Summary
Predictable secret ID and lack of secret origin API enable confused deputy attacks on Juju workloads.
Details
A Juju application can create a secret and grant it to another integrated application (grantee).
When they do so, the secret owner has to communicate the secret id to the grantee.
The grantee, having received the secret id can load the secret content and perform operations on behalf of the secret owner.
However, today the grantee has no way to determine which granted secret belongs to which owner.
Instead the grantee relies on:
- being able to read the secret by id (secret was in fact granted, by some entity)
- secret id was received over a relation (the remote end of the relation is presumed to be secret owner)
Additionally, secret IDs are XID, which are predictable, here two secrets created by two distinct apps in the same K8s model close in time:
d34vsl7mp25c76301hs0
time (UTC): 2025-09-17 00:18:28 (Unix 1758068308)
machine: f6c88a
pid: 50072
counter: 6294648
d34vslfmp25c76301hsg
time (UTC): 2025-09-17 00:18:29 (Unix 1758068309)
machine: f6c88a
pid: 50072
counter: 6294649
PoC
This allows for an IDOR attack where:
- actors:
- a Good application (the owner of the Victim),
- an Evil application, and
- a Provider application (the Confused Deputy)
- relations: Good --- Provider, Evil --- Provider
- secrets: Good and Evil create Secrets, granting them to the Provider and communicate Secret IDs with the Provider.
- semantics: the Provider performs some operation on behalf of the Good/Evil using the Secret.
- weakness 1: Evil can guess the Secret ID that Good granted and communicated to Provider.
- weakness 2: Juju doesn't provide the Provider application the facility to verify the provenance of the Secret IDs.
- exploit: Evil passes Good's secret id to Provider.
- bypass: Provider performs evil operation with Good's Secret ID on behalf of Evil.
Evil could benefit by:
- exfiltrating Good's Secret via reflection.
- reading or mutating Good's resources accessible via *Good's Secret.
Suggested remediation
1. Longer, random secret IDs
For example, if the secret id was extended with a 128-bit nonce, guessing a sibling secret ID would be infeasible, and an attack of this style would require another weakness (e.g. secret IDs exposed in logs)
2. Grantee secret API
Today, an app is not allowed to call secret-info-get on the granted secret.
Additionally, granted secrets are not included in the secret-ids output.
Suppose that the Provider could run these hook tools:
(provider/0)> secret-ids
my-own-secret-123
(provider/0)> secret-ids --grants
good-secret-id-42
evil-secret-id-43
(provider/0)> secret-info-get good-secret-id-42
good-secret-id-42:
revision: 1
label: ""
owner: good
grant-relation-id: 12
rotation: never
The Provider would then able to validate the secret ID it's about to use against:
- the relation in which the secret ID has been passed (good relation 12 or evil relation 14)
- the application or unit name of the secret owner (good or evil)
Impact
This requires a complex setup.
Not all shared secrets are used like above, so an actual exploit requires a very specific relation interface, specific semantics of the data in the databag, and an administrator having a reasonable need to deploy two apps (one evil, one good) related to the same (third) provider app.
If exploited, it can be very hard to determine what went wrong after the fact.
CVE-2026-32694 has a CVSS score of 6.6 (Medium). The vector is network-reachable, high privileges required, and no user interaction. A CVSS score reflects the worst-case severity of the vulnerability, not your specific exposure. Whether this affects your application depends on whether the vulnerable code is present and reachable in your environment. A fixed version is available (0.0.0-20260319091847-d06919eb03ec); upgrading removes the vulnerable code path.
Affected versions
Security releases
Kodem intelligence
Severity tells you how bad this could be in the worst case. It does not tell you whether you are exposed. Exploitability and impact are functions of runtime truth: whether the vulnerable code is present, reachable, and actually executes in your application. A vulnerable package can sit in your dependency tree and never run.
Kodem, an Intelligent Application Security platform, uses runtime intelligence to reveal which vulnerabilities actually execute in production, so teams prioritize the ones that genuinely matter. Kodem's runtime-powered SCA identifies whether this CVE is reachable in your applications.
Remediation advice
Kodem Kai can prioritize this vulnerability in your dependency tree and generate a fix recommendation.
Frequently Asked Questions
- What is CVE-2026-32694? CVE-2026-32694 is a medium-severity security vulnerability in github.com/juju/juju (go), affecting versions >= 0.0.0-20221021155847-35c560704ee2, < 0.0.0-20260319091847-d06919eb03ec. It is fixed in 0.0.0-20260319091847-d06919eb03ec.
- How severe is CVE-2026-32694? CVE-2026-32694 has a CVSS score of 6.6 (Medium). This score reflects the worst-case severity of the vulnerability, not your specific exposure. Whether it represents real risk in your environment depends on whether the vulnerable code is present and reachable.
- Which versions of github.com/juju/juju are affected by CVE-2026-32694? github.com/juju/juju (go) versions >= 0.0.0-20221021155847-35c560704ee2, < 0.0.0-20260319091847-d06919eb03ec is affected.
- Is there a fix for CVE-2026-32694? Yes. CVE-2026-32694 is fixed in 0.0.0-20260319091847-d06919eb03ec. Upgrade to this version or later.
- Is CVE-2026-32694 exploitable, and should I be worried? Whether CVE-2026-32694 is exploitable in your environment depends on whether the vulnerable code is present and reachable. A CVSS score is a worst-case rating; it does not account for your specific deployment, configuration, or usage patterns. Kodem, an Intelligent Application Security platform, uses runtime intelligence to show which vulnerabilities actually execute in production, so you can focus on the ones that represent real risk. Get a demo
- What actually determines whether CVE-2026-32694 is exploitable, and how bad it is? Exploitability and impact are not fixed properties of a CVE. They depend on runtime truth: whether the vulnerable code is present, reachable, and actually executes in your application. A high CVSS score on a dependency that never runs is not the same as real risk. Kodem, an Intelligent Application Security platform, uses runtime intelligence to reveal which vulnerabilities actually execute in production, so teams prioritize the ones that genuinely matter.
- How do I fix CVE-2026-32694? Upgrade
github.com/juju/jujuto 0.0.0-20260319091847-d06919eb03ec or later.