CVE-2026-34362

The verifyTokenSocket() function in plugin/YPTSocket/functions.php has its token timeout validation commented out, causing WebSocket tokens to never expire despite being generated with a 12-hour timeout. This allows captured or legitimately obtained tokens to provide permanent WebSocket access, even after user accounts are deleted, banned, or demoted from admin. Admin tokens grant access to real-time connection data for all online users including IP addresses, browser info, and page locations.

Details

WebSocket tokens are generated via getEncryptedInfo() which calls getToken(43200) to create a token with a 12-hour expiration window. The token is encrypted and contains security-critical claims: isAdmin, from_users_id, user_name, IP, browser, and device ID.

The regular HTTP token verification at objects/functions.php:3437-3439 enforces the timeout:

// objects/functions.php:3437-3439
if (!($time >= $obj->time && $time <= $obj->timeout)) {
    _error_log("verifyToken token timout...");
    return false;  // <-- enforced
}

But the WebSocket-specific verification at plugin/YPTSocket/functions.php:65-82 has the enforcement commented out:

// plugin/YPTSocket/functions.php:77-80
if (!($time >= $obj->time && $time <= $obj->timeout)) {
    //_error_log("verifyToken token timout...");
    //return false;  // <-- NOT enforced, always falls through to return true
}
return true;

Execution flow:

1. Client connects to WebSocket with ?webSocketToken=TOKEN in URL query
2. onOpen() (Message.php:34) calls getDecryptedInfo($wsocketGetVars['webSocketToken']) (line 48)
3. getDecryptedInfo() (functions.php:49) decrypts the token and calls verifyTokenSocket($json->token) (line 54)
4. verifyTokenSocket() validates the salt (passes) but the timeout check at line 77 evaluates the condition without acting on failure, return false is commented out
5. Function returns true, connection established with all token claims (isAdmin, from_users_id) trusted

Impact amplification via isAdmin:

When a connection has isAdmin=true (from token, Message.php:58), the getTotals() function (Message.php:419-432) includes detailed data about every connected client in periodic broadcast messages:

// Message.php:419-432
if ($isAdmin) {
    $index = md5($client['selfURI']);
    // Exposes: selfURI, yptDeviceId, users_id, user_name, browser, ip, location
    $return['users_uri'][$index][$client['yptDeviceId']][$client['users_id']] = $client;
}

Additionally, the webSocketToken message type (Message.php:212-217) allows anonymous connections (users_id=0) to upgrade their identity by providing a captured token, meaning stolen tokens work from new connections indefinitely.

The 10-minute inactivity timeout (Message.php:135-143) is not a mitigation, it only closes idle connections and resets on every message (line 243).

PoC

# Step 1: Obtain a WebSocket token as any authenticated user
curl -s -b 'PHPSESSID=VALID_SESSION' \
  'https://target.com/plugin/YPTSocket/getWebSocket.json.php' | jq -r '.webSocketToken'
# Save as TOKEN=<output>

# Step 2: Wait for the token to expire (>12 hours)
# In a real scenario, the attacker already has a previously captured token

# Step 3: Connect with the expired token, succeeds because verifyTokenSocket() skips timeout
wscat -c 'ws://target.com:8888/?webSocketToken=TOKEN'

# Step 4: Verify the connection is established and receiving broadcasts
# The server will send periodic getTotals data

# Step 5: If the token was from an admin, the getTotals response includes
# all connected clients' selfURI, IP, browser, device ID, user_name, and location

# Step 6: Any user can also enumerate connected users without admin:
# Send: {"msg":"getClientsList","webSocketToken":"TOKEN"}
# Response includes all users_id, isAdmin status, and usernames

Scenario: Demoted admin retains permanent admin WebSocket access

1. Admin user obtains WebSocket token (contains isAdmin: true)
2. Admin is demoted to regular user via the web interface
3. Admin's WebSocket token still works indefinitely, the isAdmin claim in the token is never re-validated
4. Demoted user continues receiving all connected users' IPs, locations, and browsing activity

