CVE-2026-49343

The account-data trie syncers leak bounded throttler slots on error paths in syncDataTrie(). Each failed trie sync permanently consumes one slot from
the NumGoRoutinesThrottler, and the slot is never returned unless the sync succeeds or the root hash was already present.

I confirmed this on the current default branch develop at commit 9640d63 (observed on May 20, 2026). I also confirmed the bug with a runtime PoC
using the real timeout path in trieSyncer.StartSyncing(): two timed-out sync attempts are enough to exhaust a throttler with capacity 2.

This affects the epoch bootstrap path because syncUserAccountsState() and syncKappAccountsState() create bounded throttlers and abort bootstrap
immediately if the syncer returns an error. Once enough trie-root sync attempts fail, the syncer cannot make forward progress and bootstrap fails.

Affected Components

• data/syncer/userAccountsSyncer.go
• data/syncer/kappAccountsSyncer.go
• data/trie/sync.go
• core/throttler/numGoRoutinesThrottler.go
• core/bootstrap/process.go

Affected Version

Verified on:

• develop HEAD 9640d63

Please check whether the same code is present in supported 1.7.x releases.

Suggested Severity

High

Vulnerability Details

Root Cause

Both account-data syncers call StartProcessing() before creating / starting the trie syncer, but they only call EndProcessing() on the success path
and on the duplicate-root early return.

userAccountsSyncer.syncDataTrie():

func (u *userAccountsSyncer) syncDataTrie(rootHash []byte, ssh data.SyncStatisticsHandler, ctx context.Context) error {
    u.throttler.StartProcessing()

    u.syncerMutex.Lock()
    if _, ok := u.dataTries[string(rootHash)]; ok {
        u.syncerMutex.Unlock()
        u.throttler.EndProcessing()
        return nil
    }

    dataTrie, err := trie.NewTrie(...)
    if err != nil {
        u.syncerMutex.Unlock()
        return err
    }

    trieSyncer, err := trie.NewTrieSyncer(arg)
    if err != nil {
        u.syncerMutex.Unlock()
        return err
    }

    u.syncerMutex.Unlock()

    err = trieSyncer.StartSyncing(rootHash, ctx)
    if err != nil {
        return err
    }

    u.throttler.EndProcessing()
    return nil
}

The same bug exists in kappAccountsSyncer.syncDataTrie().

Missing slot release paths

After StartProcessing(), the following error paths return without EndProcessing():

1. trie.NewTrie(...) returns an error
2. trie.NewTrieSyncer(...) returns an error
3. trieSyncer.StartSyncing(...) returns an error

Why this matters

NumGoRoutinesThrottler is a strict bounded counter:

  func (ngrt *NumGoRoutinesThrottler) CanProcess() bool {
      valCounter := atomic.LoadInt32(&ngrt.counter)
      return valCounter < ngrt.max
  }

  func (ngrt *NumGoRoutinesThrottler) StartProcessing() {
      atomic.AddInt32(&ngrt.counter, 1)
  }

  func (ngrt *NumGoRoutinesThrottler) EndProcessing() {
      atomic.AddInt32(&ngrt.counter, -1)
  }

  Once leaked, a slot remains consumed for the lifetime of that throttler instance.

  The parent loops in both syncers wait for capacity before starting the next account-data trie sync:

  for !u.throttler.CanProcess() {
      select {
      case <-time.After(timeBetweenRetries):
          continue
      case <-ctx.Done():
          return common.ErrTimeIsOut
      }
  }

So after enough failures, further roots stop progressing and the sync operation eventually returns time is out.

Bootstrap impact

Epoch bootstrap uses these syncers directly and aborts on any error:

  err = e.syncUserAccountsState(e.epochStartMeta.Header.TrieRoot)
  if err != nil {
      return nil, nil, err
  }

  err = e.syncKappAccountsState(e.epochStartMeta.Header.KAppsTrieRoot)
  if err != nil {
      return nil, nil, err
  }

The throttlers for these paths are real bounded throttlers created from numConcurrentTrieSyncers.

