Summary
Budibase: Mass Assignment in Webhook Trigger Allows Cross-Workspace Automation Execution via appId Override
The webhook trigger endpoint in Budibase is publicly accessible and passes the full HTTP request body into automation execution parameters. A mass assignment vulnerability in externalTrigger() allows an attacker to overwrite the internal appId property by including it in the webhook POST body. When the automation is processed asynchronously (the default path for webhooks without a collect step), the worker executes the attacker-defined automation in the context of the victim's workspace, granting full read/write access to the victim's database.
Details
The webhook trigger route is registered as a public endpoint with no authentication:
// packages/server/src/api/routes/webhook.ts:12
publicRoutes.post("/api/webhooks/trigger/:instance/:id", controller.trigger)
The controller passes the raw request body as fields alongside the server-derived appId:
// packages/server/src/api/controllers/webhook.ts:142-148
await triggers.externalTrigger(target, {
fields: {
...ctx.request.body, // attacker-controlled
body: ctx.request.body,
},
appId: prodAppId, // server-controlled
})
In externalTrigger(), for webhook-triggered automations, params.fields is spread back into params:
// packages/server/src/automations/triggers.ts:237-241
params = {
...params, // appId: prodAppId (server-controlled)
...params.fields, // appId: VICTIM_ID (attacker-controlled, overwrites above)
fields: {},
}
Because params.fields is spread after params, any key in the attacker's body overwrites the corresponding property in params. An attacker including "appId": "app_VICTIM_WORKSPACE_ID" in the POST body overwrites the legitimate, server-derived appId.
The contaminated params become data.event and are queued asynchronously:
// packages/server/src/automations/triggers.ts:244,271
const data: AutomationData = { automation, event: params }
// ...
return quotas.addAction(() => automationQueue.add(data, JOB_OPTS))
The async worker uses job.data.event.appId to set the workspace context:
// packages/server/src/threads/automation.ts:917,929-930
const workspaceId = job.data.event.appId // attacker-controlled
// ...
return await context.doInAutomationContext({
workspaceId, // victim's workspace
automationId,
task: async () => { /* automation steps run here */ }
})
The synchronous path (for webhooks with a collect step) correctly overwrites appId at triggers.ts:264:
data.event = {
...data.event,
appId: context.getWorkspaceId(), // server-controlled fix
automation,
}
This proves the developers intended appId to be server-controlled but missed applying the same fix to the async path, which is the default for all webhooks without a collect step.
PoC
Prerequisites: Attacker has builder access to their own Budibase workspace and knows a victim workspace ID (format: app_<uuid>).
Step 1: Attacker creates an automation in their own workspace with a webhook trigger and data-exfiltration steps (e.g., Query Rows → Execute Script to send data externally).
Step 2: Attacker creates a webhook for that automation and notes the webhook URL:
POST /api/webhooks/trigger/<ATTACKER_INSTANCE>/<WEBHOOK_ID>
Step 3: Attacker triggers the webhook with the victim's workspace ID injected into the body:
curl -X POST https://budibase.example.com/api/webhooks/trigger/app_ATTACKER_ID/wh_WEBHOOK_ID \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-d '{"appId": "app_VICTIM_WORKSPACE_ID", "normalData": "test"}'
Expected result: The automation defined in the attacker's workspace executes in the context of the victim's workspace. All database operations (Query Rows, Create Row, Delete Row, Execute Script, etc.) operate on the victim's data.
Additional overridable fields via the same mechanism:
timeout(automation.ts:443-444): override automation execution timeoutuser(automation.ts:413,435): set user context for automation stepsmetadata.automationChainCount(automation.ts:293): bypass chain depth limits
Impact
An attacker with builder access to their own Budibase workspace can execute arbitrary automations (of their own design) in the context of any other workspace on the same Budibase instance, provided they know the victim's workspace ID. This enables:
- Full data exfiltration: Query Rows steps read all tables in the victim's workspace
- Data manipulation: Create Row, Update Row, Delete Row steps modify victim data
- Arbitrary code execution in victim context: Execute Script steps run JavaScript with access to victim's environment variables and database
- Cross-tenant boundary violation: In multi-tenant deployments (Budibase Cloud), the tenant ID is derived from the workspace ID, so the attack crosses tenant boundaries
The attack requires no authentication (the webhook endpoint is public) and leaves minimal audit trail since the automation execution is attributed to the attacker's automation definition but runs in the victim's context.