• Permanent access after credential revocation: Deleted, banned, or suspended users retain WebSocket access with their original identity and privilege level, undermining account lifecycle management.
• Privilege persistence after demotion: Admin users who are demoted retain admin-level WebSocket access indefinitely. The isAdmin flag baked into the token is never re-checked against the database.
• Real-time surveillance via admin tokens: Admin-level tokens expose all connected users' IP addresses, geographic locations (if User_location plugin enabled), current page URLs (selfURI), browser fingerprints, and device IDs, enabling real-time tracking of user activity.
• Extended attack window for token theft: Any vulnerability that leaks a WebSocket token (XSS, log exposure, network interception) provides permanent rather than 12-hour access, significantly increasing the impact of token compromise.
• Identity hijacking: The webSocketToken message type allows using a stolen token to assume another user's identity on new connections, enabling impersonation in chat and messaging.

CVE-2026-34362 has a CVSS score of 5.4 (Medium). The vector is network-reachable, low privileges required, and no user interaction. A CVSS score reflects the worst-case severity of the vulnerability, not your specific exposure. Whether this affects your application depends on whether the vulnerable code is present and reachable in your environment. No fixed version is listed yet, so configuration controls and monitoring matter more in the interim.

Kodem intelligence

Uncomment the timeout enforcement in verifyTokenSocket() at plugin/YPTSocket/functions.php:77-80:

function verifyTokenSocket($token) {
    global $global;
    $obj = _json_decode(decryptString($token));
    if (empty($obj)) {
        _error_log("verifyToken invalid token");
        return false;
    }
    if ($obj->salt !== $global['salt']) {
        _error_log("verifyToken salt fail");
        return false;
    }
    $time = time();
    if (!($time >= $obj->time && $time <= $obj->timeout)) {
        _error_log("verifyToken token timeout time = $time; obj->time = $obj->time; obj->timeout = $obj->timeout");
        return false;  // <-- uncomment this line
    }
    return true;
}

Additionally, consider:

1. Adding an admin check to the getClientsList handler (Message.php:219) so only admins can enumerate connected users.
2. Re-validating the isAdmin claim against the database periodically rather than trusting the token claim for the lifetime of the connection.

1. What is CVE-2026-34362? CVE-2026-34362 is a medium-severity security vulnerability in wwbn/avideo (composer), affecting versions <= 26.0. No fixed version is listed yet.
2. How severe is CVE-2026-34362? CVE-2026-34362 has a CVSS score of 5.4 (Medium). This score reflects the worst-case severity of the vulnerability, not your specific exposure. Whether it represents real risk in your environment depends on whether the vulnerable code is present and reachable.
3. Which versions of wwbn/avideo are affected by CVE-2026-34362? wwbn/avideo (composer) versions <= 26.0 is affected.
4. Is there a fix for CVE-2026-34362? No fixed version is listed for CVE-2026-34362 yet. Monitor the advisory for updates and apply mitigations in the interim.
5. Is CVE-2026-34362 exploitable, and should I be worried? Whether CVE-2026-34362 is exploitable in your environment depends on whether the vulnerable code is present and reachable. A CVSS score is a worst-case rating; it does not account for your specific deployment, configuration, or usage patterns. Kodem, an Intelligent Application Security platform, uses runtime intelligence to show which vulnerabilities actually execute in production, so you can focus on the ones that represent real risk. Get a demo
6. What actually determines whether CVE-2026-34362 is exploitable, and how bad it is? Exploitability and impact are not fixed properties of a CVE. They depend on runtime truth: whether the vulnerable code is present, reachable, and actually executes in your application. A high CVSS score on a dependency that never runs is not the same as real risk. Kodem, an Intelligent Application Security platform, uses runtime intelligence to reveal which vulnerabilities actually execute in production, so teams prioritize the ones that genuinely matter.