Summary
Langflow: SSRF in URL-taking components (protection disabled by default / warn-only, not applied to RSS, SearXNG, Web Search, Home Assistant, Glean, Docling)
Before Langflow 1.10.3, several built-in components sent server-side HTTP requests to URLs the flow author controls, with no SSRF enforcement. An authenticated user who can build or run flows could make the Langflow server reach loopback, RFC 1918 / private networks, link-local addresses and cloud metadata endpoints (for example http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/), and in many cases read the response back through the component output.
Two things combined to cause this:
- Protection disabled / warn-only. The SSRF guard (
lfx/utils/ssrf_protection.py, added in 1.7.0 by #10544) shipped withssrf_protection_enabled = False, and its only caller, the API Request component, calledvalidate_url_for_ssrf(url, warn_only=True). So even with protection turned on, blocked URLs were only logged. - Inconsistent coverage. Other components that take a user-supplied URL or base URL did not call the guard at all: RSS Reader, SearXNG, Web Search (fetching result / RSS URLs), Home Assistant, Glean Search and Docling Serve (remote).
The problem was fixed across several PRs and is fully fixed in Langflow 1.10.3 (and 1.11.0+). With the default settings, outbound requests from these components are now validated after DNS resolution, pinned to the validated IP (to prevent DNS rebinding) and blocked when they target private, loopback, link-local or metadata addresses, unless the operator allowlists the host.
Affected versions
| Package (PyPI) | Vulnerable | Patched |
|---|---|---|
langflow |
< 1.10.3 |
1.10.3 |
langflow-base |
< 0.10.3 |
0.10.3 |
lfx |
< 1.10.3 |
1.10.3 |
lfx-docling (Docling Serve component) |
< 0.1.2 |
0.1.2 |
How the fix rolled out:
| Release | Change |
|---|---|
< 1.7.0 |
No SSRF guard. All URL-taking components make unrestricted requests. |
1.7.0, 1.9.2 |
Guard exists, but ssrf_protection_enabled=False by default and API Request uses warn_only=True. |
1.9.3 |
#13016: protection on by default, API Request blocks (DNS pinning / anti-rebinding). Other components still unprotected. |
1.10.1 |
#13395 (RSS Reader, SearXNG) and #13643 (Home Assistant, Glean, plus model-provider URL components) route requests through SSRF-safe helpers. |
1.10.3 |
#14033 (Docling Serve) and #14071 (Web Search result/RSS fetching). All components cited in this report are protected. |
Details
Vulnerable pattern (for example rss.py before #13395):
response = requests.get(self.rss_url, timeout=self.timeout)
API Request before #13016:
# TODO: In next major version (2.0), remove warn_only=True to enforce blocking
validate_url_for_ssrf(url, warn_only=True)
with ssrf_protection_enabled: bool = False in the settings.
Clarifications on the original report. Some sinks in the report are not exploitable SSRF:
web_search.py: the DuckDuckGo search request and the Google News RSS request, andnews_search.py:131. The host is hard-coded (html.duckduckgo.com/news.google.com) and user input only goes intoquote_plus-encoded path and query segments, so the destination cannot be redirected. The real Web Search sink was fetching the result URLs, which is fixed in #14071.langflow/load/utils.pyget_flow(): this is a client-side SDK helper (from langflow.load import get_flow) that the caller runs against their own Langflow URL. No API route calls it, so it is not a backend SSRF endpoint.
PoC (vulnerable versions)
- Log in as any user who can create flows.
- Add an RSS Reader (or SearXNG / Home Assistant / Glean / Docling Serve) component and set its URL to
http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/(or an internal host such ashttp://10.0.0.1/). - Run the component. The Langflow server issues the request, and the response or error is shown in the component output.
On patched versions the same run fails with SSRFProtectionError: Access to IP address 169.254.169.254 is blocked by SSRF protection.
Remediation
- Upgrade to
langflow >= 1.10.3(orlangflow-base >= 0.10.3/lfx >= 1.10.3/lfx-docling >= 0.1.2). - Do not set
LANGFLOW_SSRF_PROTECTION_ENABLED=false. If you need to reach internal hosts on purpose, allowlist only those hosts withLANGFLOW_SSRF_ALLOWED_HOSTS. - On versions that cannot be upgraded right away, restrict outbound network access from the Langflow host (for example, block
169.254.169.254and use IMDSv2 on AWS).
Impact
- Access to cloud instance metadata (IAM credentials / tokens) on AWS, GCP and Azure deployments.
