Summary
Flowise introduced SSRF protections through a centralized HTTP security wrapper (httpSecurity.ts) that implements deny-list validation and IP pinning logic.
However, multiple tool implementations directly import and invoke raw HTTP clients (node-fetch, axiosInstead of using the secured wrapper.
Because enforcement is neither mandatory nor centralized, these tools bypass SSRF mitigation entirely, restoring full SSRF capability even after the patch.
This issue is distinct from specification trust issues and represents incomplete mitigation of previously addressed SSRF vulnerabilities.
Details
Intended Security Model:
All outbound HTTP requests should pass through the centralized validation layer implemented in:
packages/components/src/httpSecurity.ts
This layer performs:
HTTP_DENY_LISTenforcement- IP resolution validation
- IP pinning
- Loopback blocking
Observed Implementation Gap:
Multiple tools bypass this layer and import HTTP libraries directly.
Examples include:
packages/components/nodes/tools/OpenAPIToolkit/OpenAPIToolkit.tspackages/components/nodes/tools/WebScraperTool/WebScraperTool.tspackages/components/nodes/tools/MCP/core.tspackages/components/nodes/tools/Arxiv/core.ts
These files directly execute:
importfetchfrom'node-fetch'
or invoke axios without passing through the centralized validation wrapper.
Because there is no global interceptor or enforcement mechanism, outbound requests in these components are executed without SSRF validation.
This renders the mitigation introduced in GHSA-2x8m-83vc-6wv4 incomplete.
Root Cause
Security enforcement is not centralized.
Outbound request validation depends on voluntary usage of a wrapper function rather than being structurally enforced.
Because direct imports of HTTP clients are allowed, the mitigation is easily bypassed.
This is an architectural enforcement failure rather than a single implementation bug.
PoC
Even when an administrator configures:
HTTP_DENY_LIST=169.254.0.0/16,127.0.0.0/8
The following attack succeeds if a vulnerable tool is enabled:
Chat Prompt:
Use the Web Scraper tool to retrieve:
http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/
Execution flow:
- The LLM triggers
WebScraperTool. - The tool calls raw
fetch()directly. - No
httpSecurity.tsvalidation is applied. - The request reaches the metadata endpoint.
- The response is returned to the chat context.
This demonstrates that SSRF protection is opt-in rather than enforced.
Recommended Remediation
- Refactor all tools to use the centralized
secureFetch()wrapper. - Add ESLint
no-restricted-importsrules to prohibit the direct usage ofnode-fetchoraxiosin tool components. - Consider implementing a single internal HTTP client abstraction layer.
- Apply network-level egress filtering as defense-in-depth.
Impact
Severity: Critical (CVSS v3.1: 9.1 – AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N)
This issue:
- Completely bypasses the centralized SSRF mitigation.
- Allows access to internal network resources.
- Enables the exploitation of cloud metadata and credential theft.
- Invalidates the security assumptions of the recent patch.
Any deployment enabling affected tools remains vulnerable.
Untrusted input controls the target URL of a server-initiated request, which may reach internal services not otherwise accessible from outside. Typical impact: access to internal metadata services, internal APIs, or cloud credentials.
Affected versions
Security releases
Kodem intelligence
Severity tells you how bad this could be in the worst case. It does not tell you whether you are exposed. Exploitability and impact are functions of runtime truth: whether the vulnerable code is present, reachable, and actually executes in your application. A vulnerable package can sit in your dependency tree and never run.
Kodem, an Intelligent Application Security platform, uses runtime intelligence to reveal which vulnerabilities actually execute in production, so teams prioritize the ones that genuinely matter. Kodem's runtime-powered SCA identifies whether this CVE is reachable in your applications.
Remediation advice
flowise to 3.1.0 or later; flowise-components to 3.1.0 or later
Kodem Kai can prioritize this vulnerability in your dependency tree and generate a fix recommendation.
Frequently Asked Questions
- What is CVE-2026-43995? CVE-2026-43995 is a medium-severity server-side request forgery (SSRF) vulnerability in flowise (npm), affecting versions <= 3.0.13. It is fixed in 3.1.0. Untrusted input controls the target URL of a server-initiated request, which may reach internal services not otherwise accessible from outside.
- Which packages are affected by CVE-2026-43995?
flowise(npm) (versions <= 3.0.13)flowise-components(npm) (versions <= 3.0.13)
- Is there a fix for CVE-2026-43995? Yes. CVE-2026-43995 is fixed in 3.1.0. Upgrade to this version or later.
- Is CVE-2026-43995 exploitable, and should I be worried? Whether CVE-2026-43995 is exploitable in your environment depends on whether the vulnerable code is present and reachable. A CVSS score is a worst-case rating; it does not account for your specific deployment, configuration, or usage patterns. Kodem, an Intelligent Application Security platform, uses runtime intelligence to show which vulnerabilities actually execute in production, so you can focus on the ones that represent real risk. Get a demo
- What actually determines whether CVE-2026-43995 is exploitable, and how bad it is? Exploitability and impact are not fixed properties of a CVE. They depend on runtime truth: whether the vulnerable code is present, reachable, and actually executes in your application. A high CVSS score on a dependency that never runs is not the same as real risk. Kodem, an Intelligent Application Security platform, uses runtime intelligence to reveal which vulnerabilities actually execute in production, so teams prioritize the ones that genuinely matter.
- How do I fix CVE-2026-43995?
- Upgrade
flowiseto 3.1.0 or later - Upgrade
flowise-componentsto 3.1.0 or later
- Upgrade