CVE-2026-46477 is a high-severity security vulnerability in flowise (npm), affecting versions <= 3.1.1. It is fixed in 3.1.2.
Summary Type: Mass assignment via Object.assign(entity, body) -> client-controlled workspaceId (and on create, id) overwritten on the Dataset entity -> cross-workspace data takeover and IDOR. File: packages/server/src/services/dataset/index.ts Root cause: The Dataset controller/service constructs a new Dataset() and copies the request body into it via Object.assign(...) without an explicit field allowlist. The request body therefore can include workspaceId, id, createdDate, updatedDate. The server only rebinds some of these after the assign (e.g. on create, it overwrites workspaceId but not id; on update, it overwrites id but not workspaceId). The remaining client-controlled values land directly on the persisted row, breaking workspace isolation. Same root pattern as the dataset entity's sibling controllers and as DocumentStore before it was patched in commit 840d2ae. Affected Code File: packages/server/src/services/dataset/index.ts Why it's wrong: Object.assign(target, source) copies every own enumerable property of source onto target. The TypeORM/SQL persistence layer below it does not strip ownership-bearing columns, so workspaceId set in the request body lands as the new workspaceId of the persisted row. The DocumentStore patch (commit 840d2ae) demonstrated the intended fix shape (explicit field-by-field allowlist) but it has not been applied to this entity. Exploit Chain Attacker is an authenticated member of workspace A. They have a session cookie / JWT for the Flowise web UI. State at this point: attacker can read and write entities scoped to workspace A. Attacker creates a dataset in workspace A via the documented API (or reuses an existing one they own). They note its entity id. Attacker issues a PUT /api/v1/datasets/<id> (or equivalent endpoint) with a JSON body that includes "workspaceId": "<workspace-B-id>" (an arbitrary other workspace's UUID). State at this point: the request reaches the controller as a workspace-A authenticated request. The controller calls Object.assign(updateEntity, body). The body's workspaceId overwrites the entity's workspaceId field. The persistence layer commits the row. Final state: the dataset row is now owned by workspace B. Workspace B members can see it, modify it, and use it. Workspace A loses access (it no longer satisfies their workspace filter). The original creator's workspace audit shows nothing because the operation looked like a normal update. Security Impact Severity: High. Cross-workspace boundary violation by any authenticated workspace member. Attacker capability: Any authenticated user with permission to update a dataset can move it to any workspace whose UUID they can guess or enumerate (workspace UUIDs are exposed in many API responses, so enumeration is trivial). Datasets hold training / evaluation data scoped to a workspace. Moving a Dataset across workspaces via workspaceId overwrite exposes the dataset (rows, schema, references) to the destination workspace. Preconditions: Authenticated session with edit permission for the source dataset. No second factor required. Workspace UUIDs are exposed via the /api/v1/workspaces listing or via any cross-referenced object's workspaceId field, so target enumeration is trivial. Differential: PoC-verified by source inspection of the original GHSA-q4pr-4r26-c69r. Patched build (with the suggested fix below) refuses the workspaceId field; vulnerable build accepts it and persists it. Suggested Fix Already fixed in PR https://github.com/FlowiseAI/Flowise/pull/6051 (allowlist pattern applied). Regression tests should assert that a request body containing workspaceId, id, createdDate, or updatedDate is rejected (or at minimum: does not change those columns on the persisted row) for both create and update paths.
npm
flowise (<= 3.1.1)flowise → 3.1.2 (npm)Severity tells you how bad this could be in the worst case. It does not tell you whether you are exposed. Exploitability and impact are functions of runtime truth: whether the vulnerable code is present, reachable, and actually executes in your application. A vulnerable package can sit in your dependency tree and never run.
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CVE-2026-46477 is a high-severity security vulnerability in flowise (npm), affecting versions <= 3.1.1. It is fixed in 3.1.2.
flowise (npm) versions <= 3.1.1 is affected.
Yes. CVE-2026-46477 is fixed in 3.1.2. Upgrade to this version or later.
Whether CVE-2026-46477 is exploitable in your environment depends on whether the vulnerable code is present and reachable. A CVSS score is a worst-case rating; it does not account for your specific deployment, configuration, or usage patterns. Kodem, an Intelligent Application Security platform, uses runtime intelligence to show which vulnerabilities actually execute in production, so you can focus on the ones that represent real risk. Get a demo
Exploitability and impact are not fixed properties of a CVE. They depend on runtime truth: whether the vulnerable code is present, reachable, and actually executes in your application. A high CVSS score on a dependency that never runs is not the same as real risk. Kodem, an Intelligent Application Security platform, uses runtime intelligence to reveal which vulnerabilities actually execute in production, so teams prioritize the ones that genuinely matter.
Upgrade flowise to 3.1.2 or later.