key issued to a vendor for work that had finished.
- Pin container images by digest from a source you verified. A pin protects only if the pinned version was safe. Build security tooling from source you have read.
- Keep agent consoles off the internet. Bind port
8787to localhost and reach the console over a VPN or SSH tunnel. - Enforce agent scope with network controls, not only the tool's own settings. The WorkOS incident began when a researcher's agent left its test environment.
- Alert on AI model API traffic from servers with no development purpose.
ARTEX is the first widely abused framework of its kind, not the last
Seeing ARTEX in an intrusion no longer tells a defender who is behind the activity or what they want. The tool is a commodity, the techniques are familiar, and the difference is tempo.
- The takedown did not contain the tool. Forks, localized versions, and ARTEX PRO remain available, per the FBI.
- Offensive tooling is now a supply chain target. A console holds its targets' credentials, findings, and network position, which makes the operator worth compromising.
- Speed moves the advantage to whoever has context. A team that knows which weaknesses are real in production can close them in the hours an agent needs to find them.
One prediction to check later: at least one more trojanized distribution of an agentic offensive framework will be reported before mid-2027.
Frequently Asked Questions
ARTEX is an open-source, multi-agent AI penetration testing framework written in Go and published on GitHub on July 26, 2026. LLM agents plan a test, run real tools, and record findings with little human input. Reporting also calls the tool ARTEX AI or Artex.
No. ARTEX is a dual-use offensive security framework built for authorized testing. Attackers adopted the same tool, which is why the FBI issued FLASH-20261113-001.
No CVE exists and no patch applies, since ARTEX is an attack tool and not a vulnerability. The defense is to close what the agents look for: exposed credentials, internet-facing internal tools, and unpatched web flaws.
Published reporting names Storm-0940, VAPOR PANDA, Storm-3358, Crafty Falcon, a South Korean criminal ring, and a Chinese-speaking actor targeting South Korean finance. The FBI dates malicious use to at least August 2026.
No public reporting links ARTEX to the Optimizely attack of November 16, 2026, or to the outages at JPMorgan Chase, United Airlines, and the NSA. Officials have not tied any of the outages to ARTEX or to a cyberattack. Barracuda is the recent incident with a confirmed ARTEX link.
The ARTEX source was not. Two prebuilt Docker Hub images were: tomicdd/artex and congdonglinux/artex. Both ran commands from the login form as root before authentication, and Docker removed both on November 5, 2026.
Check Compose files and image digests for tomicdd/artex or congdonglinux/artex, then compare the SHA-256 of /app/artex against d5070f52262effe216b840711343bff8f2787f39208d887d8dfd9c673f8d1573. A match means the host is compromised. Rebuild and rotate every stored credential.
Search logs for the user agents artex-enrich/1.0 and norma/0.4, bursts of requests followed by 25 to 31 second pauses, and Entra ID errors AADSTS7000215 and AADSTS7000222. Treat each match as a lead, since authorized testers also run ARTEX.
Yes. The author closed the source on October 8, 2026, but the FBI says ARTEX remains available through forks, archived copies, localized versions, and a commercial edition called ARTEX PRO.
The bottom line
ARTEX did not invent a technique. ARTEX removed the time defenders used to have. The response is not another scanner producing more findings. The response is knowing, with runtime evidence, which weaknesses are real, and closing those first.
References
- FBI, FLASH-20261113-001: Threat Overview of ARTEX Autonomous Penetration Testing Framework, November 13, 2026
- Microsoft Threat Intelligence, Storm-0940 uses ARTEX agentic AI in ConnectWise supply chain compromise, October 21, 2026
- BadByte, ARTEX Backdoor: 7,946 Pulls of a Trojanized Docker Image Handing Out Root Shells, November 4, 2026
- CERT-EU, From Penetration Testing to Cyber Threat: Beware of ARTEX
- StepSecurity, ARTEX: Attackers Adopted This AI Pentesting Tool in Three Months, November 12, 2026
- BleepingComputer, Barracuda links cloud breach to ARTEX AI-powered cyberattack, November 16, 2026
- Unit 42, Borrowed Code, Real Consequences: What OPTIMJACK Teaches Us, November 2026
- Kodem, Application Detection and Response (ADR)
- Kodem, Runtime Intelligence
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