GHSA-X92V-RPX6-P6CW

The WhatsApp and Linear bot adapters verify the inbound webhook HMAC signature only
when a secret is configured. When the secret environment variable is unset, the
default on a fresh install and common in development, verification is skipped entirely
and the webhook body is parsed and dispatched as a genuine, trusted event. A remote,
unauthenticated attacker who can reach the bot's webhook endpoint can inject arbitrary
platform events.

Affected code:

WhatsApp - src/praisonai/praisonai/bots/whatsapp.py

• init (line 108): self._app_secret = app_secret or os.environ.get("WHATSAPP_APP_SECRET", "") -> defaults to ""
• route (line 246): app.router.add_post(self._webhook_path, self._handle_webhook) -> default path "/webhook"
• _handle_webhook (lines 585-595): if self._app_secret: gates the ENTIRE check; when falsy the body is
  json.loads()'d and dispatched to _process_webhook_data() with no verification.

Linear - src/praisonai/praisonai/bots/linear.py

• init (line 86): self._signing_secret = signing_secret or os.environ.get("LINEAR_WEBHOOK_SECRET", "") -> ""
• _handle_webhook (lines 244-248): same if self._signing_secret: fail-open guard.
• start() (lines 169-170): only logs a warning; does not fail closed.

The _verify_signature implementations themselves are correct (constant-time HMAC-SHA256);
the defect is that verification is bypassed when the secret is absent.

Impact:

• WhatsApp: attacker POSTs a crafted Meta Cloud API payload spoofing any sender and message
  text; injected into agent sessions and processed as a real user message (prompt injection,
  unauthorized agent/command invocation, contact impersonation).
• Linear: attacker POSTs forged AgentSession / Comment events, causing the agent to act on and
  comment on issues no legitimate event referenced.
  The webhook routes require no other authentication, so exploitation needs only network
  reachability.

Proof of concept (bot started without the secret - the default):

curl -X POST http://VICTIM:PORT/webhook
-H 'Content-Type: application/json'
-d '{"object":"whatsapp_business_account","entry":[{"changes":[{"value":
{"messages":[{"from":"15551234567","id":"wamid.x","type":"text",
"text":{"body":"attacker-injected message"}}]}}]}]}'

A self-contained PoC that executes the real _handle_webhook / _verify_signature source
extracted from the repo confirms: secret unset -> status 200, payload dispatched (VULNERABLE);
secret set + no signature -> status 403, nothing dispatched (control).

Remediation:
Fail closed. When no secret is configured, reject all webhooks (HTTP 403) and refuse to start
the adapter unless a secret is set (or an explicit, clearly-named insecure-dev override is given):

if not self._app_secret:
return web.Response(status=403, text="Webhook secret not configured")
signature = request.headers.get("X-Hub-Signature-256", "")
if not self._verify_signature(body, signature):
return web.Response(status=403, text="Invalid signature")

Distinct from prior advisories:
The accepted default-insecure advisories cover a different surface/mechanism, CALL_SERVER_TOKEN
unset (GHSA-86qc-r5v2-v6x6) and the JWT key default "dev-secret-change-me" (GHSA-3qg8-5g3r-79v5).
This is in the bot webhook adapters and the mechanism is skipping signature verification entirely
when the secret is absent, not a weak default key.

GHSA-X92V-RPX6-P6CW has a CVSS score of 8.6 (High). The vector is network-reachable, no privileges required, and no user interaction. A CVSS score reflects the worst-case severity of the vulnerability, not your specific exposure. Whether this affects your application depends on whether the vulnerable code is present and reachable in your environment. A fixed version is available (4.6.59); upgrading removes the vulnerable code path.

Kodem intelligence

1. What is GHSA-X92V-RPX6-P6CW? GHSA-X92V-RPX6-P6CW is a high-severity security vulnerability in praisonai (pip), affecting versions <= 4.6.52. It is fixed in 4.6.59.
2. How severe is GHSA-X92V-RPX6-P6CW? GHSA-X92V-RPX6-P6CW has a CVSS score of 8.6 (High). This score reflects the worst-case severity of the vulnerability, not your specific exposure. Whether it represents real risk in your environment depends on whether the vulnerable code is present and reachable.
3. Which versions of praisonai are affected by GHSA-X92V-RPX6-P6CW? praisonai (pip) versions <= 4.6.52 is affected.
4. Is there a fix for GHSA-X92V-RPX6-P6CW? Yes. GHSA-X92V-RPX6-P6CW is fixed in 4.6.59. Upgrade to this version or later.
5. Is GHSA-X92V-RPX6-P6CW exploitable, and should I be worried? Whether GHSA-X92V-RPX6-P6CW is exploitable in your environment depends on whether the vulnerable code is present and reachable. A CVSS score is a worst-case rating; it does not account for your specific deployment, configuration, or usage patterns. Kodem, an Intelligent Application Security platform, uses runtime intelligence to show which vulnerabilities actually execute in production, so you can focus on the ones that represent real risk. Get a demo
6. What actually determines whether GHSA-X92V-RPX6-P6CW is exploitable, and how bad it is? Exploitability and impact are not fixed properties of a CVE. They depend on runtime truth: whether the vulnerable code is present, reachable, and actually executes in your application. A high CVSS score on a dependency that never runs is not the same as real risk. Kodem, an Intelligent Application Security platform, uses runtime intelligence to reveal which vulnerabilities actually execute in production, so teams prioritize the ones that genuinely matter.
7. How do I fix GHSA-X92V-RPX6-P6CW? Upgrade praisonai to 4.6.59 or later.