- Probing and interaction with internal services and private networks reachable from the Langflow host.
- Requires an authenticated account with permission to build or run flows. Deployments where every user is already fully trusted are less affected.
Untrusted input controls the target URL of a server-initiated request, which may reach internal services not otherwise accessible from outside. Typical impact: access to internal metadata services, internal APIs, or cloud credentials.
Affected versions
Security releases
Kodem intelligence
Severity tells you how bad this could be in the worst case. It does not tell you whether you are exposed. Exploitability and impact are functions of runtime truth: whether the vulnerable code is present, reachable, and actually executes in your application. A vulnerable package can sit in your dependency tree and never run.
Kodem, an Intelligent Application Security platform, uses runtime intelligence to reveal which vulnerabilities actually execute in production, so teams prioritize the ones that genuinely matter. Kodem's runtime-powered SCA identifies whether this CVE is reachable in your applications.
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#13016: sets
ssrf_protection_enabled = Trueby default, changeswarn_onlyto defaultFalse, dropswarn_only=Truefrom API Request, and addsvalidate_and_resolve_url()plusSSRFProtectedTransport(DNS pinning).- ssrf_protection_enabled: bool = False + ssrf_protection_enabled: bool = True#13395: adds
lfx.utils.ssrf_requests.ssrf_safe_get(per-hop validation and pinning forrequests) and uses it in RSS Reader and SearXNG.- response = requests.get(self.rss_url, timeout=self.timeout) + response = ssrf_safe_get(self.rss_url, timeout=self.timeout)#13643: adds
lfx.utils.ssrf_httpx(ssrf_safe_httpx_get/post, protected client kwargs) and applies it to Home Assistant, Glean and the model-provider base-URL components.#14033: Docling Serve builds its
httpx.Clientwithssrf_protected_httpx_client_kwargs_for_url(base_url).#14071 (release-1.10.3) / #14073 (forward-port to 1.11.0): Web Search validates and pins each result URL before fetching it, with redirects disabled.
Note: connector-style components (for example Home Assistant, Ollama, LM Studio) keep a documented loopback exemption (#14146), so a self-hosted user can reach a local service on localhost. Private-network and metadata addresses stay blocked. Operators can tighten or relax this with LANGFLOW_SSRF_ALLOWED_HOSTS and LANGFLOW_CONNECTOR_SSRF_VALIDATION_ENABLED.
Frequently Asked Questions
- What is GHSA-J8F7-X8JM-WMM4? GHSA-J8F7-X8JM-WMM4 is a medium-severity server-side request forgery (SSRF) vulnerability in langflow (pip), affecting versions < 1.10.3. It is fixed in 1.10.3, 0.10.3, 0.1.2. Untrusted input controls the target URL of a server-initiated request, which may reach internal services not otherwise accessible from outside.
- Which packages are affected by GHSA-J8F7-X8JM-WMM4?
langflow(pip) (versions < 1.10.3)langflow-base(pip) (versions < 0.10.3)lfx(pip) (versions < 1.10.3)lfx-docling(pip) (versions < 0.1.2)
- Is there a fix for GHSA-J8F7-X8JM-WMM4? Yes. GHSA-J8F7-X8JM-WMM4 is fixed in 1.10.3, 0.10.3, 0.1.2. Upgrade to this version or later.
- Is GHSA-J8F7-X8JM-WMM4 exploitable, and should I be worried? Whether GHSA-J8F7-X8JM-WMM4 is exploitable in your environment depends on whether the vulnerable code is present and reachable. A CVSS score is a worst-case rating; it does not account for your specific deployment, configuration, or usage patterns. Kodem, an Intelligent Application Security platform, uses runtime intelligence to show which vulnerabilities actually execute in production, so you can focus on the ones that represent real risk. Get a demo
- What actually determines whether GHSA-J8F7-X8JM-WMM4 is exploitable, and how bad it is? Exploitability and impact are not fixed properties of a CVE. They depend on runtime truth: whether the vulnerable code is present, reachable, and actually executes in your application. A high CVSS score on a dependency that never runs is not the same as real risk. Kodem, an Intelligent Application Security platform, uses runtime intelligence to reveal which vulnerabilities actually execute in production, so teams prioritize the ones that genuinely matter.
- How do I fix GHSA-J8F7-X8JM-WMM4?
- Upgrade
langflowto 1.10.3 or later - Upgrade
langflow-baseto 0.10.3 or later - Upgrade
lfxto 1.10.3 or later - Upgrade
lfx-doclingto 0.1.2 or later
- Upgrade