CVE-2026-53523

Summary

Description The getRedirectURL function in oauth2.go:22-29 constructs the OAuth2 callback URL by concatenating the request's Host header with a fixed path, with zero validation of the Host header: File: cmd/dashboard/controller/oauth2.go:22-29 This function is called from oauth2redirect() at line 53: The redirectURL is passed into o2confRaw.Setup(redirectURL) which configures the OAuth2 Config.RedirectURL field (oauth2config.go:22-33). This RedirectURL is sent to the OAuth2 provider (e.g., GitHub, Google, Microsoft) as the callback endpoint. The OAuth2 provider will redirect the user's browser, along with the authorization code, to this URL after the user authenticates. The security issue is that c.Request.Host is directly user-controllable via the HTTP Host header. An attacker who can control which Host header reaches the oauth2redirect handler can: Set Host: evil.com getRedirectURL returns https://evil.com/api/v1/oauth2/callback The OAuth2 provider redirects the victim's auth code to evil.com The attacker's server at evil.com captures the auth code The attacker exchanges the code for an access token, binding the victim's OAuth identity to the attacker's dashboard account The scheme detection (lines 24-27) uses X-Forwarded-Proto and the Referer header, both of which are also user-controllable in certain configurations, so the attacker can force https:// scheme in the redirect URL. The oauth2callback handler at line 129 later uses state.RedirectURL (which is stored in singleton.Cache at line 65) when calling exchangeOpenId at line 152. The cached redirectURL was set during the initial oauth2redirect call, tying the attack flow together. PoC A conceptual attack (no Docker needed): Prerequisites for full exploit: The victim must click the attacker's crafted link The OAuth2 provider must accept the attacker's domain as a valid redirect URI (some providers accept https:/// or allow wildcards; others are strict) Impact Account takeover: an attacker who intercepts the OAuth2 authorization code can bind the victim's OAuth identity (GitHub, Google, GitLab, etc.) to their own dashboard account, gaining the victim's access level and permissions Privilege escalation: if the victim is an admin, the attacker gains full administrative control over the Nezha deployment, access to all servers, credentials, and configuration Persistence: once bound, the attacker retains access even if the victim resets their password (unless they also unbind the OAuth2 identity) The attack complexity is higher than typical Host header injection scenarios because it requires: The Host header to reach the dashboard's handler unmodified (bypassing reverse proxy normalization) The OAuth2 provider to have loose redirect URL validation User interaction (the victim must authenticate) However, the code-level vulnerability is unambiguous: the application trusts attacker-controlled input (Host header) for a security-critical URL that participates in the OAuth2 authorization code flow. Remediation Validate the Host header against a configured allowlist of known dashboard hostnames: go func getRedirectURL(c gin.Context) string { host := c.Request.Host if !singleton.Conf.IsAllowedHost(host) { host = singleton.Conf.DashboardBaseURL // fallback } // ... } Pin the redirect URL to the configured dashboard URL from singleton.Conf instead of deriving it from the request Host header: go func getRedirectURL(c gin.Context) string { return singleton.Conf.DashboardBaseURL + "/api/v1/oauth2/callback" } Remove Host header-based URL construction entirely, the OAuth2 redirect URL should be deterministic based on server configuration, not dynamic per-request Add Host header validation middleware for all OAuth2-related endpoints as defense-in-depth

Impact

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Remediation advice