Proof of Concept

I verified the bug with the real timeout path, not only with a canceled context.

The PoC below uses:

• a real NumGoRoutinesThrottler with capacity 2
• a real trieSyncer.StartSyncing()
• an empty trie-node cache and a request handler that never supplies nodes
• a short sync timeout (1s) so StartSyncing() returns trie.ErrTimeIsOut

After the first failed sync, one slot remains leaked.
After the second failed sync, the throttler is exhausted.

PoC test

  package syncer

  import (
        "context"
        "testing"
        "time"

        commonmock "github.com/klever-io/klever-go/common/mock"
        corethrottler "github.com/klever-io/klever-go/core/throttler"
        "github.com/klever-io/klever-go/data"
        "github.com/klever-io/klever-go/data/trie"
        triestats "github.com/klever-io/klever-go/data/trie/statistics"
        "github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
  )

  func newBaseSyncerForTimeoutPOC(t *testing.T) *baseAccountsSyncer {
        t.Helper()

        storageManager, err := trie.NewTrieStorageManagerWithoutPruning(commonmock.NewMemDbMock())
        require.NoError(t, err)

        return &baseAccountsSyncer{
                hasher:                    commonmock.HasherMock{},
                marshalizer:               &commonmock.MarshalizerMock{},
                trieSyncers:               make(map[string]data.TrieSyncer),
                dataTries:                 make(map[string]data.Trie),
                trieStorageManager:        storageManager,
                requestHandler:            &commonmock.RequestHandlerStub{},
                timeout:                   time.Second,
                cacher:                    commonmock.NewCacherStub(),
                maxTrieLevelInMemory:      5,
                name:                      "timeout-poc",
                maxHardCapForMissingNodes: 1,
        }
  }

  func TestPOC_UserAccountsSyncer_LeaksThrottlerSlotOnTrieTimeout(t *testing.T) {
        thr, err := corethrottler.NewNumGoRoutinesThrottler(2)
        require.NoError(t, err)

        s := &userAccountsSyncer{
                baseAccountsSyncer: newBaseSyncerForTimeoutPOC(t),
                throttler:          thr,
        }

        err = s.syncDataTrie([]byte("missing-root-1"), triestats.NewTrieSyncStatistics(), context.Background())
        require.ErrorIs(t, err, trie.ErrTimeIsOut)
        require.True(t, thr.CanProcess())

        err = s.syncDataTrie([]byte("missing-root-2"), triestats.NewTrieSyncStatistics(), context.Background())
        require.ErrorIs(t, err, trie.ErrTimeIsOut)
        require.False(t, thr.CanProcess())
  }

  func TestPOC_KappAccountsSyncer_LeaksThrottlerSlotOnTrieTimeout(t *testing.T) {
        thr, err := corethrottler.NewNumGoRoutinesThrottler(2)
        require.NoError(t, err)

        s := &kappAccountsSyncer{
                baseAccountsSyncer: newBaseSyncerForTimeoutPOC(t),
                throttler:          thr,
        }

        err = s.syncDataTrie([]byte("missing-root-1"), triestats.NewTrieSyncStatistics(), context.Background())
        require.ErrorIs(t, err, trie.ErrTimeIsOut)
        require.True(t, thr.CanProcess())

        err = s.syncDataTrie([]byte("missing-root-2"), triestats.NewTrieSyncStatistics(), context.Background())
        require.ErrorIs(t, err, trie.ErrTimeIsOut)
        require.False(t, thr.CanProcess())
  }

Command used

  go test ./data/syncer -run 'TestPOC_(User|Kapp)AccountsSyncer_LeaksThrottlerSlotOnTrieTimeout' -count=1

Result

  ok    github.com/klever-io/klever-go/data/syncer      4.005s

This confirms the leak with the real timeout path from trieSyncer.StartSyncing().

Impact

An attacker who can repeatedly cause trie-node sync failures or timeouts during bootstrap can consume the bounded sync throttler until no capacity
remains.