CVE-2026-54351 has a CVSS score of 8.2 (High). The vector is network-reachable, low privileges required, and no user interaction. A CVSS score reflects the worst-case severity of the vulnerability, not your specific exposure. Whether this affects your application depends on whether the vulnerable code is present and reachable in your environment. A fixed version is available (3.39.9); upgrading removes the vulnerable code path.
Affected versions
Security releases
Kodem intelligence
Severity tells you how bad this could be in the worst case. It does not tell you whether you are exposed. Exploitability and impact are functions of runtime truth: whether the vulnerable code is present, reachable, and actually executes in your application. A vulnerable package can sit in your dependency tree and never run.
Kodem, an Intelligent Application Security platform, uses runtime intelligence to reveal which vulnerabilities actually execute in production, so teams prioritize the ones that genuinely matter. Kodem's runtime-powered SCA identifies whether this CVE is reachable in your applications.
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In packages/server/src/automations/triggers.ts, apply the same appId fix that exists in the synchronous path to the async path as well. The fix should ensure appId is always server-controlled before queuing:
// packages/server/src/automations/triggers.ts:244-272
const data: AutomationData = { automation, event: params }
// ... trigger filter check ...
+ // Ensure appId is always server-controlled, not user-supplied
+ data.event.appId = context.getWorkspaceId()
if (getResponses) {
data.event = {
...data.event,
appId: context.getWorkspaceId(),
automation,
}
return quotas.addAction(() =>
executeInThread({ data } as AutomationJob, { onProgress })
)
} else {
return quotas.addAction(() => automationQueue.add(data, JOB_OPTS))
}
Alternatively, use an allowlist approach for the webhook field spread to prevent any internal property from being overwritten:
// packages/server/src/automations/triggers.ts:237-241
const { appId, timeout, user, metadata, ...safeFields } = params.fields
params = {
...params,
...safeFields,
fields: {},
}
Frequently Asked Questions
- What is CVE-2026-54351? CVE-2026-54351 is a high-severity security vulnerability in @budibase/server (npm), affecting versions < 3.39.9. It is fixed in 3.39.9.
- How severe is CVE-2026-54351? CVE-2026-54351 has a CVSS score of 8.2 (High). This score reflects the worst-case severity of the vulnerability, not your specific exposure. Whether it represents real risk in your environment depends on whether the vulnerable code is present and reachable.
- Which versions of @budibase/server are affected by CVE-2026-54351? @budibase/server (npm) versions < 3.39.9 is affected.
- Is there a fix for CVE-2026-54351? Yes. CVE-2026-54351 is fixed in 3.39.9. Upgrade to this version or later.
- Is CVE-2026-54351 exploitable, and should I be worried? Whether CVE-2026-54351 is exploitable in your environment depends on whether the vulnerable code is present and reachable. A CVSS score is a worst-case rating; it does not account for your specific deployment, configuration, or usage patterns. Kodem, an Intelligent Application Security platform, uses runtime intelligence to show which vulnerabilities actually execute in production, so you can focus on the ones that represent real risk. Get a demo
- What actually determines whether CVE-2026-54351 is exploitable, and how bad it is? Exploitability and impact are not fixed properties of a CVE. They depend on runtime truth: whether the vulnerable code is present, reachable, and actually executes in your application. A high CVSS score on a dependency that never runs is not the same as real risk. Kodem, an Intelligent Application Security platform, uses runtime intelligence to reveal which vulnerabilities actually execute in production, so teams prioritize the ones that genuinely matter.
- How do I fix CVE-2026-54351? Upgrade
@budibase/serverto 3.39.9 or later.