Once enough slots are leaked:

• additional account-data trie sync attempts stop making progress
• the parent loop waits until context timeout
• SyncAccounts() fails
• epoch bootstrap fails

This is a core node availability issue. It affects fresh/restarting nodes and validators that need to bootstrap or resync state.

This is not a theoretical issue:

• StartSyncing() performs network-dependent trie-node retrieval
• it already has explicit timeout / failure paths
• the leaked throttler slots are confirmed by runtime PoC

Recommended Fix

Release the slot with defer immediately after StartProcessing() and cancel the defer only if ownership is intentionally transferred, which is not the
case here.

Example fix pattern:

  func (u *userAccountsSyncer) syncDataTrie(rootHash []byte, ssh data.SyncStatisticsHandler, ctx context.Context) error {
      u.throttler.StartProcessing()
      defer u.throttler.EndProcessing()

      u.syncerMutex.Lock()
      defer u.syncerMutex.Unlock()

      if _, ok := u.dataTries[string(rootHash)]; ok {
          return nil
      }

      dataTrie, err := trie.NewTrie(...)
      if err != nil {
          return err
      }

      trieSyncer, err := trie.NewTrieSyncer(arg)
      if err != nil {
          return err
      }

      u.trieSyncers[string(rootHash)] = trieSyncer
      return trieSyncer.StartSyncing(rootHash, ctx)
  }

The same pattern should be applied to:

• data/syncer/userAccountsSyncer.go
• data/syncer/kappAccountsSyncer.go

References

• data/syncer/userAccountsSyncer.go
• data/syncer/kappAccountsSyncer.go
• data/trie/sync.go
• core/throttler/numGoRoutinesThrottler.go
• core/bootstrap/process.go
• SECURITY.md

Crafted input forces the application to consume excessive CPU, memory, or other resources, degrading or denying service. Typical impact: denial of service.

CVE-2026-49343 has a CVSS score of 5.9 (Medium). The vector is network-reachable, no privileges required, and no user interaction. A CVSS score reflects the worst-case severity of the vulnerability, not your specific exposure. Whether this affects your application depends on whether the vulnerable code is present and reachable in your environment. A fixed version is available (1.7.18); upgrading removes the vulnerable code path.

Kodem intelligence

1. What is CVE-2026-49343? CVE-2026-49343 is a medium-severity uncontrolled resource consumption vulnerability in github.com/klever-io/klever-go (go), affecting versions < 1.7.18. It is fixed in 1.7.18. Crafted input forces the application to consume excessive CPU, memory, or other resources, degrading or denying service.
2. How severe is CVE-2026-49343? CVE-2026-49343 has a CVSS score of 5.9 (Medium). This score reflects the worst-case severity of the vulnerability, not your specific exposure. Whether it represents real risk in your environment depends on whether the vulnerable code is present and reachable.
3. Which versions of github.com/klever-io/klever-go are affected by CVE-2026-49343? github.com/klever-io/klever-go (go) versions < 1.7.18 is affected.
4. Is there a fix for CVE-2026-49343? Yes. CVE-2026-49343 is fixed in 1.7.18. Upgrade to this version or later.
5. Is CVE-2026-49343 exploitable, and should I be worried? Whether CVE-2026-49343 is exploitable in your environment depends on whether the vulnerable code is present and reachable. A CVSS score is a worst-case rating; it does not account for your specific deployment, configuration, or usage patterns. Kodem, an Intelligent Application Security platform, uses runtime intelligence to show which vulnerabilities actually execute in production, so you can focus on the ones that represent real risk. Get a demo
6. What actually determines whether CVE-2026-49343 is exploitable, and how bad it is? Exploitability and impact are not fixed properties of a CVE. They depend on runtime truth: whether the vulnerable code is present, reachable, and actually executes in your application. A high CVSS score on a dependency that never runs is not the same as real risk. Kodem, an Intelligent Application Security platform, uses runtime intelligence to reveal which vulnerabilities actually execute in production, so teams prioritize the ones that genuinely matter.
7. How do I fix CVE-2026-49343? Upgrade github.com/klever-io/klever-go to 1.7.18 or later.